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Organizations often possess data that they wish to make public for the common
good. Yet such published data often contains sensitive personal information, posing
serious privacy threat to individuals. Anonymization is a process of removing identi-
fiable information from the data, and yet to preserve as much data utility as possible
for accurate data analysis. Due to the importance of privacy, in recent years, re-
searchers were attracted to design new privacy models and anonymization algorithms
for privacy preserving data publication. Despite of their efforts, there are still many
outstanding problems remain to be solved.
We aim to contribute to the state-of-the-art data anonymization schemes with an
emphasis on different data models for data publication. Specifically, we study and
propose new data anonymization schemes for three mostly investigated data types by
the literature, namely set-valued data, social graph data, and relational data. These
three types of data are commonly encountered in our daily life, thus the privacy for
their publication is of crucial importance. Examples of the three types of data are
grocery transaction records, relationship data in online social networks, and census
data by the government, respectively.
We have adapted two common approaches to data anonymization, i.e. perturba-
tion and generalization. For set-valued data publication, we propose a nonreciporical
anonymization scheme that yields higher utility than existing approaches based on
reciporical coding. An important reason why we can achieve better utility is that we
generate a utility-efficient order for the dataset using techniques such as Gray sort,
TSP reordering and dynamic partitioning, so that similar records are grouped during
iii
anonymization. We also propose a superior model for data publishing which allows
more utility to be preserved than other approaches such as entry suppression.
For social graph publication, we study the effectiveness of using random edge per-
turbation as privacy protection scheme. Previous research rejects using random edge
perturbation for preventing the structural attack of social graph for the reason that
random edge perturbation severely destroys the graph utilities. In contrary, we show
that, by exploiting the statistical properties of random edge perturbation, it is possi-
ble to accurately recover important graph utilities such as density, transitivity, degree
distribution and modularity from the perturbed graph using estimation algorithms.
Then we show that based on the same principle, the attackers can launch a more
sophisticated interval-walk attack which yields higher probability of success than the
conventional walk-based attack. We study the conditions for preventing interval-walk
attack and more general structural attack using random perturbation.
For relational data publication, we propose a novel pattern preserving anonymi-
zation scheme based on perturbation. Using our scheme, the owner can define a set
of Properties of Interest (PoIs) which he wishes to preserve for the original data.
These PoIs are described as linear relationships among the data points. During ano-
nymization, our scheme ensures the predefined patterns to be strictly preserved while
making the anonymized data sufficiently randomized. Traditional generalization and
perturbation based approaches either completely blind or obfuscate the patterns. The
resulted data is ideal for data mining tasks such as clustering, or ranking which re-
quires the preservation of relative distances. Extensive experimental results based on
both synthetic and real data are presented to verify the effectiveness of our solutions.
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Organizations such as hospitals, companies or government agencies often possess use-
ful data that needs to be published. In some cases, these data needs to be published
for the common good of general public or the research by other organizations. For
example, the medical data kept by hospitals is useful for medical research to find the
association between a disease and a particular class of population [21]; transactional
records owned by a super-market can be useful for discovering the customers’ con-
sumption trends [20]; social network data owned by online social network companies
such as Facebook and LinkedIn is useful for designing marketing schemes based on the
social impacts of individuals [27]. In other cases, these data needs to be published by
the organizations due to the requirement of law. For example, in California, licensed
hospitals are mandated to submit the demographic information of their patients to
government authorities [74]. While containing useful information, the published data
often holds sensitive information of individuals and it may lead to privacy breach if
these data is published without any pre-processing. To overcome the problem, pri-
1
vacy preserving data publication schemes, e.g. [75, 59, 82, 38, 55] were developed
by researchers with the primary goal of maintaining the practical usability of the
data when it is published while preserving individual privacy. The basic procedure
in privacy preserving data publication is called anonymization, which is removing or
controlling the disclosure of identifiable information in the published data so that the
sensitive information cannot be linked to a particular individual.
The privacy preserving data publication is a complex topic with many chal-
lenges [33]. Over the years, researchers have contributed to the various aspects of
privacy preserving data publication. For example, there is work that focuses on the
efficiency of the algorithms, e.g. [38, 52]; there is work that addresses the issues of
data re-publication, e.g. [34, 83]; there is also work that aims to achieve better util-
ity and privacy tradeoff, e.g. [67, 82, 81]. Above all, the types of the underlying
data to be published have great impact over the design of anonymization algorithms
and privacy models. Therefore, it is critical to examine the characteristics of these
data. The pioneering privacy models, e.g. k-anonymity [75], l-diversity [59] and
t-closeness [55] were initially proposed for publishing relational data. As the research
move forward, researchers have developed similar privacy models for other types of
data, such as set-valued data, social graph data, textual data and moving object
data [33], because similar privacy issues also occur in the publication of these types
of data. Besides of the relational data, the set-valued data [40, 37, 17, 89, 77] and the
social graph data [58, 98, 14, 99] have attracted most of the research efforts due to
their broad usage in daily life. Despite of the efforts, there are still many outstanding
problems to be solved. Before elaborating some of these problems in Section 1.1, we
first outline these three main data types:
2
Name Age Weight Disease
Alice 42 66 Gastritis
Derek 40 76 Diabetes
Bob 49 73 Pneumonia
Ginny 54 68 Gastritis
Harry 55 53 Pneumonia
Peter 60 66 Alzheimer
Table 1.1: Example of relational data
Relational Data. The relational, set-valued and social graph are common data
types seen in our daily life. Relational data is a type of data which is similar to the
tabular data that appears in the relational databases. A data in relational model
consists a set of records where each record can be characterised by a fixed set of
attributes, either numerical or categorical. This is a simple and yet powerful model
that is suitable for describing the object entities that can be characterised by a set of
parameters. Depending on its semantic, a numerical attribute takes a value from a
range of real numbers. For example, the age of a person is usually an integer in the
range 1 to 100. On the other hand, a categorical attribute takes a value from a set of
categories. For example, the gender of a person is usually either male or female. The
main difference of the two types of attributes during anonymization is that while the
values of numerical attributes are comparable and have an total order, the values of
categorical attributes usually are not. Table 1.1 shows an example of relational model
with a medical data, in which each row corresponds to a medical record of a person
attributed by the person’s age, weight and disease. Note that the disease information
is sensitive, and may raise privacy concern if the data is published directly.
Set-valued Data. In a set-valued data, each record corresponds to a set of items
3
drawn from a universe of items. For example, the set of goods purchased in a super-
market by a person such as apple, milk, meat and towel, can be represented as a
record in set-valued form. Note that a set-valued data can also be associated with
a sensitive information, similar to the disease information in the medical data as in
Table 1.1. Table 1.2 shows an example of a set-valued data which is the favorite
sport activities by a group of people and their religions. In this table, the religion
of each person is considered as the sensitive information of the data. Naturally, the
favorite sports by each person are represented as a list of activities following the
set-valued data model. Unlike the relational data which usually has a fixed schema
(e.g.Table 1.1) and the attribute values can be either numerical or categorical, the
set valued data only consists of records with variable number of items which usually
fall into the same class (e.g. the types of sports as in Table 1.2). Although similar
privacy models can be defined for both relational data and set-valued data, the design
of anonymization algorithms for set-valued data is usually more challenging than
for the relational data. There are two characteristics of the set-valued data that
crucially make the anonymization of set-valued data a different problem from the
anonymization of relational-data. First, unlike relational data which usually has a
small number of attributes, the set-valued data often has a large dimensionality,
e.g. as large as all types of sports in the world. Second, the number of items in a
record is relative small compared to the size of universe, e.g. a person normally has
very limited number of favorite sports. These two characteristics, when combined,
make the finding of similar records for forming an anonymization group much more
difficult than for the relational data. Therefore, special techniques, e.g. the use of
encodings [38], or more constrained priority knowledge models [89] need to be adapted
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when designing anonymization algorithms for set-valued data.
Name Activities Religion
Alice jogging, swimming Christian
Derek swimming, tennis Christian
Bob jogging, swimming, soccer Muslim
Ginny swimming, tennis, soccer Buddhist
Harry jogging, swimming, tennis Buddhist
Peter jogging, tennis, swimming Muslim




Figure 1.1: Example of social graph data
Social Graph Data. As social networking becomes popular, researchers have
started to examine various issues in publishing the social graph data, e.g. [7, 46, 65],
and mechanisms to protect the privacy, e.g. [58, 98, 14, 99]. A social graph is typ-
ically modeled as a graph that consists of nodes and edges, where nodes usually
represent the involved persons and edges represent the existence of relationships be-
tween persons. Figure 1.1 shows an example of a small social graph data. Although
a social graph data can be represented an adjacency list and a binary matrix, making
it similar to set-valued data or relational data, we emphasize that the anonymiza-
tion algorithms for set-valued data or relational data usually cannot be used directly
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to anonymize social graph data. The main reason is that the primary information
contained in a social graph data is structure, whereas the primary information con-
tained in relational data or set-valued data is the values of individual records. The
anonymization algorithms for relational and set-valued data usually aims to anony-
mize individual records, and may fail prevent to prevent the attack of an adversary
who owns structural background knowledge. Further, anonymization algorithms for
relational or set-valued data usually focus on minimizing the distortion to the values
of individual records and do not to care about structural changes, thus may compro-
mise the value of the social graph data for data mining applications. Therefore, the
anonymization of social graph data is addressed separately and independently from
the anonymization of relational data and set-valued data.
1.1 Privacy issues of multi-type data in data pub-
lication
Despite of the multiple data types in data publication, we observe that there exist the
following common information in their data that would be exploited for compromising
privacy:
1. The data contains identifiable or partial identifiable information The data
contains information that can be linked to the identity of specific person or a
group of people. In normal circumstance, as part of privacy protection, the
name or ID of a person is taken out from the data. This process is called na¨ıve
anonymization. However, the data may still contain partial identifiable infor-
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mation such as age, race, gender, post code, location, and friends and etc. Since
the partial identifiable information of a person in a particular group could be
unique, it is possible to re-identify a person by knowing the partial identifiable
information of that person.
2. The data contains sensitive information Sensitive information alone does not
necessarily create privacy problems. However, when a sensitive information is
linked to a specific person, e.g. via the partial identifiable information, the pri-
vacy problem is created. For example, knowing the lung cancer rate among the
population of a city does not violate anyone’s privacy, but knowing a specific
person contracting lung cancer without a consent generally violates his privacy.
If a data have the above two vulnerable information, an adversary who possesses
partial identifiable information about a person implied in the data can compromise
the sensitive information of that person. In the following sub-sections, we present the
background of privacy issues for publishing relational, set-valued, and social graph
data, respectively and review some common approaches to address the problems.
We also briefly describe how our work is different from others. In Section 1.2, we
summarize our contributions in more detail.
1.1.1 Relational data publication
The problem of publishing relational data was first noted and addressed by L. Sweeney
in [75]. We use an example in Figure 1.2(a), which is a set of medical data of a few
anonymous patients owned by a hospital, to illustrate the problem. As pointed out
by L. Sweeney in [75], although the names of the patients have been removed from
7
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(b) Voters registration list
Figure 1.2: Privacy violation in medical data publication
the data, there is still potential privacy risk in publishing the data directly. The
reason is that the data still contains partial identifiable information such as age,
birthday, gender, and zip code, which can be used to match against other background
knowledge to re-identify a person. The background knowledge usually consists the
name of a person and his partial-identifiable information such as the ones included in
the medical records, and can be easily acquired by either knowing a person or through
publicly available datasets. For example, according to L. Sweeney [75], the public
voters registration list, in the form of Figure 1.2(b), can be purchased with twenty
dollars from the market. As we see, there are three attributes, birth date, gender and
zip code that are common to both the medical records and voters registration list. By
matching the two data, one can identify the record for Ginny in the voters registration
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Figure 1.3: Anonymized table based on k-anonymity for k=2
list that matches with the record whose contracted disease is cancer. Therefore, it
can be deduced that with very high probability that Ginny has contracted cancer and
such act violates her personal privacy. Such problem has been posing a real privacy
threat to the society: the result of study in [43] shows that 63% of the U.S. population
can be uniquely identified based on one’s reported gender, ZIP code and full birth
date in the year 2000 census data.
To better protect the privacy in relational data publication, L. Sweeney [75] has
proposed a privacy model k-anonymity that addresses the above re-identification
problem. Based on the suggested data publishing model, hospitals should modify
the data in the medical records before publishing so that each record can only be
re-identified among at least k other records by the partial identifiable information.
For example, the sample medical records in Figure 1.2(a) has been modified to the
one in Figure 1.3 to satisfy k = 2 according to the k-anonymity model. The way to
modify the records is either replacing some specific values with a general wildcard
character * , or generalizing specific values to range values. This way of replacing
the original value with a broader range of possible values including the original one is
called generalization. After generalization, each record is no longer unique as the par-
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tial identifiable information concerns: for each record, there is another record which
has exactly the same partial identifiable information. In this context, the partial
identifiable attribute values are also known as quasi-identifiers (QIs) and the set of
records that have the same QI are said to be in the same equivalent-classes (EC). The
effect of modification is that when someone matches against the anonymized medical
records with his background knowledge, he can no longer pinpoint the exact record
that correspond to a person. In the voters registration list example in Figure 1.2,
anyone can deduce that the medical record correspond to Ginny is one of the last
two records (in Figure 1.3). In this way, Ginny’s real disease is concealed by the
k-anonymity model under the parameter k = 2 when the anonymized medical data
is published. In practice, the k parameter can be set to an appropriate value based
on the sensitivity of the data. A larger k value a implies stronger privacy protection.
Besides of achieving the privacy assurance as specified by the privacy model, there
is another basic requirement that any anonymization algorithm should meet, which is
the preservation of data utility. Since the anonymized medical data is later to be used
for some specific purposes by organizations such as medical research or for revising
national health care policy, it is important to ensure that the modification does not
affect much the quality of data analysis. Over the last a few years, many research
work [81, 87, 67, 57, 51, 50, 13, 38, 62, 3] are devoted to algorithms that minimize
the utility loss due to anonymization based on the k-anonymity model.
The k-anonymity has its own drawback as a privacy protection method. The
problem with k-anonymity is that it does not specify the distribution of sensitive
values among the records with the same partial identifiable information, leading to
privacy breaches when the distribution lacks of diversity. For example, in the ano-
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nymized records in Figure 1.3 in which disease is sensitive information, the first two
records who have the same QIs after anonymization are in the same EC. By matching
against background knowledge about a victim, e.g. Harry, whose QIs match the first
two records according to the Voters registration list in Figure 1.2(b), one can only
know that the Harry’s medical record is one of the two. However, in this particular
case, the disease information for both records are Gastritis. Therefore, without the
need of identifying the exact record, one can still infer the disease information of
Harry. Due to this flaw, other privacy models such as l-diversity [59], t-closeness [55]
were proposed to avoid such problem. These models improve k-anonymity model by
specifying constraints on the distribution of sensitive values with in an EC, ensuring
there is sufficient diversity of sensitive values in any EC. The algorithms supporting
these model group records into the same EC only if their sensitive values distribu-
tion satisfy the predefined distribution. Therefore, the first two records in Figure 1.3
which result an problematic EC using k-anonymity model is never grouped into the
same EC using these models.
Very recently, a class of data publishing schemes based on differential privacy [30,
28] have been proposed. Generally speaking, differential privacy limits the confidence
of an adversary of inferring the existence of a particular record when querying a
database, even the adversary has the complete knowledge about all other records in
the database. Despite of the general purpose of differential privacy, it can also be
applied to relational data publication [30, 85]. These methods [30, 85] first map the
dataset to a frequency matrixM where each entry is the count of number of instances
under the corresponding attributes, and algorithmically add noise to M and produce
a M ′. Finally, instead of publishing dataset with individual records, the frequency
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matrix M ′ is published for data analytics.
Despite that state-of-the-art approaches supporting generalization based (e.g. [38,
81, 55]) and differential privacy based models (e.g. [30, 85]) can be used to transform
data to meet certain privacy guarantee while well retaining the original distribution of
the data, we observe that such approaches severely destroy the internal relationships
for the records within the same EC. For example, the first two anonymized records in
Figure 1.3 are totally indistinguishable resulting the complete loss of relative distance
(e.g. the Euclidean distance in the data space) between the two records. The relative
distance is useful for data mining tasks such as clustering or ranking. The need for
these data mining tasks motivates us to design new anonymization algorithms that
better preserve relative distance information.
In this thesis, we take the initiative to propose a different perturbation based
approach for anonymizing relational data, which allows the Euclidean distance infor-
mation to be better preserved.
1.1.2 Set-valued data publication
The privacy problem in publishing set-valued data is very similar to that of publishing
relational data, i.e. the background knowledge about the existence of certain items of
a record that corresponds to a person can be used to uniquely identify the person in
the record. In Table 1.3 we show a na¨ıvely anonymized data for the set-valued data
in Table 1.2. Although the names of persons in the table have been removed, there
is still privacy problem if this table is directly published. For example, if someone
knows that Harry likes jogging, swimming and tennis and does not like soccer, he
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can uniquely identify that the record r5 corresponds to Harry and learn that his
religion is Buddhist which may violate his privacy. The privacy of publishing set-
valued data can be protecting using similar mechanisms as for relational data. In
Table 1.4, we show the result of anonymization of the set-valued data in Table 1.3
using k-anonymity model with k = 3. In this anonymized table, we have replaced the
values of certain entries in the original table with the wildcard character * to indicate
that the value of the corresponding entry could be either 0 or 1. The result is that two
equivalent-classes were created and each record can be re-identified with probability
1
3
. Similar to relational data, there is also diversity problem in the sensitive values
within an equivalent-class. In this example, since in each equivalent-class there are
three distinct sensitive values, the anonymized table also satisfies l-diversity with
l = 3. Naturally, it follows that there is also algorithms for set-valued data which
aim to achieve t-closeness, e.g. [16].
ID Jogging Swimming Tennis Soccer Religion
r1 1 1 0 0 Christian
r2 0 1 1 0 Christian
r3 1 1 0 1 Muslim
r4 0 1 1 1 Buddhist
r5 1 1 1 0 Buddhist
r6 1 0 1 1 Muslim
Table 1.3: Original set-valued data after na¨ıve anonymization
The anonymization algorithms for set-valued data usually make use of the char-
acteristics of set-valued data. For example, as usually the universe of all items in a
set-valued data is typicaly large, e.g. all types of salable items in a super-market, it
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ID Jogging Swimming Tennis Soccer Religion
r1 1 1 * * Christian
r3 1 1 * * Muslim
r5 1 1 * * Buddhist
r2 * * 1 * Christian
r4 * * 1 * Buddhist
r6 * * 1 * Muslim
Table 1.4: Data anonymized by suppression
is fair to assume that an adversary only knows the existence or non-exisitence of a
subset of all items of a record. Therefore, the work in [77] proposes a privacy model
which assumes that an adversary knows at most m items in any record where m is a
configurable parameter. For another example, since all entries of set-valued data are
either 1 or 0 in its tabular view, it is therefore possible to use some coding algorithms
during the anonymization to improve the utility under certain privacy guarantee. The
work in [40] proposes an anonymization algorithm for set-valued data which employs
techniques such as band matrix transformation and Gray coding.
For any anonymization algorithm, utility preservation is always a goal to pursue.
Especially, for set-valued data, as the dimensionality of the data is usually high,
maintaining low information loss during anonymization is very challenging [1]. In
this thesis, we propose a nonreciprocal anonymization scheme similar to [81] for set-
valued data. In reciprocal scheme, there exists strict non-overlapping partitions of
the data known as equivalent class for the purpose of generalization. On the other
hand, a nonreciprocal scheme allows overlapping groups to be used for generalization
without sacrificing privacy guarantee. The loosen of constraint allows more utility
to be yield during the data anonymization using nonreciprocal scheme than using
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reciprocal scheme.
The data anonymized by our algorithm yields higher utility compared to the state-
of-the-art. We also propose a new data publication model that better benefits the
utility of the published data than conventional schemes.
1.1.3 Social graph data publication
In social graph data publication, two pioneering work [7, 46] have shown that na¨ıve
anonymization by simply removing the names of the persons in the graph is insufficient
to protect the privacy, as an adversary may still use structural background knowledge
to re-identify a person and compromises his relationship privacy. For example, Fig-
ure 1.4(a) shows an fragment of original social graph, where each node corresponds
a person with a name. The edge between two nodes represents the friendship rela-
tionship between the two persons. Before publishing the data, the social graph data
owner, e.g. a social network platform company, removes the names labeled on the
nodes, and obtains a na¨ıvely anonymized data as in Figure 1.4(b) which is thought
to be an adequate measure for privacy protection. As illustrated in [46], structural
information about a victim node, such as the node’s degree, the sequence of degrees
of the node’s neighbors and the subgraph that the node is embedded in can be used
to re-identify the node through the na¨ıvely anonymized graph. In our example, sup-
pose an adversary wants to re-identify the node of Alice from the anonymized graph
and he also knows that Alice has only one friend in the graph, then he can deduce
that the node labeled ‘1’ corresponds to Alice as this is the only node has degree 1
in the graph. If the adversary also knows that Ginny has three friends, and each of
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his friend has three, five and four friends respectively, then the adversary can deduce
node ‘7’ corresponds to Ginny as it is the only node that satisfies the constraint.
By successfully re-identified Alice’s and Ginny’s nodes, the adversary further infer
that Alice and Ginny share a common friend (node ‘6’) which could be a sensitive
information. L. Backstrom et. al. [7] have demonstrated how to launch a realistic
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(a) Original subgraph (b) Subgraph after na¨ıve anonymization
Figure 1.4: Example of social graph
To prevent the structural attack in social graph data publishing, researchers have
proposed various protection mechanisms. These techniques generally fall into two
classes: 1) Random perturbation based approach. 2) Structural similarity based
approach. In random perturbation based approaches [46, 45, 10], the social graph is
modified randomly or semi-randomly [95] by adding and removing edges so that the
adversary cannot re-identify victims’ nodes using structural background knowledge.
In structural similarity based approach, similar to the generalization based approach
for relational data, the anonymization process aims to achieve some privacy guarantee
that is similar to k-anonymity for relational data. For example, there is work for
achieving k-degree similarity [58], in which the graph is modified so that each node
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can identified with at most 1
k
probability by its degree value. There is also work on k-
neighborhood similarity [98], so that any node is indistinguishable in the anonymized
graph among at least k nodes as its neighborhood structure is concerned. There are
also work that achieve k-automorphism [99] or k-isomorphism, in which any node
is indistinguishable in the anonymized graph among at least k nodes using graph
automorphism or isomorphism respectively.
Interestingly, [95] has rejected using random edge perturbation for social graph
anonymization by showing that random edge perturbation severely destroys graph
utilities such as density, degree distribution, transitivity and etc. However, the au-
thors in [4] have shown that the distribution of relational data can be recovered after
perturbation. Following similar idea, we find that by exploring probabilistic proper-
ties of random edge perturbation these graph utilities can be accurately recovered.
Following the same principle, we also show that the attacker can launch more sophis-
ticated attack with higher success rate than the walk-based attack in [7]. We further
analyze the condition for preventing such attack using random edge perturbation.
1.2 Research Contributions and Thesis Organiza-
tion
As noted in the last section, there exists privacy problems in data publication of set-
valued, relational and social graph data despite of recent research efforts. The cause
of these problems would be elaborated as follows: the partial identifiable information
contained in the data can be matched against with certain background knowledge to
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re-identify a person whom can then be linked to a particular sensitive information.
Naturally, the prevention approaches for these multi-type data are also very similar.
Generally, these prevention approaches provide privacy protection either by modifying
the data to achieve certain level of similarity, e.g. generalization based approach
or randomizing the data to make the records hardly distinguishable, e.g. random
perturbation based approach. In this thesis, we address important privacy problems in
the data publication of set-value, social graph and relational data, respectively and
try to enhance the state-of-the-art. For set-valued data we adapt generalization based
approach and for social graph and relational we adapt perturbation based approach.
The contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
• Nonreciprocal Generalization for Set-valued Data As we explained by
example in Section 1.1.2 that a person can be re-identified via the knowl-
edge on a subset of items contained in the corresponding record. Previous
research [40, 37, 17, 89, 78, 47] has focused on either proposing new privacy
models or algorithms for better trade-off between privacy and utility. Recently,
there is a class of nonreciprocal generalization schemes [42, 81] proposed for re-
lational data which show significant improvement over conventional reciprocal
schemes in utility preservation. Compared to a reciprocal scheme, a nonrecipro-
cal anonymization scheme provides more flexibility in forming group of records
for generalization, and such flexibility allows better utility to be preserved while
ensuring privacy guarantee similar to k-anonymity or l-diversity.
In this work, our first contribution is a nonreciprocal generalization scheme for
set-valued data. Specifically, we first treat each record as a binary string and
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use techniques such as Gray coding, Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) sorting
and dynamic partitioning to obtain a total order of the records with Hamming
distance between two consecutive records greatly reduced, and then apply non-
reciprocal generalization that is similar to [81]. Nevertheless, we improve the
nonreciprocal scheme in [81] mainly in the following two aspects: 1) a close-
walk algorithm that is more efficient than the back-track algorithm proposed
in [81] during the randomization process. 2) A greedy matching algorithm for
achieving l-diversity with good utility.
Our second contribution is a novel data publishing model which allows more
utility to be preserved in the anonymized data. The entry suppression used in
the example in Table 1.4 usually leads to severe utility loss, instead we use ma-
jority vote to decide the bit for an entry when needed so that more information
can be preserved. In addition, we use distance map and an error threshold pa-
rameter to describe the universe of matched candidates of a record to meet the
notion of k-anonymity or l-diversity under low information loss. We conduct
experimental study with two real dataset to confirm our the advancement of
our proposal over other reciprocal schemes.
• Rethinking Social Graph Anonymization via Random Perturbation
The increasing trend towards social graph data analysis has raised concerns
about the privacy of related entities or individuals. In Section 1.1.3 we have
shown by example that the anonymized graph data due to such na¨ıve anony-
mization, which simply replaces the identities of individuals with pseudonyms,
suffers from structural attack. Under structural attack, the identities of victim
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nodes can be found, and the relationships among the victims nodes can then
be compromised. To overcome the attack, anonymization algorithms based on
structural similarity and random edge perturbation have been proposed by the
researchers. Among the two classes of solutions, the random edge perturbation
works by randomly adding and removing a set of edges from the original graph
controlled by a single probability parameter µ. Specifically, the perturbation
algorithm works as follows: for any pair of nodes in the graph, if there is an
edge between the pair of nodes then the edge is removed with probability µ;
otherwise an edge is added between the pair of nodes with probability µ. Our
work was motivated by the findings by [95], in which the authors conclude that
important graph properties can be severely destroyed by a variation of random
edge perturbation and thus not recommending using random edge perturbation
for graph anonymization. Instead, we show a different result: By exploring the
probabilistic properties of random edge perturbation, we can devise appropriate
estimation algorithms to accurately estimate important graph properties, e.g.
graph density, degree distribution, transitivity, modularity and others from the
perturbed graph. These are utility metrics that are crucial for complex network
analysis according to [25]. Instead of rejecting random edge perturbation as a
solution, our findings put random edge perturbation back into the game.
Further, following the same idea of exploiting the probabilistic properties, we
analyze the impacts on the attack methods from the attacker’s perspective.
In [7], the authors have proposed a practical attack method, i.e. walk-based
attack, using the principle of structural attack. This attack takes two steps: 1)
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The attacker embeds a subgraph with backbone path which is then connected
to the victims in the original social graph. In a social network platform, e.g.
Facebook, this can be done by creating dummy accounts with random rela-
tionships among themselves ensuring all accounts are connected by a path and
then link a subset of the dummy accounts to target victims. 2) Find back the
embedded subgraph in the published social graph data by matching the degree
sequence of the embedded subgraph in the backbone, and then identify the vic-
tims connected to the subgraph. We show that the walk-based attack can be
easily prevented using random edge perturbation. Based on the principle of util-
ity discovery, we propose a variant of walk-based attack, namely interval-walk
attack. The interval-walk attack has the same practicality and works similarly
as the walk-based attack, but it stronger in the sense that walk-based hardly
works in perturbed graph while interval-walk attack is resilient to certain level
of perturbation. Nevertheless, all attacks can be prevented by raising the per-
turbation probability µ to sufficient high level. We study the condition on µ for
the interval-walk attacks to fail. Eventually, we conduct a thorough theoretical
study of the probability of success of any structural attack as a function of the
perturbation probability. Our analysis provides insights for assessing the iden-
tification risk of the perturbed social graph data. We also conduct extensive
experiments with synthetic and real datasets to confirm our theoretical results.
• Utility Driven Anonymization for Relational Data Publication
Privacy-preserving relational data publication has been studied intensely in the
past years. Still, existing approaches mainly transform data values by ran-
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dom perturbation or generalization. These schemes offer to the data owner
very limited freedom on determining what exact information to be preserved
in the anonymized data. For example, in schemes like k-anonymity [75] and
ℓ-diversity [59], data owners can only vary the k or ℓ parameter. In random
perturbation, they can only specify the interval and distribution of the noise.
Besides, none of these approaches preserves the relative distance of the records.
Thus, the resulting anonymized data may fail to meet the needs of data mining
operations such as clustering or ranking, where relative distance information is
critical.
In this work, we introduce a different data anonymization methodology for
relational data. Our proposal allows the data owner to flexibly define a set of
properties of interest (PoIs) that hold for the original data. Such properties
are represented as linear relationships among data points. For example, given
a 1-dimensional relational data D = (3, 5, 11, 27, 33, 45), where di refers the i
th
data record in D. The fact that d1 + d2 ≤ d3, d3 + d5 < 2 · d4 and d4 + d5 >
d6 can be defined as three PoIs for the D if the owner wants to retain such
relationships in the anonymized data. After extracting the PoIs, the owner uses
a value substitution algorithm to generate a set of anonymized data that strictly
preserves these user defined properties, thus maintaining specified patterns in
the data. For the above example, the anonymized data for D could be D′ =
{2, 7, 13, 25, 29, 47}. Notice that the three PoIs defined are still hold for D′
while the data values in D′ appear to be different from D. On the other hand,
our algorithm is also ideal for privacy protection as it achieves this result by
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randomly and uniformly selecting one of all possible transformations that retain
the specified patterns. We use extensive experiments with real and synthetic
data to show that our algorithm is efficient, and produces anonymized data
that affords different privacy versus utility tradeoff compared to conventional
schemes.
We organize the rest of chapters of the thesis as follows: in Chapter 2 we review the
related work in privacy preserving data publication with focus on set-valued, social
graph and relational data respectively, followed by a overview of recent development
in differential privacy. In Chapter 3, we first introduce our edit distance based data
publishing model and then our algorithm for obtaining a total order of data which
aims to reduced the Hamming distance between two consecutive records. Second, we
describe our closed-walk algorithm for extracting random assignments for nonrecip-
rocal generalization of set-valued data for achieving k-anonymity. Third, we extend
the nonreciprocal algorithm to l-diversity using greedy method. Fourth, we use ex-
periments with real datasets to verify the utility gain and time cost of our scheme.
In Chapter 4 we introduce our work on using random edge perturbation as privacy
protecting scheme for social graph data. We first propose new estimation algorithm
for measuring several important graph utilities of the original graph from the per-
turbed graph. Then we introduce the principle and algorithm for the interval-walk
attack. Last we verify our findings using experiments. In Chapter 5 we introduce
our complete work for utility driven anonymization for relational data publication.
We describe the details of our two phases anonymization algorithm, i.e. properties
extraction value substitutions. We use experiments to show that the anonymized data
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is good for both clustering and answering aggregate queries. Lastly, in Chapter 6 we
first conclude the thesis and then we introduce the future work which describes the




In this chapter, we review research works that are related to privacy preserving data
publication. In each of the section, we review the research works for set-valued data,
social graph data, and relational data, respectively. We also highlight the comparison
between our works and related works.
2.1 Set-valued Data Anonymitzation
Research on preserving privacy in set-valued data has recently focused on transform-
ing the data in a way that provides a generic privacy guarantee. The pioneering work
in the field [40] transforms the data into a band matrix by permutating rows and
columns in the original table, and forms anonymized groups on this matrix, offering
the privacy guarantee that the probability of associating a record with a particular
sensitive label does not exceed a threshold 1
p
. This method is augmented by two more
approaches in [37]. The best performer in terms of both data utility and execution
time is a scheme that interprets itemsets as Gray codes and sorts them by their Gray-
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code rank, so that consecutive records have low Hamming distance, facilitating group
formation. In our work, we extended the Gray-code ranking to Gray-TSP sort, which
further reduces the Hamming distances between neighboring records after sorting to
a significant extent. Still, the publication model of [40, 37] publishes exact public
items together with a summary of the frequencies of sensitive labels per group; this
transparency renders it vulnerable to attacks by adversaries who are already aware
of some associations and wish to infer others [17].
Another alternative [89] opts to selectively suppress some items, and ensures that
an adversary can link an individual to (none, or) at least k records, with at most h%
thereof sharing the same sensitive label; the h parameter is thus equivalent to 1
p
in
[40, 37]. However, in contrast to [40, 37], [89] assumes that an adversary’s knowledge
is limited to at most p items in a record. In our work, the background knowledge of
the adversary is similar to [40, 37] and not constrainted to p items as in [89]. Besides,
the suppression technique of [89] results in high information loss [17, 78]. Thus, in
our work, we propose a new data publishing model based on majority voting which
allows more information to be preserved while ensuring privacy guarantee.
More recently, [78, 47, 17] use hierarchy-based generalization to anonymize set-
valued data, and provide privacy guarantees against an adversary’s capacity to link
an individual to a small number of records [78, 47], or to confidently infer any sen-
sitive item among the items in a record themselves [17]. However, a generalization
hierarchy is not always applicable and/or available, and its construction is by it-
self a non-trivial problem [47]. In their experimental studies, [78, 47, 17] construct
synthetic hierarchies. Under such a synthetic hierarchy, [47] applies its proposal on
the anonymization of query logs. On the other hand, [48] anonymizes query logs,
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without assuming a generalization hierarchy over query objects; users are rendered
indistinguishable according to a loose similarity measure, by adding and suppressing
query objects. On the other hand, as we opt to publish anonymized records that have
the same domain as the original records, we do not need to employ any hierarchical
structure to assist the generalization.
All methods discussed above use syntactic transformations. Another line of re-
search uses random perturbation to anonymize data [26, 71, 31, 32, 68, 5]. However,
perturbation techniques can expose the privacy of outliers in a way that syntactic
methods do not [37]. The sketch-based method of [2] tries to avoid such drawbacks,
providing a guarantee that renders records hardly distinguishable from their k nearest
neighbors. However, as it may not always be possible to satisfy this privacy condition,
[2] resorts to suppressing outlier records. Besides, perturbation-based transformations
provide no information on how much a given record has been perturbed; in other
words, they render data in an inaccurate form, hence limit the purposes they can
be useful for [53]. On the other hand, syntactic transformations hamper the data’s
precision, but not its accuracy.
As discussed, a syntactic transformation recasts the data by a still accurate repre-
sentation, albeit imprecise and coarse, with an explicit margin of error. Past research
[89, 40, 37, 78, 47] applied syntactic transformations under the premise that, for any
two records s and t, if s is recoded into an anonymized record as one of the candi-
dates for t, then t should also be recoded into an anonymized record as one of the
candidates for s. Given that any recoded record also matches its original form, this
assumption implies that the published records are clustered in disjoint groups, where
(the public parts of) all records in a group have the same recoded form.
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Nevertheless, this reciprocity assumption is not required by a privacy condition;
it is redundant. This redundancy was noted by [11], observing that “there is no pri-
vacy reason” therefor. Contemporaneously, [42] revisited this question in the context
of relational anonymization, and noted that dropping the reciprocity assumption al-
lows for improved data utility; the model of global (1, k)-anonymity [42] guarantees,
by nonreciprocal recoding, that an individual is associated with at least k recoded
records, is hence equivalent to the popular k-anonymity model which conventionally
uses reciprocal recoding. Later, [81] observed that the techniques of [42] do not ensure
that each such association is equi-probable, and provided an algorithm for nonrecip-
rocal recoding that guarantees equi-probable associations, using randomization.
In our work, we venture to apply the nonreciprocal generalization paradigm to
the anonymization of set-valued data. Our scheme outperforms other conventional
reciprocal schemes in terms of utility preservation. In addition, a novel data publishing
model based on binary edit distance was proposed.
2.2 Social Graph Data Anonymization
In the past few years, most of the research in privacy preserving data mining has
been focusing on the privacy issues for relational data and set-valued data. Never-
theless, the research concerning privacy problems in social graph data did not emerge
until very recently with the increasing popularity of social network platforms such as
Facebook, Flickr or Twitter.
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2.2.1 Structural attack
The first work that addresses the privacy problem for social graph data was initiated
by Backstrom et al. [7]. In their work, the authors consider the scenario where a
social graph is published for data mining purpose. In social graph model, a node rep-
resents an individual and a link represents a particular type of (sensitive) relationship
between two individuals. They present several attacks on social graphs. Specifically,
the authors emphasize the differences between active attacks, where the adversary
may be able to add nodes and edges before the publication of a graph, and passive
attacks, where the adversary attacks only an already published and static graph. To
compromise the victim’s privacy, the authors propose the walk-based and cut-based
attacks. They demonstrate the feasibility of the attacks using experiments with real
world data, but did not provide protection schemes to mitigate the attacks. As we
demonstrate in our work, the walk-based attack can be easily prevented by random edge
perturbation. We utilize the fact the noise due to randomization can be filtered to cer-
tain extend by estimation algorithms and propose a stronger form of structural attack
than the walk-based attack which is called the interval-walk attack. The interval-walk
attack still allows the adversary to successfully find back the embedded malicious graph
and the set of victims nodes from the perturbed graph in cases where walk-based attack
always fails. In order to prevent the interval-walk attack, the perturbation probabil-
ity has to be chosen sufficiently large so that the probability that the backbone of the
maliciously embedded graph been broken is high. We analyze the condition for the
perturbation probability for preventing such attack. Influenced by [7], a number of
new works that study similar problems were proposed by researchers in recent years.
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These works either present new attacks under new graph and adversary models or
propose new protection schemes.
One of the early works on social graph anonymization is done by Hay et al [46].
The type of social graph studied by the authors is the same as in [7] where only the
structure of the social graph is published. As explained in sub-sectionsubsec:ppma, in
order to identify the victim the adversary needs to have some background knowledge
that can be matched against the partial identifiable information contained in the data.
In their work, the authors propose a model to represent the adversary’s knowledge as
the degrees of the contacts within certain hops, which is called vertex refinement in
their terminology. In addition, the authors also models the adversary’s knowledge as
a subgraph that is centered around the victim, which is called subgraph knowledge.
However, the limitation of their models is that the subgraph must be centered around
the victim. Unlike their work, we study the background knowledge subgraph does not
have to be centered around the victim. Instead, for the walk-based attack, we assume
there is a k-path backbone exist in the maliciously embedded subgraph. In the same
work, Hay et al. propose a technique based on random edge insertions and deletions
1 as a protection against such attacks, which is similar to the random edge perturba-
tion that we study. The effectiveness of their protection scheme, in terms of utility
preservation, were not reported. Instead of pre-determining the amount of edges to be
added or deleted, our random edge perturbation relies on the perturbation probability
µ. With this formulation, we can better study both the utility preservation and the
privacy protection with a single parameter µ. In [45], Hay et al. formalized another
1A fixed number of edges are randomly removed from the graph, and the same number of edges
are randomly added to the graph
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class of adversary’s knowledge model based on hub finger prints. The hub finger
print for a victim node describes the node’s connections to a set of designated hubs.
Instead of using random edge addition and deletion, a new approach based on graph
generalization was proposed. To show that the graph generalization also preserves
the utility metrics, the authors experimented several general graph utilities such as
degree distribution, path length, transitivity and infectiousness. The experiments
show that the utilities distortion due to generalization is relatively low.
In [95], Ying and Wu propose a spectrum preserving randomization technique
to prevent the above structural attack. With the same social graph model as in
[7, 46, 45], the paper focus more on how their spectrum preserving randomization
technique achieves good utility preservation. The authors first study the relationship
between random edge perturbation and graph utilities, and claim that the random
edge perturbation degrades the graph utilities significantly. Later the authors show
that the general graph utilities are closely related to the eigenvalues of the matrix
that represents the social graph. Therefore, they introduce a new algorithm that
randomizes the links between nodes and yet preserves the spectral properties. The
authors show that when the spectral properties are preserved, many utility metrics
are also preserved. Our work shows that the claim of Ying and Wu about the random
edge perturbation is only true if the utility metrics are measured in the perturbed
graph. Instead, we show that the random edge perturbation is still good for utility
preservation by using estimation algorithms to recover the utilities.
In [58], Liu and Terzi model the adversary’s background as the knowledge of the
degree of the victim. In their model, the privacy breach threat is that the victim’s
node can be identified if the degree of the victim is unique in the published graph.
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The authors adopts the idea of k-anonymity used in tabular data and extend it to
social graphs. After degree anonymization, for each node having degree d, we can find
at least k− 1 other nodes with the same degree. However, the degree anonymization
is insufficient to prevent the attack that we consider, as with our knowledge model
the adversary can launch more powerful attacks.
Zhou and Pei [98] study the use of edge addition and label generalization for a
different k-anonymous graph definition, i.e., a graph is k-anonymous if for every node
there exists at least k− 1 other nodes that share isomorphic neighborhoods. In their
model, the adversary’s background knowledge is limited to the edge informations of
the victim’s immediate neighbors and their labels. Instead of reporting the distor-
tion of general graph utilities, the authors proposed a cost function based on the
addition and generalization of edges in order to quantify and measure the amount of
information loss.
In [14], Campan and Truta consider a completely different social graph model
from the previous works. In the published graph, the nodes contain quasi-identifiers
and confidential attribute values. The authors assume that the background knowl-
edge of the adversary are the quasi-identifiers of the victim, and also the edge facts
of the victim’s immediate neighbors which is similar to [98]. With the additional
knowledge of the quasi-identifiers, the attack is launched not only based on struc-
ture matching, but also on relational data matching, using the idea of generalization
which is widely applied in k-anonymization of relational data. The authors propose
to use edge intra-cluster generalization and edge inter-cluster generalization to gen-
erate k-anonymous masked graph, in which every node is indistinguishable with at
least k-1 other nodes in terms of attributes’ values and their associated neighborhood
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structural information. In our work, we assume the nodes do not have any labels and
the adversary’s knowledge is constraint to the maliciously embedded subgraph.
Instead of employing graph isomorphism as in [98, 14], Zou et al. [99] use the idea
of graph automorphism to prevent structural attack. In short, an automorphism of a
graph is a graph isomorphism with itself. In their work, the background knowledge of
the adversary is modeled as general structure knowledge (including degree, structure
of the neighbors, distance to hub prints etc) about the victim. Therefore, their solu-
tion is not limited against a particular structural attack, e.g. the degree attack. The
authors propose to use graph k-automorphism, where in the anonymized graph each
node can find k-1 automorphic mappings for itself. In this way, with any structural
information, the adversary cannot distinguish the victim from k-1 other nodes. In
addition, the authors consider the problem of dynamic release of graphs where an
evolutionary graph is published periodically. The authors argue that removing or
randomizing vertex identifiers is improper to data mining, and hence they propose
to use vertex identifiers generalization to reduce the risk of determining the victim
in dynamic releases. In terms of utility evaluation, similar to other ‘structure only’
graph models, the authors evaluated the loss in total degree differences, path length
and clustering coefficients with increasing k. The graph k-isomorphism and graph
k-automorphism provide privacy guarantee by achieving structural similarity. The
relationship between the structural similarity based approaches and our random edge
perturbation approach is similar to the relationship between k-anonymity for relational
data and random perturbation schemes for relational data.
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2.2.2 Other attacks
In [65], the authors demonstrate a different attack. Compared to the work in [7],
the authors employs different graph model and adversary’s background knowledge.
In [7], only the graph structure is published and the adversary has only a structural
information which is modeled as a subgraph, but in [65], each node and each edge is
associated with a set of attributes. Furthermore, the knowledge of the adversary is
modeled as an imperfect fraction of the original graph. Here imperfect means that
the adversary’s knowledge about the nodes’ or edges’ attribute values is modeled
as probability distributions rather than exact values. For example, for a particular
edge between two individuals, the adversary has 70% confidence that the relationship
is ‘colleague’ and 30% confidence that it is ‘friend’. The distribution captures the
adversary’s uncertainty about the attribute values. In addition, in their model, the
adversary also possesses detailed information about a small set of nodes in the graph,
which is combined with the imperfect knowledge to deduce sensitive information
about other nodes in the graph. However, note that the work focuses only on the
process of the attack and do not provide new protection schemes.
Another work that demonstrates a possible attack over social graph is [97]. In their
graph model, the authors assume that each node has a sensitive attribute value which
is either public or private. In addition, they employ the concept of group in their graph
model. A group is a collection of nodes which can be joined or disjoint. The authors
conjecture that group membership disclosure can lead to attribute disclosure. The
authors build a few classification models based on the facts that there are correlations
in the attribute values for the linked nodes and the nodes in the same group. Similar
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to [7] and [65], the work focus only on the attacks and do not provide any insights on
possible protections.
In [24] Cormode et al. propose a very different graph model. In all previous men-
tioned works, the nodes are modeled as individuals and the edges as relationships. In
this work, the social graph is modeled as a bipartite graph over the set of all users and
the set of all interactions. For example, if Alice and Bob add each other as a friend on
the 8th of February 2010, there is a link from the node representing the interaction
’add friend, 8th Feb 2010’ to the node representing Alice and the node representing
Bob, respectively. The authors describe two types of anonymization techniques that
are based on entities partitioning. Depending on the different background knowl-
edge of the adversary, the anonymization techniques ensure different levels of privacy.
Comparing with the ‘structure only’ graph model, this graph model contains much
richer information. Therefore, in the utility evaluation, the authors demonstrated
that several random queries (e.g. pair, trio and triangle queries) can be answered
accurately from the anonymized graph.
The use of random edge perturbation as a privacy protection and utility preserva-
tion is based on the randomized response technique proposed in [80]. In their work,
the survey respondents are either in group A or group B. In order to learn the per-
centage of people in each group, each respondent only gives the correct answer with
a probability p. In this way, the adversary cannot deduce the real answer of each
individual with probability higher than 1− p and the statistics about the percentage
of people in group A and B can still be accurately estimated. Another associated
work to ours is [67]. The authors proposed an αβ algorithm for protecting the pres-
ence of a tuple in a published table. The α (respectively β) refers to the probability
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that a real (respectively false) tuple is removed (respectively inserted) in the released
table. However, this work focuses on relational data, whereas we target graph data.
Consequently, the notion of privacy in our work is different from theirs.
As a summary, the social graph models employed by different works are either
‘structure only’ or ‘labeled nodes’ (with some variants as labeled edges etc). In
practice, depending on the nature of the graph, both graph models are useful. For
example, in a social network where each node has a profile and the various types
of relationship, the ‘labeled nodes’ model is more suitable. Whereas, in an email or
telecommunication network where each node is only represented by an email account
or a phone number and the relationship type is fixed, the ‘structure only’ graph model
is better suited. Depending on the graph model, the assumption on the adversary’s
knowledge can be different. In our work, we focus on ‘structure only’ publication and
model the adversary’s knowledge as general structural information. Hence, our work
is better related to the works in [7, 46, 45, 95, 58, 99].
2.3 Relational Data Anonymization
Interest in relational data anonymization started out with the k-anonymity model [70],
which suggests grouping tuples in ECs of no less than k tuples, with indistinguishable
QI values. Past research has proposed several k-anonymization schemes [70, 49, 9,
35, 50, 3, 87, 51, 15, 39] that transform the data by generalization. Generalization
replaces, or recodes, all values of a QI attribute in an EC by a single range that contains
them. For example, QI Gender with values male and female can be generalized to
person, and QI Age with values 20, 25 and 32 can be generalized to the interval [20, 32].
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An extreme case of generalization, suppression, deletes some QI values or even tuples
from the released table. Generalization for a categorical attribute is facilitated by a
hierarchy over its values.
Still, while the objective of anonymization is to conceal sensitive information about
the subject involved, k-anonymity pays no attention to non-QI sensitive attributes
(SAs). Thus, a k-anonymized table may contain ECs with so skewed a distribution
of SA values, that an adversary can still infer the SA value of a record with high
confidence. To address this limitation, [59] extended k-anonymity to the ℓ-diversity
model, which postulates that each EC contains at least ℓ “well represented” values.
The proposal of the ℓ-diversity model was not accompanied by an anonymization
algorithm tailored for it. In response, [39] provides an ℓ-diversification framework
that resolves the arising partitioning problem in high dimensions via a space-filling
curve, such as the Hilbert curve [63]. [84] proposes the m-invariance model, which
supports diversity-aware data re-publication after insertions and deletions of tuples.
The ℓ-diversity model is designed with a categorical SA in mind; it does not directly
apply to the case of a numerical SA. Namely, a diversity of numerical SA values does
not guarantee privacy when their range in an EC is narrow (i.e., the values are close
to each other); such a narrow range can provide accurate enough information to an
adversary. To address this deficiency, [96] proposes a model that requires the range of
a numerical SA’s values in an EC to be wider than a threshold. Yet, an adversary may
still be able to infer a numerical SA value with high confidence, if most numerical SA
values in an EC are close, no matter how wide their total range is (i.e., the EC may





where G is a given EC, gc any group of close tuples in G, and m a parameter.
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The deficiency of ℓ-diversity outlined above can also apply to semantically similar
values of categorical SA. In general, ℓ-diversity fails to guarantee privacy when the
distribution of SA values within an EC differs substantially from their overall distri-
bution in the released table. Thus, [55] proposes the t-closeness model, which requires
that the difference, measured by an appropriate metric, of the SA distribution within
any EC from the overall distribution of that SA be no more than a given threshold
t. According to the t-closeness model, an adversary who knows the overall SA distri-
bution in the published table gains only limited more information about an EC by
seeing the SA distribution in it.
In [42], the authors revisited the problem of k-anonymization and proposed a
nonreciprocal algorithm for a model similar to k-anonymity. Their model is called
(1,k)-anonymity, which specifies that an invididual should not be associated with less
than k generalized records. However, their scheme suffers from the problem that the
probabilities are not evenly distributed among the k or more records that associated
with an individual, which leading to weaker privacy guarantee than the traditional k-
anonymity model. In addition, the highest complexity of their algorithm is O(k2 ·n2.5)
which is comparably slow than other anonymization schemes. Based on their work,
the authors in [81] has improved their model for better privacy guarantee and devised
an algorithm that achieves better utility The algorithm also runs faster than the
algorithm in [42].
The schemes described above fall into the classes of generalization based ap-
proaches. In parallel, there is another class of perturbation based approaches. In
[4], the authors have used the perturbation by which random noise is added to the
data prior to data mining. The authors show that despite that the noise has made
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individual records sufficiently deviant from their original value, the aggregated in-
formation can still be recovered accurately via filter processing process. In [32], the
authors have proposed a privacy model and algorithm based on random perturbation
for protecting the privacy of relational data for data mining. Their model imposes a
bound ρ2 to the posterior probability of certain properties in the data, given a bound
ρ1 on the prior probability (i.e., before data release). This model is modified in [76],
where the posterior confidence should simply not exceed the prior one by more than
∆ integrity. Essentially, our approach for anonymizing relational data is similar to
perturbation. Instead of adding random noise that are uniformly distributed, our
algorithm ensures that the noise added does not destroy the pre-determined linear
patterns in the original data, but still ensuring sufficient randomness. Our approach
is also different from generalization based approaches in the sense that attribute val-
ues in the anonymized data by generalization based approaches contain intervals or
wildcard characters ∗, which loses the exactness of data. The anonymized records by
our approach preserves the exactness of data, and hence it is useful for data mining
operations that use exact values of data.
In another direction [64] proposes a data-reduction approach to privacy protec-
tion, using Fourier-related transforms to hide sensitive data values in a way that
approximately preserves Euclidean distances. However, the privacy guarantees this
method offers are not clear. Recent research has also proposed distorting the data
by geometric transformations [66, 18]. However, given that all data values undergo
transformation based on the same matrix, an adversary who knows a few original
values can reconstruct the whole original table.
Our work starts out from the observation that conventional generalization-based
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approaches and perturbation based approaches, such as the ones mentioned above,
tend to destroy the relative distance relationships among the data records. On the
other hand, the relative distance information is critical for data mining tasks such
as clustering, ranking or skyline query. Motivated by this, we propose a different
anonymization algorithm using a similar approach as perturbation, but ensures that
pre-defined linear relationships are always preserved during anonymization.
2.4 Differentially Private Data Publication
In recent years, differential privacy [28, 30] has emerged as a new model for pro-
viding data privacy. The privacy guarantee offered by differential privacy is robust
as it requires very little assumption on the adversary’s prior knowledge. Generally
speaking, differential privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a single record
does not significantly affect the outcome of any analysis. Under this guarantee, an
adversary’s confidence in inferring the existence of a particular record (which corre-
sponds to a particular person) is limited to under a certain threshold, as he could
hardly tell which database contains the particular record based on the result of his
analysis. The privacy enforcement provided by differential privacy is usually modeled
as follows: Let A be a randomized algorithm. A satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if and
only if for any two databases D and D′ that only differ on a single record, and any
possible output S ⊆ Range((A)), the probability that S is the output of A on D and
the probability that S is the output of A on D′ is only different by a constant ratio.
Formally, it is required that:
Pr(A(D) = S) ≤ eǫ · Pr(A(D′) = S) (2.1)
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where ǫ is a constant provided by the user as the required level of privacy guarantee.
As we see from the definition, differential privacy relies on randomization to
achieve privacy guarantee. A randomized algorithm A is usually created by adding
noise, such as following the Laplace mechanism [28], exponential mechanism [61] and
geometric mechanism [41], to a deterministic algorithm G.
Conventionally, differential privacy techniques are mainly designed for interactive
setting [29], in which an agency that running a randomized algorithm is sitting be-
tween the query user and the database and adding noise to the query result to achieve
differential privacy. The problem of interactive setting is that as more queries are an-
swered more statistical information about the original database is revealed. In the
worst case, the original database can be almost entirely reconstructed based on the
historical query results. Hence, in order to limit information disclosure, an upper limit
on the number of queries and constraints to the types of queries that can be asked are
often posed in the interactive setting. More recently, there is an increasing interest in
developing differential privacy techniques for non-interactive setting [88, 8, 19, 23, 86],
in which the data or the summary of the data is published for various oﬄine analysis
under the guarantee of differential privacy. Differential privacy has rapidly gained
acceptance as a robust privacy model, in the following we emphasize three differences
between differential privacy and the generalized based models, such as k-anonymity,
l-diversity and t-closeness:
First, the privacy notations for privacy modeling are often very comprehensive
in generaliztion based approaches. For example, k-anonymity model specifies that
a record can be uniquely re-identified by the quasi-identifiers with probability at
most 1/k; the l-diversity specifies that the ratio of most frequent sensitive attribute
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value does not go beyond 1/l. On the other hand, in differential privacy, the privacy
budget is described by the parameter ǫ, which is derived from probabilistic domain.
This parameter is not comprehensive to a data owner, and in the absent of sufficient
statistical knowledge the owner may not be able to choose an appropriate value of ǫ
for data sanitization. Thus, it remains a challenge to design more a comprehensive
privacy metric for differential privacy.
Second, though both the generalization based approaches and the differential pri-
vacy based approaches are trying to protect the sensitive value of a person, they have
different assumptions in their privacy modeling. Generalization based approaches
normally assume that the adversary has the knowledge of a particular person is in
the database and try to break the association between the person’s quasi-identifiers
and his sensitive value. On the other hand, the differential privacy works by revealing
limited information to the adversary so that the adversary could not infer the
existence of the person in the database. Thus, generalization based approaches and
differential privacy each suits different application scenarios.
Third, generalization based approaches and differential privacy normally publish
different levels of details about the original database. In generalization based ap-
proach, the data is often published with record level of details where the published
data has similar form as the original data. Thus, the published data is convenient
for record level of analysis. On the other hand, the data published with differen-
tial privacy often contains aggregate level information, such as the histogram of the
data [88, 86], or frequency map [85, 28]. Such aggregated level of information may be
useful for answering range queries, or count queries. Thus, the different forms in the
data publication may make generalization based approaches and differential privacy
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based approaches suitable for different applications.
With the above differences in mind, we believe that the differential privacy ap-
proach and the generalization based approach each has their own merits while com-






Assume a data vendor who wants to publish a data set D of set-valued data, where a
record ri ∈ D consists of a set of items, ri = {o1, . . . , on}, drawn from a universe I.
Moreover, each record ri can potentially be associated with a sensitive label, denoting
a piece of information such as marital status, sexual orientation, political conviction,
or income group. Several real-world data sharing problems can be formulated by
this model, even when the data does not originally arise in a set-valued form; the
set-valued data may describe data originally presented as a bipartite graph matching,
e.g., users to preferences, or even relational database data, where each ri contains a
tuple’s attribute values.
Publishing such data in their original form, even without identifiers, compromises
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privacy. Thus, there is a need to transform the data in a way that preserves infor-
mation while alleviating privacy threats. There are two desiderata: First, a record ri
should not be clearly distinguishable from other records, leading to direct exposure
of its subject’s identity. Second, a sensitive label, when present, should not be easily
associable to a certain individual.
ID Jogging Swimming Tennis Soccer Religion
r1 1 1 0 0 Christian
r2 0 1 1 0 Christian
r3 1 1 0 1 Muslim
r4 0 1 1 1 Buddhist
r5 1 1 1 0 Buddhist
r6 1 0 1 1 Muslim
Table 3.1: Original set-valued data after na¨ıve anonymization
Table 3.1 shows an example of set-valued data about the sport preferences and
religious affiliation of certain individuals. For each record ri, a value of 1 at position
j indicates that item j is present in ri, whereas a 0 indicates absence. Each record
in Table 3.1 is uniquely identifiable by the characteristic vector of the itemset. Thus,
an adversary who is aware of the this characteristic vector can infer an individual’s
presence in the data sensitive label as well. For example, if Alex knows that Barbara
likes only jogging and swimming, he can identify her record as r1, and also infer
that she is a Christian. We aim to publish the data in a form that prevents such
disclosures.
Previous research has noted the importance of transforming set-valued data for
privacy-preserving publication [31, 32, 37, 95, 78, 47, 5, 17], but employed trans-
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formation operations mostly unsuitable for the nature of the data at hand. Works
such as [31, 32, 5] employ random perturbation, adding noise to the data. While
random perturbation provides no information about the extent at which a particular
record has been perturbed, it renders outliers vulnerable to an adversary with exter-
nal knowledge [37]. On the other hand, syntactic data transformations, such as those
in [37, 95, 78, 47, 17], recast the data so that they maintain a consistency to their
original form, despite the obfuscation they undergo [53, 11]. Among them, [95] strives
for a privacy objective by selectively suppressing some items (i.e., withholding them
from publication); more refined generalization methods are employed in [78, 47, 17],
based on the assumption that a generalization hierarchy is applicable on the data
items in I. However, such hierarchies are not always available in practice; for ex-
ample, in the case where the set-valued data represent query logs, their construction
is, by itself, a non-trivial problem [47]. The experimental studies of [78, 47, 17] use
ad hoc hierarchies, which are clearly arbitrary. Another suggestion [48] adds and
suppresses query log objects so as to render users indistinguishable by a loose mea-
sure of user similarity. Last, [37] publishes exact (public) itemsets in groups, along
with a separate summary table of (private) sensitive labels for each group. Unfor-
tunately, this transparent publication method is vulnerable to attacks by adversaries
with background knowledge of some sensitive associations: an adversary who sees the
exact items in a record can carry out a chain of reasoning leading to an inference of a
sensitive label, which would be hindered if these items were obfuscated by generaliza-
tion [17]. Besides, the publication model of [37] does not provide protection against
identity disclosure as generalization does [39].
A conventional syntactic anonymization method may partition records in distinct
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ID Jogging Swimming Tennis Soccer Religion
r1 1 1 * * Christian
r3 1 1 * * Muslim
r5 1 1 * * Buddhist
r2 * * 1 * Christian
r4 * * 1 * Buddhist
r6 * * 1 * Muslim
Table 3.2: Data anonymized by suppression
groups, where all records in a group are interchangeable with each other. Table 3.2
shows an example along these lines, applied on the data of Table 3.1. The privacy
objective is that, for each original record ri, there should be (at least) three records
that may be an obfuscated form of (or match) ri’s characteristic vector, and three
different sensitive labels that may be associated to ri. To achieve this objective, one
can suppress some bit values, so that it is not disclosed whether the item in question
is present or not, and form two distinct groups, with records in the same group having
indistinguishable characteristic vectors and different sensitive labels. Yet even in this
simple example, a significant number of suppressions is required to achieve the desired
privacy, compromising the utility of the data.
However, it is not necessary that our privacy objective be achieved via the forma-
tion of distinct groups, as above, while the obfuscation mechanism does not have to
be suppression (or generalization along an arbitrary hierarchy) either. In this work,
we propose an alternative model for anonymizing set-valued data, by adapting the
non-reciprocal generalization scheme for relational data [42, 81]. Our scheme en-
sures that each original record matches a group of generalized records, yet this effect
is not brought about by creating groups of records recast so as to be identical to
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each other; differently said, original records match anonymized ones in a nonrecip-
rocal manner: when an original record s matches the anonymized form t′ of another
record t, then it is not necessary that t also matches s′. Furthermore, we recast
each record’s characteristic vector ri by only altering some of its bits (i.e., adding
or deleting items), and publish a base characteristic vector r′i along with a distance
bitmap di, and an edit-distance threshold t. In order to detect pairs of records of
small Hamming distance, which can be easily recast so as to match each other, we
employ a Gray-encoding-based sorting of characteristic vector, enhanced by applying
an approximation algorithm for the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP).
ID Jogging Swimming Tennis Soccer Religion di t
r′
1
1 1 0 1 Christian 1 0 1 1 2 bits
r′
2
1 1 1 0 Christian 1 1 0 1 2 bits
r′
3
0 1 1 1 Muslim 1 0 1 1 2 bits
r′
4
0 1 1 1 Buddhist 1 1 0 1 2 bits
r′
5
1 1 0 0 Buddhist 0 0 1 1 1 bit
r′
6
1 1 1 0 Muslim 0 1 1 1 2 bits
Table 3.3: Data anonymized by our method
Table 3.3 shows a way of publishing the data of Table 3.1 by our method that
achieves the same privacy as the publication in Table 3.2, but much higher utility.
For each original record ri, the table shows its anonymized characteristic vector r
′
i, a
sensitive label, a distance bitmap di that indicates the positions where an error may
occur in r′i, and an edit-distance threshold t that indicates the maximum possible
number of errors among the positions indicated in di.
For example, the distance bitmap for r′5 is 0011, denoting that an original record
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r represented by r′5 may differ from it at the 3rd or 4th bit. The error-bits threshold
t indicates that r may only differ from r′5 by at most 1 bit, which reduces our options
to either the 3rd bit, or the 4th, or none. Thus, three possible worlds [22] are defined,
as r may be either 1100, or 1110, or 1101. In the first case, r is r1, in the second
case it is r5, and in the third case it is r3. We emphasize that some possible worlds
might not correspond to any real record, yet all real records that have to match an
anonymized one by our scheme are always found among the possible worlds.






















































6 r1, r5, r6
Table 3.4: Original/anonymized data correspondence
Table 3.4 shows the correspondence between original and anonymized records,
i.e., the anonymized records in Table 3.3 that each original record in Table 3.1 is
compatible with, and vice versa. As each anonymized record matches three original
records, and vice versa, a privacy guarantee of 3-anonymity is achieved [69].
49
3.2 Background of Nonreciprocal Recoding
The Reciprocity assumption is not required by a privacy condition; it is redundant.
This redundancy was noted by [11], observing that “there is no privacy reason” there-
for. Contemporaneously, [42] revisited this question in the context of microdata ano-
nymization, and noted that dropping the reciprocity assumption allows for improved
data utility; the model of global (1, k)-anonymity [42] guarantees, by nonreciprocal
recoding, that an individual is associated with at least k recoded records, is hence
equivalent to the popular k-anonymity model which conventionally uses reciprocal re-
coding. Later, [81] observed that the techniques of [42] do not ensure that each such
association is equi-probable, and provided an algorithm for nonreciprocal recoding

























































































(a) All-assignments graph (b) Sample assignment
Figure 3.1: Nonreciprocal recoding in graph view
We illustrate nonreciprocal recoding with two kinds of directed graphs. An all-
assignments graph shows how the values of original records match those of anonymized
records. A directed edge (ri, r
′
j) in an all-assignments graph indicates that the ano-
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nymized record r′j should include original record ri among its possible worlds. Figure
3.1(a) shows the all-assignments graph for the example in the previous section. We
present two views of this graph: a bipartite view, as well as as a unified view where a
single node represents both the original record ri and the anonymized record r
′
i. For





1) and (r4, r
′
1), respectively. The unified view merges the nodes for ri and r
′
i in
the bipartite view into a single node ri. As in each assignment, each node has exactly
one outgoing and one incoming edge in the bipartite view, the edges will form a set
of cycles in the unified view. The unified view is needed as our algorithm generates
assignments by creating cycles in the unified view.
The privacy principle of k-anonymity [69] requires that each original record ri have
at least k equally probable matches among anonymized records R′. Under the conven-
tional reciprocity assumption, this property is easily satisfied by forming groups of k
records mutually matching each other within each group. However, when we drop the
reciprocity assumption, we need to spell out the requirements for k-anonymity to be
satisfied. It has been shown by [42, 81] that, to achieve k-anonymity by nonreciprocal
recoding, it suffices to ensure that each original record ri has exactly k matches in
R′ (i.e., k outgoing edges in the all-assignments graph), and each anonymized record
r′i also has exactly k matches in R (i.e., incoming edges); of course the same effect
can be achieved with any k′ > k, but then k′-anonymity is attained. In other words,
it suffices to ensure that the data’s all-assignments graph is k-regular. From such
a graph we can generate k disjoint assignments [81]. The all-assignments graph in
Figure 3.1(a) is 3-regular, hence ensures 3-anonymity. In order to create a k-regular
all-assignments graph, [81] suggests the method of ring generalization: given k, an
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all-assignments graph is constructed as a ring, linking each of n records, ri, to itself
and its k−1 successors by a given cyclical order. The all-assignments graph in Figure
3.1(a) is a ring all-assignments graph for the order {r2, r4, r3, r1, r5, r6}.
On the other hand, a single assignment graph shows a particular one-to-one corre-
spondence between original and anonymized records (i.e., an assignment); it provides
the assumed identities of anonymized records, and may be used as a guide when as-
signing non-generalized attributes (e.g., sensitive labels) to them. A single assignment
graph is a subset of the all-assignments graph. Figure 3.1(b) shows a possible assign-
ment for our example in bipartite and unified view. To ensure the equal probability
requirement of k-anonymity, we should ensure that each edge in an all-assignments
graph is equally likely to participate in a chosen single assignment. This result can
be achieved by selecting one of k disjoint assignments uniformly at random. Further-
more, the set of disjoint assignments to select from should be a random one, out of
the many possible such set a k-regular graph can yield. A randomization scheme for
generating such a set is proposed in [81]; this scheme generates each single assignment
by iteratively extracting cycles (including self-loops) from the all-assignments graph
(in unified view) via random walks, until all records are covered. We illustrate a very
simple example of this process in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2(a) depicts a 2-regular all-assignments graph for a data set of 3 records,
and the first step of the process, which extracts the cycle r1 → r2 → r1 by random
walk. Then, the graph is updated to reflect the matching choices made so far. The
node that originally stood for r1 (and r
′
1) now stands for r1 and its match, r
′
2, while
the node that stood for r2 (and r
′
2) now stands for r2 and r
′
1; thus, the two chosen
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Figure 3.2: Iterative cycle extraction
another cycle, potentially destroying some of the previously selected matches (i.e.,
de-selecting the self-loops of those nodes as matches of our choice) in case the new
cycle passes through the same nodes, yet without ever reducing the number ofmatched
nodes; some matches may be replaced by others, but no previously matched node is
left orphan. Such a new cycle, namely r3 → r1/r′2 → r3, is shown in Figure 3.2(b).
This cycle replaces the match of r1 to r
′
3, while it matches r3 to r
′
2 instead. With these
new matches our task is completed, as all records in the all-assignments graph have
been covered. Figure 3.2(c) shows the chosen single assignment graph, composed of
self-loop singletons.
Their algorithm is secure in the sense that the cycle discovery process is guided by
random-walking making the adversary difficult to re-construct the final assignment
giving the knowledge to the all-assignments graph.
3.3 Challenges in Our Design
Our non-reciprocal scheme is developed mainly based on the prior work in [81]. While
the previous algorithm are designed for relational data, we aim to apply the non-
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reciprocal recoding method to set-valued data. However, due to the different charac-
teristics of set-valued data and relational data, the previous algorithm for relational
data may not work well for set-valued data. Unlike relational data which usually
has a very limited number of dimensionality and each record takes a value for each
attribute, the set-valued data usually has much higher sparsity. The high sparsity
implies that the universe of value is large, e.g. all the movies the world, and that
number of values in a record is much smaller than the universe size, e.g. the movies
liked by a person. According to [1], in k-anonymization, the increase of data dimen-
sionality may severely destroy the data utility in the anonymized data. Therefore,
to anonymize the set-valued data, we need techniques to fully explore the utility po-
tential of the dataset, by making use of the high sparsity and high dimensionality
characteristics of the set-valued data. Thus, we made several modifications to the
previous algorithm and added our own innovations, which we summarize as below:
First, an enhanced Gray-encoding-and-TSP-based order that ensures con-
secutive records have small Hamming distance. This order is derived in two steps:
first, records are sorted in a Gray-encoding-based order, as in [37]; then, this order
is enhanced by applying a partition-wise approximate Traveling-Salesman-Problem
(TSP) algorithm; the partitions this algorithm operates on are derived by dynamic
programming. Our experiments show that our technique effectively reduces the Ham-
ming distance of neighboring records, and eventually gains better utility for anony-
mized ata.
Second, a nonreciprocal recoding scheme tailored for set-valued data, which
allows for the maximum benefits to be reaped from generalization by the Gray-
encoding-based order. This form of generalization has been used under different
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names in the context of the microdata anonymization [42, 81]. However, the algo-
rithms suggested in these works are not efficient enough to be applied on a large
data set. The time complexity of the randomization-based scheme in [81] is O(kn2).
Noting this complexity, [81] suggests that their scheme can be applied on top of tra-
ditional reciprocal recoding schemes, so as to improve the utility within each of the
groups that these schemes form; thus, the scheme of [81] remains dependent on a
partitioning by reciprocal recoding. Our recoding algorithm goes beyond those of
[42, 81] as it can operate efficiently on the full Gray-encoding data set and it caters
to data utility more straightforwardly; to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first
algorithm for nonreciprocal recoding that has these properties.
Third, a novel publication method that represents each generalized record via
a base characteristic vector r′i, a distance bitmap di, and a distance threshold t, which
encompasses the original as one of the possible worlds it describes, following the basic
principle of syntactic anonymization [22]. There are several differences between our
publication model and existing publication models: (1) Our anonymization groups are
nonreciprocal and there is no fixed partition. (2) We publish exact values rather than
suppressed or generalized values for the QI labels. (3) The association between the
QI labels and sensitive labels are fixed, contrast to anatomy based approaches. (4) In
addition, we publish additional information (distance bitmap and distance threshold)
which indicates where the possible errors are for better utility while ensuring privacy
guarantee.
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3.4 Definitions and Principles
We consider a set-valued dataset D = (R, S) of n records. R = {r1, . . . , rn}, where
ri is the non-sensitive part of record i and S is a set of sensitive labels of records.
Each ri is represented as a characteristic vector of b bits, where b is the cardinality
of the universe of items I a record draws from. The value of the bit at position
j, ri,j , denotes the presence or absence of the j
th item in I in/from ri. We aim to
obfuscate the non-sensitive parts of records, producing R′ = {r′1, . . . , r′n}, where r′i is
the anonymized version of ri.
We say that an original record ri and an obfuscated record r
′
j match each other
when r′j is possibly an obfuscated from of ri. We then define the privacy guarantees
of k-anonymity [69] and ℓ-diversity [60] in the context of set-valued data as follows:
Definition 1. An anonymized set-valued data set D′=(R′, S) satisfies k-anonymity
with respect to the original data D = (R, S) iff each original record ri ∈ D matches
at least k records in D′, each of which has, from an adversary’s perspective, equal
probability to be the true match of ri. D
′ satisfies ℓ-diversity with respect to D iff
each ri ∈ D matches at least ℓ published records, each associated with a different
sensitive label s ∈ S.
These guarantees ensure that an adversary knowing the non-sensitive part of all
records, i.e. R, shall not be able to identify the true match of a record ri (and its sensi-






. The twin problems of k-anonymization
and ℓ-diversification for set-valued data call for satisfying these guarantees with a low
reduction of the utility of the original data:
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Problem Given a data set D = (R, S), transform D to an anonymized form D′
that satisfies k-anonymity (ℓ-diversity), maintaining as much of the data utility as
possible.
We describe a collection of matches encompassing a complete set of original and
anonymized records as an assignment.
Definition 2. Given a set-valued data set D = (R, S) and an anonymized version
thereof, D′ = (R′, S), an assignment α from D to D′ is an one-to-one mapping from
D to D′, denoted as α = {(ri1 , r′j1), . . . , (rin , r′jn)}, such that each ri ∈D is mapped
to exactly one r′j ∈D′, where ri matches r′j. In each pair (ri, r′j) ∈ α, we say that ri
is the preimage of r′j and r
′
j is the postimage of ri. Two assignments αp and αq are
disjoint if αp ∩ αq = ∅.
In order to achieve k-anonymity, we need to ensure that there exist k disjoint
assignments from original records in D to records in D′. After we have constructed
a set of k such desired assignments, we can determine the values of records in D′
therefrom, such that each record r′i ∈D′ is indeed compatible to (i.e., matches) the
records mapped to it. Last, we can select one of these k assignments as the one that
defines the true matches between D and D′ and publish any other attributes of our
data accordingly. This reasoning extends to the case of ℓ-diversity, with the additional
provision that the ℓ matches assigned to a record r in ℓ different assignments should
have different sensitive labels from each other.
A set of m disjoint assignments defines exactly m distinct matches in D′ for each
ri ∈ D (i.e., one by each assignment), and vice versa, i.e., m distinct matches in D
for each r′i ∈ D′. The net result can be represented by means of an all-assignments
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graph [81].
Definition 3. Given a set-valued data set D = (R, S) and its anonymized version
D′=(R′, S), an all-assignments graph G = (V,E) is a directed graph in which each
vertex v ∈ V stands for an original/anonymized record ri ∈ D and r′i ∈ D′, and an
edge (vi, vj) ∈ E is present iff ri matches r′j.
Our definition corresponds to the unified view of such a graph (see Figure 3.1(a)).
In a bipartite view, the vertex standing for an original record ri is separate from that
standing for their anonymized form r′i. A set of m disjoint assignments defines an
all-assignments graph in which each vertex has exactly m outgoing and m incoming
edges, i.e., an m-regular all-assignments graph. As [81] has shown, the reverse is
also true, that is, a m-regular all-assignments graph effectively defines m disjoint
assignments.
In our publication model, we publish the anonymized data D′ = (R′, S), while
for each anonymized record r′i we also publish a distance bitmap di, which denotes
with value 1 the bits where r′i may differ from any of its matches, and a distance
threshold ti, which upper-bounds the number of different bits between between r
′
i
and its matches, hence ti does not exceed the number of 1 bits in di. Taken together,
di and ti compactly define a set of possible worlds [22], one of which corresponds to
the true match of r′i.
3.5 Methodology Overview
Our overall methodology consists of the following three steps.
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First, we create an m-regular all-assignments graph, where m is k or ℓ. For k-
anonymization, we build such a graph as a ring over a cyclical order first, and extract
k disjoint assignments therefrom. In contrast to [81], we apply the methodology on
the full data, not on partitions thereof; we can do so thanks to a highly efficient
closed walk algorithm for generating assignments. For ℓ-diversification, we extract ℓ
disjoint assignments from the dataset’s complete graph first, and define an ℓ-regular
all-assignments graph thereby. In both cases, we strive to contain information loss
by ensuring matched records are close to each other.
Second, we randomly pick up one of the selected k (ℓ) disjoint assignments,
which defines the putative identity and (when such exists) the sensitive label of each
anonymized record r′i. The non-deterministic nature of this step provides a privacy
safeguard, as each preimage of r′i has the same probability of being selected.
Third, for each anonymized record, we set its base characteristic vector r′i, dis-
tance bitmap di, and distance threshold ti, as a function of itsm preimages. Let P(r′i)
be the set of m preimages of r′i. For the sake of data utility, the values in r
′
i should
be similar to those of its preimages. To achieve this result, we employ a bit voting
method: the pth bit of r′i is set as the most common p
th bit value among its preimages
(ties are resolved arbitrarily). For example, if P(r′i) = {1100, 1011, 0101}, then r′i is
set to be 1101; while r′i is not identical to any of its preimages, each one of its bits
has the most common value among those in P(r′i). Thus, the value of r′i minimizes
the sum of Hamming distances among r′i and its preimages. We emphasize that there
is no privacy loss caused by this provision. The match of a record is chosen with
equal probability among all the matches in the all-assignments graph. The bit voting
method has no effect on this choice; it only reveals information on what single items
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are frequent in the data, which is the kind of information we wish to give. Next, the
value of the pth bit of di is set to 0 iff the p
th bit is the same among all preimages
of r′i; otherwise it is set to 1, denoting that at least one preimage differs from r
′
i in
that position. Last, the distance threshold ti is measured as the maximum Hamming
distance among r′i and its preimages, ti = max{H(r′i, rj)∀rj ∈ P(r′i)}. Eventually, di
and ti define a set of possible worlds that is a superset of P(r′i).
3.6 Generating Assignments
In a nutshell, our methodology puts the characteristic vectors of records in a cyclical
order and extracts disjoint assignments using this order. We make three distinct
contributions along this process, as follows.
The utility achieved by ring generalization depends on the extent to which neigh-
boring records in the ring (hence a node’s matches) are close to each other by some
distance metric, hence limit the aﬄicted information loss. With a view on relational
data, [81] suggests that this order can be defined via a Hilbert curve on the space
defined by attribute value domains. Unfortunately, a Hilbert curve approach is nei-
ther efficient nor effective over the very high-dimensional space defined by set-valued
data. Therefore, we exploit the order defined by the Gray code over the characteristic
vectors of our data instead; this order is also used by [37] in the context of reciprocal
recoding. We enhance this order via a local approximate solution to the Traveling
Salesman Problem (TSP). We call our result a Gray-TSP order. The formulation
of this order and its application in nonreciprocal recoding are distinct contributions
of ours.
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In order to extract disjoint assignments from a ring all-assignments graph in the
context of k-anonymization, we employ a random walk algorithm introduced by [81].
Yet instead of aiming to create cycles via random walk, and backtracking whenever
the walk reaches a dead-end, as in [81], we propose a Closed Walk method: we allow
the followed path to revisit vertices and continue, unobstructed by dead-ends. Thus,
we gain a significant efficiency advantage that enables our algorithm to run smoothly
over large data.
When addressing the ℓ-diversification problem, we eschew ring generalization al-
together. Instead, we propose aGreedy Assignment Extraction algorithm, which
directly extracts ℓ disjoint assignments out of the raw data, under a constraint derived
from the ℓ-diversity requirement, and forms an ℓ-regular all-assignments graph out of
them. This Greedy algorithm utilizes both our Gray-TSP order and our Closed-Walk
approach to assignment extraction; in particular, it caters to utility by making greedy
next-hop choices during the closed walk, using the Gray-TSP order as a guide.
We now elaborate on these three building blocks of our approach.
3.6.1 The Gray-TSP Order
The Gray code, or reflected binary code [44], is a binary numeral system where two
successive values differ in only one bit, i.e. their Hamming distance is 1. Table 3.5
depicts an example of Gray encoding for the decimals from 0 to 7.
An itemset drawing items from a universe I of b items may take one of 2b values.
A Gray order defined over these values, expressed as characteristic vectors, provides
a guide for sorting a dataset D of records drawing items from I. Nevertheless, a
61
Decimal 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Binary 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
Gray 000 001 011 010 110 111 101 100
Table 3.5: An example of Gray coding
typical real-world data set D contains much fewer records than the 2b possible records
(characteristic vectors) of size b. In effect, even after the records in D are sorted
following the Gray order of their characteristic vectors, there will still be large gaps,
i.e. large Hamming distances, between consecutive records.
To mitigate this drawback, we use the Gray order only as an initialization step,
and then enhance it via a local application of an approximation algorithm for the
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). In particular, we first sort D by its Gray order,
to obtain a sorted version, σ(D). Then we divide σ(D) into segments. In each
segment Si, we fix the position of the first and last record, rf and rl, and treat each
record ri ∈ Si as a node vi in a complete weighted graph G(V,E), where each edge
(vi, vj) ∈E is weighted by the Hamming distance among the records corresponding
to its adjacent nodes, H(ri, rj). We aim to locally reorder the internal records in Si
so as to reduce the total sum of Hamming distances among consecutive records. This
problem amounts to solving the TSP on G. As the TSP is NP-hard, we apply an
efficient genetic algorithm therefor TSP [72], with vf as origin and vl as destination.
We divide σ(D) into segments so as to avoid applying the TSP algorithm on the
full size of the data. We emphasize that our strategy does not aim to acquire the
optimal TSP solution, but only to leverage a TSP algorithm in order to improve upon
the Gray order. We fix the first and last record in each segment so as to facilitate the
transitions among segments, preserving the Hamming distances provided by the Gray
order at these breakpoints. Ideally, these breakpoints should be placed at positions
where the Hamming distance between consecutive records in the Gray order is small.
To achieve this effect, we design a dynamic programming (DP) algorithm that finds
appropriate breakpoints. This DP algorithm receives as parameters the minimum and
maximum segment size allowed, m and M respectively, and detects the optimal way
of partitioning D into segments under these constraints, so that the sum of Hamming
distances at breakpoints is minimized. Let C(i) be the minimum sum of Hamming
distances for partitioning the first i records in σ(D). C(i) is recursively computed as:
C(i) = min
j∈[i−M,i−m]
{C(j) +H(rj, rj+1)}, C(0) = 0 (3.1)
In Equation 3.1, the j variable goes through all the allowed positions for the last
breakpoint in the examined prefix of σ(D), and chooses the best among them. The
overall solution is obtained by computing C(n) in O
(
(M−m)n) = O(n). Eventually,
after partitioning σ(D) into segments and locally enhancing each of them by TSP, we
arrive at a Gray-TSP order of D, denoted as φ(R).
3.6.2 The Closed Walk
We now describe our Closed Walk algorithm for assignment extraction. This algo-
rithm finds application both in our k-anonymization and ℓ-diversification algorithms.
In the former, it is used to extract random assignments from a k-regular ring all-
assignments graph over the Gray-TSP order of records, and makes choices in a ran-
dom manner, i.e. it is a Random Closed Walk. In the latter, it extracts assignments
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from the complete graph of the data (the graph where a directed edge exists from any
record to all other records), and operates in a greedy manner assisted by the Gray-
TSP order, i.e. it is a Greedy Closed Walk; we elaborate on this in Section 3.6.3. Here
we present the core aspect of the algorithm.
Our algorithm works in m rounds. Each round generates an assignment Ai, dis-
joint from previously generated ones, by iterative cycle extraction; it repetitively
starts from a random node, takes a (random or greedy) walk to build a cycle along
edges that have never been traversed before (neither in previous rounds nor in the
current one), and updates the graph rendering all selected edges as self-loops, until
all its nodes are covered; the final set of self-loop edges represents the generated as-
signment for that round. After m rounds, n×m edges have been used to generate m
disjoint assignments. In k-anonymization, all n×k edges of the ring all-assignments
graph are used. In ℓ-diversification, the n×ℓ chosen edges define the all-assignments
graph themselves.
The algorithm in [81], which we call WMC, works under the constraint that a
node cannot be revisited by the same random walk. Thus, WMC encounters a dead-
end whenever it brings itself in a situation where there is no available next hop to
move to, as it has previously traversed all nodes adjacent to its current position. In
such circumstances, WMC backtracks and attempts to correct a previous decision.
Such backtracking operations may occupy most of its running time, manifesting its
worst-case O(kn2) complexity.
In contrast, when our algorithm encounters a situation where all next hops have
already been visited by the current walk, it proceeds to revisit one of them, say u,
anyway; thereby, a deviant cycle starting from and ending at u is created. This
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deviant cycle is henceforward ignored, and the walk proceeds as usual, until it closes
by reaching the node it started from. In graph theory terms, while WMC strives to
build a cycle, i.e. a closed walk in which no vertex is revisited, our algorithm strives



























(a) All-assignments graph (b) Backtracking (c) Closed-walking
Figure 3.3: Backtracking vs. Closed-walking
We illustrate the difference between backtracking and closed-walking with an ex-
ample. Assume we start out with the 2-regular all-assignments graph in Figure 3.3(a).
We aim to extract an assignment, i.e. a set of cycles covering all vertices. Assume the
first round starts from r4, and randomly picks up its first 4 hops as in Figure 3.3(b).
Then WMC encounters a dead-end, as there is no previously unvisited next hop at
r2: both adjacent nodes, r1 and r3, are already in the walk, and backtracks from r2 to
r3 (Step 5). At r3, it still cannot find a previously unvisited next hop: the only alter-
native, r5, has been already visited. In effect, it backtracks onto r1 (Step 6). Then
WMC can eventually select a legitimate alternative next hop, r4, and thus completes
a cycle (Step 7). Altogether, it takes 7 steps to detect cycle r4 → r5 → r1 → r4.
Figure 3.3(c) shows how our closed-walk algorithm resolves the same conflict. At
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Step 5, instead of backtracking, the random walk revisits r1, thereby creating the
deviant cycle r1→r3→r2→ r1. The deviant nodes r3 and r2, are duly removed from
the cycle under construction. In step 6, the walk moves on to r4 and closes the cycle.
Thus, cycle r4→r5→r1→ r4 is constructed in only 6 steps. The difference in steps
between backtracking and closed-walking can be arbitrarily large; for a deviant cycle
of p edges, backtracking performs 2(p−1) steps until it returns to the origin of its
deviation, while closed-walking performs p steps; such O(p) differences, accumulated
over many deviations, translate to a significant efficiency advantage. We reexamine
this issue in our experiments.
Algorithm 1 generates the rth assignment Ar by closed walk. It starts out by
initializing Ar (Line 1), in which each ui is matched with u
′
i. This assignment does
not need to be valid; some of the matches (edges) in it may have already been used by
previous assignments. Our update process will later update Ar with valid matchings.
In Line 2, we set L as the list of unprocessed nodes, initially all nodes in the graph.
After a cycle is found, the nodes therein are removed from L. Hence, |L|monotonically
decreases as more cycles are found. Line 3 starts the cycle-discovery loop, to be
terminated when all nodes in the graph have been assigned to a cycle, i.e. when
L = ∅. For each cycle to be created, we initialize a visited data structure (Line
4), which keeps track of each traversed node and its chosen next hop(s); a node v
may have multiple next hops, if it has been revisited during the walk. This visited
structure serves two purposes: (i) the algorithm always attempts to select nodes that
have not been previously visited, so as to avoid creating deviant cycles; it only creates
a deviant cycle is when all possible next hops have already been visited; (ii) when v
is revisited, the choice of its next hop should avoid previously chosen next hops, so
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that we do not indefinitely reiterate the same deviant cycle.
We initiate a single cycle by picking up a node ui∈L at random (Line 5). Then,
the algorithm selects a next-hop node, u′j (Line 6); the method for picking up u
′
j is
either random or greedy; this point makes the difference between our Random Closed
Walk and Greedy Closed Walk variants. In both cases, we always make a choice not
made in a previous assignment. The random choice, used with k-anonymization, is
preferably made among next hops not already visited in the current walk; if such
options are not available, then a random choice is made among visited ones, creating
a deviant cycle. We elaborate on the greedy selection, used with ℓ-diversification, in
the next section. Once the next hop has been chosen, the pair (ui, u
′
j) is duly added
to the visited data structure (Line 7). Then a loop iterates until the cycle under
construction is closed by reaching u′i (Lines 8-12). At each iteration, we pick (Line
9) the current preimage ux of the selected next hop u
′
j in the existing assignment
Ar, choose a new next hop, u
′
y, for ux (Line 10), add the pair (ux, u
′
y) to the visited
structure, and set u′y as the child of u
′
j, so as to retrieve the created cycle later (Line
11). The matching (ux, u
′
y) is not registered in the extracted assignment Ar at this
point; it may be updated by later steps of the same closed walk. Last, we pass the
reference of u′y to u
′
j, so as to proceed with the next hop (Line 12). When the internal
while loop (Lines 8-12) terminates, a cycle has been discovered. Now the constructed
assignment Ar is eventually updated with the matchings in the discovered cycle (Line
13). This update may potentially annul some matchings created by a previous cycle
iteration. Yet the overall process is progressive, as at least one new record selected
from L is added to the set of matched records with each cycle; previously matched
records may re-orient their matches (i.e., their preimage and postimage), but they do
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Algorithm 1: Assignment extraction by Closed Walk
Data: The dataset φ(R) and φ(R′) sorted in Gray-TSP order; The privacy
level m; Current round r
Result: An assignment Ar
Ar ← {(ui, u′i)} where ui ∈ φ(R) and u′i ∈ φ(R′) ;1
L← R;2
while L 6= ∅ do3
visited← new empty list;4
Pick ui ∈ L at random;5




while u′j 6= u′i do8
ux ← u s.t. (u, u′j) in Ar;9
u′y ← Pick(ux, φ(R), φ(R′), visited);10
add (ux, u
′
y) to visited; set the child of u
′




Update Ar with the matchings in the cycle;13
Remove nodes matched with nodes in the cycle from L;14
return Ar;15
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not become unmatched. Lastly, the set of newly matched nodes is removed from L,
so as not to be selected as a starting point for cycle-creation again (Line 14). When
all nodes are removed from L, one assignment has been extracted.
While the worst-case complexity of our algorithm is quadratic, it performs less re-
dundant steps than WMC [81], and is therefore more efficient. Our algorithm is based
on the assumption that the walk can always be closed by returning to the starting
node without reusing any edge. The following theorem justifies this assumption.
Theorem 3.6.1. In a directed graph G where each node u has the same number mu
of incoming and outgoing edges, if there is a path from node v to v′, then there exists
a path from v′ to v that does not reuse any edge in the path from v to v′ .
Proof. Consider the graph G′ consisting of all nodes and edges in G except the edges
along the path from v to v′, and with an additional edge from v to v′. Each node
in G′ has the same number of incoming and outgoing edges, as we have deleted one
incoming and one outgoing edge from each node along the path, and the added edge
from v to v′ compensates for the edges these nodes have lost. If a path from v′ to v
exists in G′, then it also exists in G, and by definition of G′, does not reuse any edge
in the path from v to v′. Thus, it suffices to prove that such a path exists in G′.
Assume there is no such path. Then consider W , the set of nodes in G′ that can
be reached from v′; v′ is in W and has at least one outgoing edge (given that it has
an incoming edge), hence W is non-empty. By definition, each outgoing edge from
(a node in) W leads to a node in W , hence is an incoming edge to W . Since each
node in G′ has an equal number of incoming and outgoing edges, it follows that each
incoming edge to W is also outgoing from W . Still, by our assumption, v does not
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belong to W , hence the edge from v to v′, is incoming to, but not outgoing from W ;
a contradiction. By reductio ad absurdum, it follows that there is a path from v′ to
v in G′, hence a path from v′ to v in G, which does not reuse any edge in the path
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(b) SV Assignment (c) Bit voting
Figure 3.4: Workflow and publication details in our example
Figure 3.4 carries the example in the introduction forward by illustrating all el-
ements of our methodology. The 3-regular ring all-assignments graph we presented
in Figure 3.1(a) is already defined on the Gray-TSP order over the dataset. Fig-






































































































































(a) Assignment 1 (b) Assignment 2 (c) Assignment 3
Figure 3.5: Extracted assignments in our example
Gray order, reducing the sum of their Hamming distances from 14 to 12. The ap-
plication of the TSP algorithm further reduces this distance to 10. The Gray-TSP
order (r2, r4, r1, r3, r5, r6) is then used in the graph of Figure 3.1(a), whose edges are
also shown in Figure 3.4(a). The values of anonymized records are defined by the
majority vote of each record’s preimages in the graph, as also shown in Figure 3.4(a).
The details of voting are shown for record r′3 as example, in Figure 3.4(c). Further-
more, Figure 3.5 depicts the three disjoint assignments we extract. Eventually, we
randomly pick one of these; assume the one in Figure 3.4(c) is chosen. We use this
assignment as a guide to assign presumed identifies and any other attributes, such
as sensitive labels, to our six records, as in Figure 3.4(b). The anonymized data we
obtain is the same as those in Table 3.3. However, for the sake of simplicity, in that
table we did not yet present the effect of assigning sensitive values according to a
randomly selected assignment.
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3.6.3 Greedy Assignment Extraction
The solution in our example applies our k-anonymization algorithm and satisfies 3-
anonymity. By chance, it also happens to satisfy 3-diversity, as each original record
matches three anonymized records of different sensitive values. However, in order
to systematically address the ℓ-diversification problem, we need to ensure that the
all-assignments graph we work with satisfies the ℓ-diversity requirement itself, i.e., it
should match each original record to ℓ anonymized postimages of different sensitive
values. Such an all-assignments graph cannot be built by applying a simple rule over
a given order, as we do by constructing a ring for k-anonymization. However, we can
eschew the a priori construction of an all-assignments graph altogether. Instead, we
start out by assuming a complete all-assignments graph, i.e. a graph where an edge
exists from every preimage to every postimage, extract ℓ assignments therefrom, and
build the all-assignments-graph we eventually use as the union of these ℓ assignments.
Assuming the full data set satisfies ℓ-diversity (is ℓ-eligible [60]), such ℓ assignments
can be extracted, so that each record obtains ℓ-diverse matches. The burden falls upon
our closed-walk algorithm to take sensitive values in consideration when picking next
hops. We now outline our method for picking up next hops in a manner that satisfies
the ℓ-diversity requirement, i.e., ensures that each postimage a record is matched to
has a different sensitive value from those it was previously matched to, while otherwise
making greedy decisions for the benefit of utility. Algorithm 2 presents a pseudo-code
for this greedyPick method, to be used by our closed-walk algorithm.
In a nutshell, given a preimage u and the TSP-Gray-sorted node lists φ(R) and
φ(R′), greedyPick aims to return an eligible postimage for u that is close to u by
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Algorithm 2: greedyPick(u, φ(R), φ(R′), visited)
i← the rank of u in φ(R);1
last← false;2
for j ← 0 to n
2
+ 1 do3
u′1 ← record at rank i+ j mod n in φ(R′);4
u′2 ← record at rank i− j mod n in φ(R′);5
Su ← sens. labels of records previously matched with u;6
for p← 1 to 2 do7
if (u, u′p) ∈ any A1 . . . Ar−1 or visited then8
u′p ← null;9
if u′p.s ∈ Su then10
u′p ← null;11
if u′1 and u
′
2 both are null then12
continue loop;13
u′ ← u′p ∈ {u′1, u′2} s.t. H(u′p, u) is minimum;14
if ∄ ux, s.t. (ux, u′) ∈ visited then15
u′′ ← u′; break loop;16
if last = false then17
u′′ ← u′; last← true;18
return u′′;19
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Hamming distance. The rank of u in φ(R) is denoted as i (Line 1). Our algorithm
uses a boolean, initialized as false (Line 2), which indicates whether an option of last
resort has been reached, so that a deviant cycle may be created by picking up as next
hop a node already visited in the current walk. As discussed, such an option is not
preferred by our closed-walk algorithm; however, if another choice is not available,
then it can be opted for. For the sake of utility, we prefer to select a postimage that
is close to u in the Gray-TSP order. The search for such a postimage is conducted
progressively by the for loop in Lines 3-20. Each iteration considers the next two
candidate records, u′1 and u
′
2, that are one position further away from u (in two
directions along the one-dimensional order) than previously considered ones (Lines
4-5), and tries to match either u′1 or u
′
2 with u, while satisfying the following criteria:
(i) u cannot be matched to a record it has been matched to in a previous assignment;
(ii) in case u is being revisited by the closed walk (Algorithm 1) (i.e., a deviant cycle
is created), it cannot be matched again to a record it was matched to before in this
walk; as we discussed, this measure is needed so as to ensure that the walk does not
repeat the same deviant cycle indefinitely; (iii) for ℓ-diversity to be satisfied, u cannot
be matched to a record having the same sensitive label as a match of u selected in
a previous assignment. In case both u′1 and u
′
2 fail these criteria, the loop continues
to the next iteration (Lines 6-13). Otherwise, we pick the one that has the lowest
Hamming distance to u as u′ (Line 14). If u′ has not been previously visited in the
current walk, the loop terminates and u′ is returned as u′′ (Lines 15-16). Otherwise,
if no option of last resort has been set before, u′ is marked as the best such option
(Lines 17-18). Thus, u′ will be eventually returned, unless a more preferable option
is found in a subsequent iteration.
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We emphasize the greedy character of the process. As φ(R) is sorted by the Gray-
TSP order, and we always pick up u′ as close as possible to u, we expect the Hamming
distance between them to be small; at the same time, we avoid u′ with sensitive labels
already picked up in previous assignments. We therefor maintain the set of sensitive
labels already assigned to u, Su (Line 6). After u
′ is picked as a match for u, its label
is also added to Su. Eventually, our all-assignments graph is created as the union of
ℓ assignments extracted by closed walk using our greedyPick method.
Dataset # records n Avg. size Universe size |I|
Chess 3,196 37 75
Pumsb 49,046 75 7,117
Table 3.6: Dataset information
3.7 Experimental Evaluation
We now evaluate our schemes experimentally. We use two real-life set-valued data:
Pumbs and Chess, available at the UCI Machine Learning Repository.1 The data
specifications are presented in Table 3.6. Pumsb contains transactions representing
a sample of responses from the Los Angeles – Long Beach area census question-
naire. Such data sets are used in targeted marketing campaigns for identifying a
population likely to respond to a particular promotion. Chess contains 37-attribute
board-descriptions for chess endgames. The first 36 attributes describe the board,
while the last attribute is the classification: “win” or “nowin”. For our evaluation
1Online at http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/
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of our ℓ-diversification scheme, we have introduced sensitive labels in all data in a
consistent manner. We obtain the empirical distribution of sensitive labels from the
histogram of occupation values from the census data2 of 1990, and assign to each
record a randomly sampled sensitive label. The extracted census data has 3,030,728
records with 470 distinct occupation attribute values.
The goal of our experiments is to show that our proposed scheme allows the utility
of the data to be better preserved than the state-of-the-art scheme under affordable
running time needed by the algorithm. To achieve this goal, we evaluate our schemes
in: (i) the information loss incurred by the anonymization process, which is measured
in terms of the amount of bit changes in the data due to anonymization. (ii) the
accuracy in answering aggregate queries over the data, in which we show that the
data anonymized by our algorithm allows more accurate aggregate query answering
than the state-of-the-art. (iii) runtime efficiency and scalability. Our algorithms were
implemented in Java and experiments ran on a 4 CPU, 2.4GHz Linux server with
8GB RAM.
3.7.1 Information Loss
We first assess the information loss caused by our techniques. As there is no previous
work that k-anonymizes set-valued data by generalization without employing a hier-
archy, we focus the evaluation of our k-anonymization scheme on assessing the benefit
brought about by the TSP-Gray sorting, in terms of reducing information loss. On
the other hand, in the case of ℓ-diversification, there is previous work we can compare












































































(c) QE for Chess vs. k (d) QE for Chess vs. ℓ
Figure 3.6: Bit error rate and query error for Chess data
most recommended reciprocal anonymization scheme proposed in [37].
CAHD partitions records in groups, assisted by a Gray order, so that the distribu-
tion of sensitive labels within groups satisfies a privacy requirement p, equivalent to
ℓ-diversity for p = 1
ℓ
. Eventually, the data is published by breaking the associations
among individual records and their sensitive labels. In order to render CAHD com-
parable to our scheme, we apply our publication model on the data obtained from
CAHD as well, i.e., we generalize the characteristic vectors of records within a group













































































(c) QE for Pumsb vs. k (d) QE for Pumsb vs. ℓ
Figure 3.7: Bit error rate and query error for Pumsb data
error inflicted by this model, we propose an Error Rate (ER) metric, defined as the
average ratio of the number of bits flipped in the published base characteristic vector
r′i of an original record ri to the number of bits valued 1 in ri.
We measure ER for the anonymized Pumsb and Chess data. For our schemes,
we set the chunk-size range in Gray-TSP sorting to [300, 350], [100, 150], and [10, 30],
respectively. These parameters are used in all our experiments. To evaluate the
benefit brought about by our sorting scheme, we prepare each data set in two differ-
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ent orders: one using the Gray order only, and another using the Gray-TSP order,
and apply ring-based nonreciprocal generalization on each. Figures 3.6(a) and 3.7(a)
show our ER results as a function of the k parameter. Remarkably, lower ER values
are achieved with the Gray-TSP order than with the plain Gray order; this result
confirms that the TSP enhancement bears fruits in terms of containing information
loss. We emphasize that the Gray-only technique is also using nonreciprocal recoding.
Figures 3.6(b) and 3.7(b) show our results on ℓ-diversification, comparing our com-
plete nonreciprocal method (NR) to CAHD, as a function of ℓ. The results show a
clear utility advantage for NR; this advantage is gained thanks to both nonreciprocal
recoding and our TSP-based enhancement of the Gray order.
3.7.2 Answering Aggregation Queries
Next, we study the accuracy achieved with anonymized data over aggregation queries.
We propose two types of queries, which count records based on whether a certain
itemset is present in or absent from them. Given In⊆I and Ex⊆I, these types are
defined as:
Type I: Select COUNT(r) FROM R′ WHERE In ⊆ IS(ri);
Type II: Select COUNT(r) FROM R′ WHERE Ex ∩ IS(ri) = ∅;
A Type I (II) query count records with certain items present (absent). We first
specify the size of In and Ex based on the average number of records and the universe
size in each dataset. In particular, the values of (|In|, |Ex|) for Pumsb and Chess are
(1, 5) and (3, 4), respectively. We randomly select |In| items from I to form In, and
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|Ex| items from I to form Ex. For each tested value of k, we run 500 random queries,
and measure the query error (QE), defined as QE = |Co−Ca|
n
, where Co (Ca) is the
result obtained from the original (anonymized) data and n the size of the dataset.
Figures 3.6(c,d) and 3.7(c,d) show the average QE results. Again, our TSP-based
method permits lower query error than the variant using only a Gray-code order,
while our nonreciprocal ℓ-diversification scheme clearly outperforms CAHD for both


















































(a) Time with Pumsb (b) k-anonymization (c) ℓ-diversification
Figure 3.8: Runtime vs. k and size
3.7.3 Runtime Results
We now evaluate the benefit brought about by our closed-walk algorithm for assign-
ment extraction as compared to the backtracking algorithm in [81]. Figure 3.8(a)
presents the time needed for assignment generation in k-anonymization by both algo-
rithms on the Pumsb data, as a function of k. Our closed walk offers a clear efficiency
benefit. We also examine scalability in data size. We obtain data sets of size 2×,
4×, 8× and 16× that of Chess by duplication and random perturbation. We ran
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both compared method on these data, with k set to 16. Figure 3.8(b) shows our re-
sults on logarithmic axes. Our closed-walk method maintains an advantage of almost
one order of magnitude over increasing data size. We also evaluate the scalability
of our ℓ-diversification technique vis-a`-vis CAHD on the same data, setting ℓ to 6.
Figure 3.8(c) shows our results. For our technique, the measured time includes both
the time for TSP-Gray sorting and that for assignment generation. Expectedly, our
method requires more time than CAHD, but presents a similarly scalable growth
trend. Arguably, the extra time it requires is a reasonable cost for the utility benefits
it brings.
3.8 Summary
In this work we revisited the problem of sharing set-valued data while conforming
to k-anonymity-like and ℓ-diversity-like privacy guarantees. We proposed a novel
nonreciprocal anonymization scheme for such data, whereby it is not required that
original records match anonymized ones in groups. In the process, we also brought
the state of the art for nonreciprocal anonymization forward in terms of efficiency,
applied it on a complete data, and developed a special method for nonreciprocal ℓ-
diversification. Our technique comes along with a novel way to devise a total order
over set-valued records, employing both the Gray-code order but improving on it by
applying a TSP algorithm. Our experimental study demonstrates that our schemes
preserve data utility to a degree not achieved by previous methods; the extra runtime
required compared to CAHD is an affordable price to pay for the benefits we gain. In
the future, we plan to investigate how nonreciprocal anonymization techniques can
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Anonymization via Random Edge
Perturbation
4.1 Introduction
With the constant evolutions in hardware and software, it becomes feasible for data
owners (e.g., companies, organizations) to store very large volumes of digital hu-
man interactions. Examples include groups of players in an online game, persons
that share files in peer-to-peer networks, or social networks describing relationships
among individuals. Such networks can be represented by a social graph G = (V,E)
where vertices represent individuals and edges represent relations (e.g., friendship
connections, email communication, etc). Data owners wish to publish these graphs














































(d) Perturbed graph Gp.
Figure 4.1: Example of a social graph.
4.1.1 Structural attack in graph publication
Naturally, data owners are not willing to publish sensitive information contained in
their networks. A common procedure, called na¨ıve graph anonymization, is based on
the fact that network analysis focuses on graph properties like density, connectivity
and degree distribution. Identifying attributes (e.g., names, e-mails or IP addresses)
can thus be removed without any impact on the graph characteristics. For example,
the original graph Go in Figure 4.1(a) is transformed to the anonymized graph Gn
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(cf. Figure 4.1(b)) by replacing the names on the vertices with random numbers.
Unfortunately, na¨ıve anonymization does not always preserve privacy. As stated
by Hay et al. [45], structural similarities combined with background knowledge, can
expose individuals. Consider, for instance, an adversary who has access to the anony-
mized graph Gn (cf. Figure 4.1(b)) and knows the following: “Suzanne has 3 friends”
and “no friend of Suzanne has more than 2 friends”. Such knowledge can help the
adversary identify Suzanne. From the first information, the candidates set is reduced
to nodes {3, 7, 8}. By combining this with the second information, the adversary can
conclude that Suzanne corresponds to node 3 in Gn.
Backstrom et al. [7] showed that a practical way for an adversary to gain struc-
tural knowledge, is to embed a known subgraph in the social graph (e.g., by reg-
istering dummy users and linking them to the victims) prior to the anonymization
and publication process. In Figure 4.1(c), the adversary created a subgraph of five
nodes with known structure (i.e., the subgraph {11, 12, 13, 14, 15}). Malicious nodes
were connected to Suzanne and Robert (e.g., by tricking them to respond to a bogus
friendship invitation) before the anonymization. Assuming that the adversary is able
to efficiently find his embedded subgraph, he can identify Suzanne and Robert and
therefore compromise their link relation.
Let GA = (VA, EA) be the adversary’s subgraph and k = |VA| be the number of
nodes in GA. Typically k is small (i.e., in the order of
√
log |Go|). This is because
the number of possible subgraphs with k nodes grows exponentially with k2, and the
probability of uniqueness of the subgraph increases very fast with k. In the general
case, finding GA is an intractable problem [36], so it is impractical for very large
graphs. For this reason, the authors of [7] only consider subgraphs with connected
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backbone (i.e., there exists a connected k-path, so that all nodes in the subgraph
can be visited in a walk without repeating any node or edge). They describe an
efficient method called walk-based attack, which works as follows: Let Do be a vector
of size k such that Do[i] is the degree of the ith node in GA; Do is called the degree
sequence of GA. In Figure 4.1(c), Do = [2, 5, 3, 4, 2] for the subgraph with nodes
{11, 12, 13, 14, 15}. The adversary can find GA by performing an efficient search for
paths with degree sequence Do.
4.1.2 Random edge perturbation
The first contribution of this work is the theoretical investigation of random edge
perturbation as a method to prevent the walk-based attack. This is the first step
towards a complete theoretical analysis of the random edge perturbation scheme for
any structural attack. Let µ be the perturbation probability (i.e., the probability of
an edge to be added to, or deleted from the graph). We assume that the original
graph Go is first transformed to Gn through na¨ıve anonymization; subsequently, Gn
is transformed to Gp through random edge perturbation. Figure 4.1(d) shows the
perturbed graph Gp. Compared to Gn, the edges between nodes (4, 5), (8, 9) and
(11, 13) have been removed, whereas edges (13, 15) and (5, 10) have been added.
Observe that the degree sequence Do cannot be found in Gp; therefore the walk-based
attack fails.
Interestingly, Ying and Wu [95] reject the random edge perturbation as a method
for privacy preservation, basically because important graph characteristics may de-
grade. However, we present a very different result by showing that we can exhibit
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estimation algorithms that accurately recover the important graph utility metrics (e.g.
density, degree distribution, transitivity, modularity etc) from the perturbed graph.
As a case study, in Section 4.3 we apply this methodology to several graph utilities;
all these are important metrics in graph analysis [25]. Our estimation algorithms are
not solely available to the presented graph metrics, in addition, we also introduce a
generic framework for estimating a class of utility metrics. Moreover, with our exper-
iments we offer evidence that it is also possible to achieve very good results for more
complicated data mining operation using randomly perturbed graphs.
An undesirable side effect of the recovery of the graph properties, is that an ad-
versary can employ similar methodology to launch sophisticated attacks. We demon-
strate this in Section 4.4, where we develop a interval-walk attack. This is a general-
ization of the walk-based attack, where multiple possible degree orders are examined,
each with its own probability of appearance. Although the interval-walk attack is
more computationally intensive than the walk-based one, our experiments revealed
that it is practical over perturbed graphs and the probability of success is much
higher than the walk-based attack.
Motivated by this problem and the following question: if an attacker can apply
the same idea of estimations over a perturbed graph to launch sophisticated attacks,
what is the point of perturbing? We generalize in Section 4.5 our theoretical study
to take into account any possible structural attack. Our analysis is generic and even
covers the extreme case of powerful adversaries having enough computational power
to enumerate all possible subgraphs of size k inside Gn. To illustrate this, assume
that the original subgraph of the adversary contains nodes {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5}, which
correspond to the following anonymized nodes in Figure 4.1(c): u1 → 11, . . . , u5 → 15.
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Recall that the adversary can only access the perturbed graph Gp in Figure 4.1(d).
His goal is to relabel Gp in such a way that his labels u1, . . . , u5 are assigned to
the correct nodes. From the adversary’s point of view, his attack scheme should be
based on the following two important points: (i) any permutation of 5 nodes needs
to considered, and (ii) any permutation has a positive probability of representing
the nodes in the embedded subgraph. To maximize the probability of success, the
adversary has to choose the subgraph along with the labeling that gives the maximum
likelihood of being his originally embedded subgraph. Our analysis calculates the
maximum probability of success, given k and µ.
In summary, our contributions are the following:
1. We show that important graph properties, such as density, degree distribution
and transitivity can be recovered accurately from the perturbed graph. We
also introduce and discuss a generic framework for estimating a class of utility
metrics. We also show that accurate data mining tasks are also possible using
the perturbed data.
2. We develop a novel interval-walk attack which is more powerful than the walk-
based one to underline the idea that attackers can use the same methodology
and notion of estimations to launch sophisticated attacks.
3. We study theoretically the probability of success of any structural attack. Our
analysis and formulas can be directly used by the data owner to assess the
privacy risk of the perturbed social graph data before any publication.
4. In Section 4.6, we confirm experimentally the theoretical analysis, using syn-
thetic and real datasets.
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4.2 Notations and Definitions
Let Go = (V,E) be an undirected graph representing the original social graph and
let N = |V |. Without loss of generality, we assume that V is ordered and V [i] refers
to the ith node in the set. Let L be a labeling function such that L(V [i], Go) returns
the label αi of node V [i] in Go; note that labels are unique.
Na¨ıve anonymization replaces all labels in Go with random pseudonyms. The
resulting graph is denoted by Gn, whereas the new labels are given by L(V [i] ,Gn),
i ∈ [1, N ]. Note that Gn = (V,E) since Gn and Go contain the same set of nodes and
edges.
Random edge perturbation produces a perturbed graph Gp = (V,Ep) from a
na¨ıvely anonymized graph Gn by adding or removing edges. Specifically, let µ ∈ [0, 12)
be a user defined parameter, called perturbation probability. Let (V [i], V [j]) denote
the edge between nodes V [i] and V [j]. For every pair of nodes V [i], V [j] ∈ V :

if (V [i], V [j]) ∈ E, then (V [i], V [j]) 6∈ Ep with prob. µ
if (V [i], V [j]) 6∈ E, then (V [i], V [j]) ∈ Ep with prob. µ
The adversary knows a subgraph GA = (VA, EA) in the original graph Go. GA
contains k nodes, which are ordered. Obviously, the labels L(VA[i], GA) are known
to the adversary. His goal is to find an ordered set Y of k nodes in Gp, such that
L(Y [i], Go) = L(VA[i], GA), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and Y [i] ∈ Y .
4.3 Utility Preservation
So far we have described the impact of random edge perturbation on the probability
of success in the walk-based attack. However, random edge perturbation comes at a
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cost as some graph characteristics will be degraded with respect to the perturbation
value µ.
In this section, we study the effect of the perturbation algorithm on different
graph utility metrics. There is no single metric for measuring the utility of a graph
and organizations may use the graph for different purposes. However, there are quite
a few accepted metrics for measuring different properties (the interested reader can
refer to [25] which provides an excellent survey on metrics for measuring complex
graphs). As a case study, we choose four widely used metrics and test them on several
different graph models, i.e. density, degree distribution, transitivity and modularity.
The authors in [95] assert that the graph utility metrics degrade very fast with
random edge perturbation. However, we believe that this conclusion is only partially
true. An important conclusion that we want to draw is that even if the metrics
measured directly from the perturbed graph may vary greatly from the ones in the
original graph, we can still design algorithms that can achieve very good estimations
of the original metrics. In the following, we first show estimation algorithms for the
four selected utility metrics then we present a general framework for estimating a
class of utility metrics.
4.3.1 Density
The density metric for a general graph measures the ratio of the number of edges
in the graph over the maximum number of edges. It describes the average level of
connectivity between nodes. Formally, the density value is defined as follows:
density =
2|E|
|V |2 − |V | (4.1)
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Due to its importance and simplicity, density is very widely used in social graph
data analysis. However, due to perturbation, the number of edges in the original
graph will be different from the perturbed graph, resulting utility loss in density
measurement. The idea behind our estimation algorithm is as follows: since the
density value of a graph depends on the graph size and the number of edges, when
the graph size is known, we only need to estimate the number of edges in the original
graph. Let h = |E| be a variable representing the number of edges in graph Go.
hp = |Ep| be the real number of edges in the perturbed graph Gp as observed. Though
the real value of h is not known as the original graph Go is never published, it can be





In the above equation, Pr(hp|h) is the probability of having hp edges in the perturbed
graph when the number of edges in the original graph is h. Intuitively, the estimator
hˆ is the number of edges in the original graph that would result in hp edges in the
perturbed graph with highest probability.
Density estimation: From the definition of hˆ, we need to find a value h that
maximizes Pr(hp|h). Alternatively, we can find the value of hˆ by establishing an
equation with the following rationale: since each edge removal and addition during
perturbation can be viewed as an independent Bernoulli trial, the value of h that max-
imizes Pr(hp|h) is the one that makes the expected number of edges in the perturbed
graph to be the same as hp. The following equation holds:
hp = ⌊hˆ · (1− µ) + (N
2 −N
2





is the maximum number of edges in the graph and ⌊⌉ is the operation for
rounding to the nearest integer. The r.h.s. of the equation is the expected number
of edges in the perturbed graph rounded to the nearest integer when the number of
edges in the original graph is hˆ, which is set to be equal to hp.
We can solve hˆ in equation 4.3, and get:




(1− 2µ) ⌉ (4.4)
4.3.2 Degree distribution
The degree is an important characteristic of a node. For example, in a social graph,
the degree may describe the number of friends that a person has. Degree distribu-
tion describes the percentage of nodes with a particular degree. In many real world
networks, the degrees of nodes exhibit power law distribution. The estimation algo-
rithm used for the degree distribution is similar to that of the density estimation.
The original degree of a node can be estimated using the degree of this node in the
perturbed graph. Although there is a great probability of error in the estimation for
an individual node, the degree distribution for the whole graph can still be accurately
estimated.
Degree distribution estimation: To estimate degree distribution, we focus on
the estimation of the original degree of a particular node. Let dp, and dˆo be the
observed degree of the node in Gp, and the estimated degree of the node in Go,
respectively. Similar to the density estimation, dˆo can be computed based on the
observed value of dp. We set dp to be equal to the expected degree of this node in
the perturbed graph when the original degree is dˆo, and we can form the following
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Tp Xp Ip Dp
To (1 µ)
3 (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)µ2 µ3
Xo (1 µ)
2µ (1 µ)3 (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)µ2 µ3 (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)µ2
Io (1 µ)µ
2 (1 µ)2µ µ3 (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)3 (1 µ)2µ
Do µ
3 (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)µ2 (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)2µ (1 µ)3
Figure 4.2: Convert a pattern in Go to another in Gp.
equation:
dp = dˆo · (1− µ) + (N − 1− dˆo) · µ (4.5)
Therefore,
dˆo =
dp − (N − 1) · µ
(1− 2µ) (4.6)
If ˆdo[i] is the estimation of the degree of the i
th node, then [dˆo[1], dˆo[2], . . . , dˆo[N ]]
forms an estimation of the degree sequence of all nodes in the original graph, from
which the degree distribution can be computed.
4.3.3 Transitivity
The transitivity metric measures the presence of loops of order three in a graph. In
a social graph, if v1 is connected to both v2 and v3, then there is a relatively high
probability that v2 and v3 are also connected (i.e., the friend of my friend is also my
friend). Generally speaking, most social graphs present high transitivity behaviors.
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In the above formula, N∆ is the number of triangles in the graph, andN3 is the number
of connected node triplets. A triplet is a graph structure that involves exactly 3 nodes
(not necessarily connected).
Transitivity estimation: The computation of transitivity requires the count
of number of triangles and the count of number of connected triplets in the origi-
nal graph. However, due to perturbation, such structures may be destroyed in the
perturbed graph. Nevertheless, we can count of the number different triplets struc-
tures in the perturbed graph, and use them to estimate the number of triangles and
connected triplets in the original graph.
We consider a triplet of nodes in Go. The possible edge connections in the triplet
are always one of the four following patterns:
• Pattern 1 : They are all connected and form a triangle. Let To be the estimated
number of triangles in Go and let Tp be the number of triangles in Gp.
• Pattern 2 : They form a connected triplet with two edges. Let Xo and Xp be
the estimated number of connected triplet in Go and Gp, respectively.
• Pattern 3 : They form a disconnected triplet with only one edge. Let Io and Ip
be the estimated number of this pattern in Go and in Gp, respectively.
• Pattern 4 : They are completely disconnected with no edges. Let Do and Dp be
estimated the number of this pattern in Go and in Gp, respectively.
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For each possible pattern triplet in Go, there is a probability that it will get
transformed into one of the three other patterns in Gp. For example, a triangle in the
original graph can be come a triplet in either Pattern 2, Pattern 3 or Pattern 4 or
remain unchanged at different probabilities. Figure 4.2 summarizes the probability of
one pattern in the original graph to be converted to another pattern in the perturbed
graph. For example, the probability that a triangle in the original remains unchanged
in the perturbed graph is (1−µ)3. The probability that a triangle becomes a Pattern
2 triplet (three possible cases as shown in Figure 4.2) in the perturbed graph is
3(1−µ)2µ. With the count of triplets in different patterns (Tp, Xp, Ip and Dp) in the
perturbed graph, and the pattern converting probabilities summarized in Figure 4.2,
we can build a system of linear equations with four unknown variables Tˆo, Xˆo, Iˆo
and Dˆo in the similar way as in the equations for density and degree distribution
estimation. Solving the system of equations, we get Tˆo and Xˆo:
Tˆo = − 1(−1+2µ)3 (Ipµ2 −Dpµ3 − Ipµ3 + Tp
−3µTp + 3µ2Tp − µ3Tp − µXp
+2µ2Xp − µ3Xp)
(4.8)
Xˆo = − 1(−1+2µ)3 (−2Ipµ+ 3Dpµ2 + 4Ipµ2
−3Dpµ3 − 3Ipµ3 − 3µTp + 6µ2Tp − 3µ3Tp
+Xp − 3µXp + 5µ2Xp − 3µ3Xp)
(4.9)
From the estimated value of Tˆo and Xˆo, based on the results from the equations 4.8







Many social graphs exhibit community structures. A characteristic of such graph is
that the ratio links within the community is relatively higher than the ratio of links
between different communities. The modularity is a metric that is used for measuring
whether a partition of graph exhibits some community properties. Before computing
the modularity, the graph has to be partitioned into a fixed number of communities.
A symmetric matrix A is formed such that the elements A[i, i] (i.e., the diagonal of
matrix A) are the fractions of links between the nodes in the same community i. The
other elements A[i, j] are the fractions of links between communities i and j. The










Modularity estimation: The modularity value depends on the values of the
entries in the matrix A. To estimate the modularity value, we first create an estimator
Aˆ for matrix A. To determine Aˆ, we need the help of another symmetric matrix. Let
B be a symmetric matrix in which the entry B[i, i] refers to the number of edges within
the the community i and B[i, j] refers to the number of edges between community
i and community j. Bp and Bˆ refer to the matrix in the perturbed graph and the
estimator for B, respectively. Once Bˆ is computed, Aˆ can be computed easily from
Bˆ by dividing each entry with the estimated total number of edges. Since the entries
in B are counts of edges between nodes, we can apply similar technique as in density
estimation to estimate the value of entries in Bˆ. From the perturbed graph, the matrix
Bp can directly be computed by counting the edges within and between partitions.
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The relation between Bˆ[i, i] and Bp[i, i] is as follows:
Bˆ[i, i] =
2Bp[i, i]− (z2i + zi) · µ
2− 4µ (4.12)
In the above equation zi is the number of nodes in the partition. The relation
between Bˆ[i, j] and Bp[i, j] is as follows, assuming the number of nodes in community
i and j are zi and zj respectively:
Bˆ[i, j] =
Bp[i, j]− zi · zj · µ
1− µ (4.13)
With the above estimation, each entry in Aˆ can be computed by dividing the
corresponding entry in Bˆ by the estimated number of edges in the graph.
In the above, we introduced several estimation algorithms for four widely used
graph utility metrics. We also managed to show that density, degree distribution,
transitivity and modularity of the original graph can be estimated from the perturbed
graph. The accuracy of the estimation is verified in the experiments in Section 4.6.
However, there are a lot of other utility metrics that can be used, depending on the
analyst or end-user task. For example, the analyst may be interested only on the
average path length in the social graph, or he can be focusing on different entropy
measures to have an idea of the heterogeneity of the graph [25]. It is of course
impossible to list exhaustively all the estimation algorithms for every graph utility
metric. However, in the following, we introduce a generic framework in order to
estimate a particular class of utility metrics.
4.3.5 A generic framework for estimating utility metrics
A common characteristic of the above four metrics is that the utility value relies
on the counts of certain substructures (a subgraph) in the graph. For example,
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the density value relies on the count of disconnected pairs of nodes and the count
of connected pairs of nodes. Similarly, the transitivity value relies on the count
of connected triplets and the count of triangles in the graph. Generally, the class
of the utility metrics whose values rely on the counts of substructures can be esti-
mated using a generic framework. The generic framework for estimation is described
as follows: Let ST R be a set of smax number of substructures relevant to a par-
ticular utility metric, where ST Ri refers to the ith substructure. For example, in
transitivity estimation, smax = 2, and the two substructures are triangles and con-
nected triplets. ST Ri.cnt refers to the count of the ith substructure in the original
graph. Therefore, the utility value is a function of the counts of different structures
in ST R, i.e. f(ST R1.cnt,ST R2.cnt, . . . ,ST Rsmax .cnt). To estimate the utility
value, we need to estimate the value of ST Ri.cnt for all substructures in ST R.
Let ST Ri.sze be the number of nodes in the ith substructure. In transitivity es-
timation, the number of nodes in the two substructures (triangles and triplets) are
both 3. In the perturbed graph, we count the number of all substructures involving
ST R1.sze,ST R2.sze, . . . ,ST Rsmax .sze number of nodes, respectively. The count of
all the substructures in the perturbed graph is denoted as p1, p2, . . ., psmax . In transi-
tivity estimation, they are the counts of the four patterns involving three nodes. The
ˆST Ri.cnt ∀i, are maximum likelihood estimations for the parameters ST Ri.cnt, and
can be derived by solving the following maximization problem:
ˆST R1.cnt, ˆST R2.cnt, . . . , ˆST Rsmax .cnt
= argmax
ST Ri.cnt ∀i
(Pr(p1, p2, . . . , psmax |ST Ri.cnt ∀i))
(4.14)
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With the estimation ˆST Ri.cnt ∀i, we can compute the estimated utility value with
function f . Although the original utility metric is not strictly based on maximum
likelihood estimation, since the inputs ˆST Ri.cnt ∀i to f are based on the maximum
likelihood estimation and should maintain certain accuracy, we expect the estimated
original utility metric can still accurately estimated. Note that the counting of all
substructures is only feasible for substructures involving a small number of nodes.
For example, in density, we count substructures involving two nodes only and in
transitivity estimation we count substructures involving three nodes only. For utility
metrics involving substructures with larger number of nodes, we can use sampling
technique (define an upper limit for counting or execution time) to estimate the utility
values. We do not claim that all the utility metrics can be effectively recovered.
However, there exists an ineffective algorithm(impractical due to the computation
cost) that takes standard procedures to estimate all the metrics. The algorithm is
described as follows: Let G denote the set of all possible graphs on N number of
nodes. For each possible graph G[i], there is a probability that G[i] = Go, which can
be computed based on G[i], Gp and µ, and denoted by Pr(G[i] = Go|Gp). Consider a
particular metric Z, we can measure its value vali(Z) on each G[i]. Lastly, the sum
of vali(Z) · Pr(G[i] = Go|Gp), ∀i forms an estimation to the metric Z in the original
graph. Although theoretically sound, the algorithm is unpractical as it requires the
enumeration of all possible graphs on N nodes. In view of the above challenges, we
leave the recovering of various graph metrics as an open problem.
Besides of the efficiency of estimating algorithm, the quality of estimated utility
metrics is another concern. In order to further study the quality guarantees of various
estimations, standard error of the mean (StErr) can be developed. For example, in
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the following, we show that our density estimation is is unbiased.
Standard deviation of the density estimation: Since E(h) = h · (1 − µ) +
(M −h) ·µ, we substitute E(h) into equation 4.4, and get E(hˆ) = h. This shows that




Let R = 1 (resp. R = 0) denotes the event there exists (resp. does not exist) an









)·(1−µ). Therefore, σ2(hp) =M ·Pr(R = 1)·Pr(R = 0).
Substituting it to the equation 4.15, we have:
σ(hˆ) =
√
M · [ 1
16 · (1
2






With the above StErr, usual confidence intervals can be established. For example,
when M = 499, 500 (i.e. N = 1, 000), µ = 0.01 and h = 99, 900, by estimation, the
number of edges in the original graph false into the interval [99328, 100472] with 95%
confidence.
4.4 Attack on the Perturbed Graph
By carefully designing estimation algorithms, many of the original graph utilities
could actually be recovered. However, this advantage of random perturbation can
also be misused by the adversary. In this section, we propose an attack that is based
on the similar intuition as the utility recovery. Our interval-walk attack works in
many cases where the normal walk-based attack is not practical because of extremely
low γ value. In the following, we first describe the principle of our attack and then
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discuss the algorithmic details. The theoretical support for the interval-walk attack
is presented in the next section.
4.4.1 Principles of the interval-walk attack
The interval-walk attack is based on the fact that the adversary can always estimate
a degree interval (i.e., range) for each malicious node he embedded, with a certain
confidence. By using a similar approach to the walk-based attack, the adversary is
able to efficiently enumerate a list of candidate degree sequences that will include,
with high probability, the one that represents his embedded subgraph GA. In most
cases, the adversary will be left with a unique degree sequence which represents, with
high probability, the subgraph he embedded in the original graph. This is possible
because the candidate degree sequences are filtered out in our algorithm using two
tests: the interval degree checking and the error-tolerant edge checking. Note that
these tests work differently from those of the walk-based attack.
There are a few challenges in demonstrating the feasibility of the attack: first,
the prediction of degree ranges should be correct with high probability. Second, the
length of the predicted interval for an adversary’s node should be the smallest possible
as a large interval may result in a large number of nodes passing the degree check.
This will indeed cause a severe penalty to the attack’s time complexity. Finally, in
order for our attack to succeed, perturbation may alter the attacker’s subgraph but
must not destroy the k-path. In Table 4.1, we show several combinations of different
µ and k. The probability that the k-path is preserved remains very high. Therefore, it
is reasonable for the adversary to assume that the k-path still exists in his embedded
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k = 10 k = 20 k = 30
µ = 0.0001 0.9991 0.9981 0.9971
µ = 0.001 0.9910 0.9812 0.9714
µ = 0.01 0.9135 0.8262 0.7472
Table 4.1: Probability that the adversary’s k-path in GA is preserved.
subgraph after perturbation.
4.4.2 Predicting the degree interval
Let do be the random variable for the degree of a malicious node in Go and dp
the random variable for the degree of the same node after perturbation. In the
following, we we first compute Pr(dp|do), i.e., the probability that, given that the
node’s original node degree is do, its degree after perturbation is dp. Let r be the
number of neighbors eventually removed from the set of do’s neighbors in Go, and a
the number of new neighbors added, due to perturbation. Without loss of generality,
suppose that the dp neighbors of the malicious node at hand are generated in two
steps: first, r neighbors are disconnected and the number of remaining neighbors is
do − r; then, a = dp − (do − r) nodes are connected and become neighbors, so the
total number of neighbors is do − r + a = dp. Then the following three inequalities
hold:
r ≥ 0, do − r ≥ 0, dp − (do − r) ≥ 0 (4.17)
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Thus, an adversary can efficiently compute Pr(dp|do). The possible values of dp
after perturbation ranges from 1 to N − 1. Yet the distribution of these values is
not uniform. For each embedded node, the adversary can select a small subset of
dp values and build an interval I representing the range of possible degrees for that
node. We check inclusion in this interval as our degree check.
The removal and addition of neighbors of an embedded node can be viewed as two
independent Binomial processes. The expected values for r and a are E[r] = ⌊do · µ⌉
and E[a] = ⌊(N − do − 1) · µ⌉, respectively. Pr(dp|do) is maximized for r = E[r]
and a = E[a] (under which case the value of degree of the node after perturbation
is E[dp]). Then the chosen interval I for the embedded node at hand is centered
at E[dp], with w other values to its left and right, where w is a small non-negative
integer. Eventually, the predicted degree interval for a selected malicious node in Gp
is I = [E[dp] − w,E[dp] + w]. Let Pr(dp ∈ I) be the probability that the embedded
node’s degree is in I after perturbation. An effective attack is possible if the adversary
can find a fine-tuned value of w such that Pr(dp ∈ I) is sufficiently large and yet the
width of I is small enough to make the algorithm runnable. Let IVA[i] be the degree
interval for embedded node VA[i], and Dp be the degree sequence of the embedded










µ = 0.001 0 0.3670 5.9643× 10−6
µ = 0.001 2 0.9814 0.7983
µ = 0.001 4 0.9994 0.9931
µ = 0.01 0 0.1246 1.3935× 10−11
µ = 0.01 4 0.8488 0.1399
µ = 0.01 8 0.9927 0.9158
Table 4.2: Pr(dp ∈ I) with N = 10, 000 and do = 50.
Table 4.2 shows the values of Pr(dp ∈ I) for selected values of µ and w with k = 12.
We observe that, when the number of nodes in the graph is 10, 000, the perturbation
probability is 0.001 and w = 4, then the probability that a single embedded node
falls into the interval I is close to 1. Moreover, the probability that all the embedded
nodes’ degrees fall into their respective intervals after perturbation is also close to 1
in the same configuration. We conclude that, with this configuration, the attacker is
almost sure that all embedded nodes will pass the interval degree check.
For example, in the graph in Figure 4.1(c), the adversary’s degree sequence is
[2, 5, 3, 4, 2]. Yet in the perturbed graph Gp the degree of the node labeled 11 has
become 1. Then, if a walk-based attack is launched, this node will not be detected.
Still, with a interval-walk attack, the adversary is able to estimate the degree interval
for each embedded node. For example (after integer rounding) the estimated degree
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intervals can be [ [1, 2], [4, 5], [3, 4], [3, 4], [2, 3] ]. In this scenario node 11 can still be
accepted by the adversary as a candidate node, allowing for a successful attack.
4.4.3 Description of the attack
Algorithm 3: The interval-walk attack
Data: Gp, GA, µ, w as chosen, m = 0, k-path;
Result: A k-path containing identifiers of nodes in VA;
while k-path not found and wmax,mmax unreached do1
T =new Tree(); level = 0;2
foreach V [i] in Gp do3
localSearch(V [i], level, T .root());4
end5
if w < wmax then6
w ++;7




In Algorithm 3 we describe our interval-walk attack. T is the tree that contains
all the candidate subgraphs, w is the width parameter for the degree intervals used in
our interval degree checking (this parameter is chosen by the adversary as discussed
previously) and m is the maximum number of errors allowed in error-tolerant edge
105
Function localSearch(curnode, level, parent)
if level = k then1
return;2
end3
if curnode passes Int. degree and ET-Edge checks then4
T .add(curnode, parent);5
foreach neighbor nb of curnode do6
localSearch(nb, level ++, curnode);7
end8
end9
checking. The main block of the algorithm is a loop which continues until a k-path
is found in T or both w and m reach their predefined maximum thresholds wmax
and mmax. The key difference from the walk-based attack is on the two different tests
(lines 4 and 5 in function localSearch()): to pass the interval degree checking the
degree of the node should fall in the predicted degree interval of the adversary’s node
VA[level]. To pass the error-tolerant edge checking
1, the number of errors in edge
checking accumulated in the path from this node to the root should not be larger
than m. In each loop, if a k-path is not found, we relax the searching condition
by either increasing w or m. However, using large w and m enlarges search space.
The maximum w and m values that can be used depend only on the computational
1In the walk-based attack, edge checking is a test based on edge presence between a level i and a
level j node that are on the same T path. These nodes must respect the edge relation (whether these
nodes are connected or not) that exists between the malicious nodes VA[i] and VA[j], ∀1 ≤ j < i.
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capability of the adversary.
4.4.4 Building edges to target the victims
In order to compromise the victims’ privacy, the adversary has to correctly identify
the victims. However, due to perturbation, the link between the victim and the ad-
versary’s nodes may have changed which raises new challenges for identifying the
victims. We propose a method that minimizes the impact of perturbation and es-
tablishes robust links against perturbation. Let the set of nodes that represent the
victims in the graph be VT = {τ1, τ2, . . . τq}. Sτi ⊂ VA is the set of maliciously em-
bedded nodes that are linked to victim τi, 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Our approach is as follows: we
define two parameters ρ1 and ρ2, where ρ1 defines the minimum size of Sτi , and ρ2
defines the minimum number of different members between the two sets Sτi and Sτj ,
for i 6= j. Formally:


|Sτi | ≥ ρ1 ∀i ∈ [1, q]
|Sτi\Sτj | ≥ ρ2 ∀i, j ∈ [1, q] and i 6= j
(4.18)
Moreover, we require that none of the adversary’s nodes share common neighbors
other than the nodes in VT and VA. To prove the robustness of the links between the
victims and the adversary’s nodes under our requirements, we show analytically that
the probabilities of the three events that affect the identification of the victims are
negligible.
Claim 1:The probability that Sτi for any τi changes due to perturbation tends to
be 0 when µ→ 0.
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Proof. Sτi is preserved for any τi if the edge relations between this τi and all the
adversary’s nodes are preserved (i.e, (1 − µ)k). Therefore, the probability that Sτi
changes is 1− (1− µ)k. Therefore, when µ→ 0, 1− (1− µ)k → 0.
Claim 2:The probability that there is another node v outside sets VA and VT such
that Ev, which describes the set of edges between v and the nodes from VA, is equal to
Sτi for the victim τi decreases fast with the increase of ρ1.
Proof. Let us consider a particular node v which already has an edge with a node in
Sτi . The probability that it forms new edges with all other nodes in Sτi but not with
the nodes in VA−Sτi is at most µρ1−1·(1−µ)k−ρ1+1. Moreover, the total number of such
possible nodes v in the graph is N−k−q. Therefore, (N−k−q) ·µρ1−1 · (1−µ)k−ρ1+1
is the probability for the event in this claim. When µ = c
N
, this probability at most
cρ1−1
Nρ1−2
(by taking N − k − q as N and (1− µ)k−ρ1+1 as 1), which decreases fast with
the increase of ρ1.
Claim 3:The probability that the set Sτi of malicious nodes connected to victim
τi becomes the same as the set Sτj of malicious nodes connected to victim τj after
perturbation decreases fast with the increase of ρ2.
Proof. Let the number of non-common elements in Sτi and Sτj be xij. Similarly to
the derivation of equation 4.29, Sτi is converted to Sτj by perturbation if and only if
an xij number of edge additions and deletions occurs. Therefore, after perturbation,
Pr(Sτi = Sτj) = (1−µ)k−xij ·µxij . Since ρ2 ≥ xij , Pr(Sτi = Sτj) ≤ µρ2 , which decreases
fast with the increase of ρ2.
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A trivial algorithm that builds the above robust links can be stated as follows:
for each victim τi, repeat the random selection of a subset of the nodes in VA until
a subset that satisfies both ρ1 and ρ2 requirements is found; then link τi to all the
nodes in this particular subset of VA.
4.4.5 Preventing the interval-walk attack
The adversary can successfully identify his subgraph based on the assumption that the
k-path is not broken. However, the publisher can increase the perturbation probability
so that, with high probability, the k-path is broken and therefore the interval-walk
attack is infeasible. Let ε, the secure parameter, be the maximum probability that
the k-path is preserved. Therefore,
(1− µ)k−1 ≤ ε (4.19)
The following inequality gives the minimum µ to be used so as to prevent the interval-
walk attack with probability no less than 1− ε:
µ ≥ 1− k−1√ε (4.20)
In reality, it is possible that an attacker may use some sophisticated algorithms
which do not rely on the existence of the k-path backbone for finding back the mali-
ciously embedded graph. Our discussion for such type of attacker is in the following
section.
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4.5 General Structural Attack
In this section, we consider a more general analysis on the adversary’s probability
of success. Our hypothesis is that any structural attack can be translated into an
instance of the graph isomorphism problem. We show that if an adversary is able
to enumerate all permutations of k nodes in the graph Gp, he will be able, with
high probability, to find back his embedded nodes under a random edge perturbation
scheme (supposing that the µ value remains reasonable). Generally, let Yi be the i
th
permutation of k nodes in the graph, we assume the extreme case where the adversary
has infinite computational power and that he is able to enumerate all permutations
of k nodes in the graph: Y = {Yi : 1 ≤ i ≤ PNk } where PNk = N !(N−k)! is the total
number of permutations. The adversary will choose a particular permutation Y ∈ Y
as a candidate for VA and he will assume that Y [i] is VA[i]. Due to perturbation,
the adversary is facing the following two challenges when choosing the best Y value:
first, the perturbation may change the adversary’s graph GA in such a way that GA
cannot be found in Gp. Second, even if the adversary is able to find a permutation Y
that gives him exactly the same subgraph GA, there still remains a probability that
Y is not his original VA due to perturbation (cf. Figure 4.1(d)).
To study the adversary’s probability of success under the above two challenges,
we define λY which is the actual probability that the chosen Y is VA given Gp. For
the sake of simplicity, we use EYA to denote the event that the set of edges on Y is




Let EYp represents the set of edges of the nodes in Y in the perturbed graph Ep.
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We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5.1. For a perturbed graph Gp of size N with a perturbation value µ,
the probability for an adversary to successfully find back his subgraph GA for a given







Proof of Theorem 4.5.1: First, we rewrite the expression using Bayes’ theorem,
Pr(EYA |Ep) =




Pr(Ep|EYiA ) · Pr(EYiA )
(4.23)
In the above equation, Pr(EYiA ) is the prior probability of Y being the attacker’s








Next, we focus on the derivation of the numerator Pr(Ep|EYA ) in the r.h.s of
equation 4.24. Firstly, we split the set of edges in the perturbed graph into two sets,
i.e. EYp the of edges between the nodes in Y only and E
Y
p , the set of other edges in
Ep. By definition, EYp =Ep − EYp . EYp and EYp are independent, therefore,
Pr(Ep) = Pr(E
Y
p ) · Pr(EYp ) (4.25)
By adding the conditional variable EYA to equation 4.25, the numerator of equation
4.24 can be written as,
Pr(Ep|EYA ) = Pr(EYp |EYA ) · Pr(EYp |EYA ) (4.26)
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Pr(EYp |EYA ) is equivalent to Pr(EYp ), as EYp and EYA are independent. Moreover,
it can be written as Pr(EYp ) =
Pr(Ep)
Pr(EYp )
from 4.25. A simplified version of equation 4.26
is,




We substitute the Pr(Ep|EYA ) derived in the above equation to the r.h.s of equation
4.24, and replace the denominator with the expression in the same form but using Yi







The interpretation of the λY value is quite intuitive: the numerator Pr(E
Y
p |EYA )
describes the likelihood of the particular permutation Y being VA. The denominator
is the sum of the likelihood of each permutation Yi being VA in the graph. The ratio
describes the probability of success of a particular selection Y being VA. The value of
λY depends on the value of Pr(E
Y
p |EYA ) and the sum of Pr(EYip |EYiA ) for all i. Notice
that the computation of exact λY requires the enumeration of all permutation of k
nodes in the graph. In the following, we study the conditional probability Pr(EYp |EYA )
for a particular Y .
Given that Y is the set of adversary’s nodes and that EYA is the set of edges
among the nodes in Y before perturbation, Pr(EYp |EYA ) is the probability that the
set of edges in Y becomes EYp after perturbation. With this in mind, the derivation
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of Pr(EYp |EYA ) becomes easy: let m be the number of non-common edges in EYp and
EYA (i.e., m = |EYp −EYA |). Note that the minimum value of m is 0 when EYA and EYp
are exactly the same, and the maximum value of m is M = k
2−k
2
when EYA and E
Y
p
are totally complementary of each other. Since each removal or addition of an edge
happens with probability µ in a random edge perturbation scheme, the probability
that EYA is converted to E
Y
p :
Pr(EYp |EYA ) = µm · (1− µ)M−m (4.29)
4.5.1 λY estimation
From an adversary’s point of view, Equation (4.22) can be used to compute λY for
each Y = Yi. The attacker will assume that the set Y that gives the maximal value of
λY is his embedded subgraph VA in Gp. More specifically, the adversary will choose
the set Y that maximizes the numerator in Equation (4.22) as the denominator is
constant for a given EA and Gp. The best case for the adversary is when m = 0
(i.e., EYp and E
Y
A are exactly the same). For other cases, the adversary has to choose
the set Y that gives the most similar subgraph to GA. In the following we provide a
simple method for estimating the λY value. For any permutation of k nodes Yi, let
mYi = |EYiA − EYip |. We consider EYip which is a random subset of all possible edges
generated from Yi in the perturbed graph Gp. Therefore, the expected value for mYi
is M
2
and the expected value of Pr(EYip |EYiA ) is (1− µ)
M











The Equation (4.30) depends on parameters µ and m. In Table 4.3, we list
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Table 4.3: λY with k = 10, M = 45, N = 10, 000.
µ l λˆY when m = l Pr(m ≤ l)
0.0001 0 1 0.9955
0.0001 5 1 1
0.0001 10 1 1
0.001 0 1 0.9559
0.001 5 1 1
0.001 10 0.0031 1
different values of λY with respect to different µ and m combinations in a graph
containing 10, 000 nodes and 10 malicious nodes. Recall that m can be viewed as the
number of errors in the edge comparison between EYA and E
Y
p . From Table 4.3, we can
also see that unless both the perturbation probability and number of errors in edge
comparison are high, λˆY is always approaching 1. Lastly, we study the distribution of
the m value under the random edge perturbation scheme. In fact, the perturbation
can be viewed as a binomial process for adding and deleting edges with probability
µ, thus the probability distribution function of m is defined as:








The last column of Table 4.3 shows the probability distribution for m with the
k and µ values specified. Observe that Pr(m = 0) equals 0.9955 and 0.9559 for
µ = 0.0001 and µ = 0.001, respectively. This is good news for an adversary who
has the computational powers to enumerate all subgraphs and choose the one most
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similar to the embedded one.
4.6 Experimental Evaluation
We now present our experimental evaluation. First, we investigate the probability of
success of the interval-walk attack under different values of µ, and measure its execu-
tion time. Next, we investigate the effect of perturbation on the graph properties.
All experiments ran on a 2.33GHz CPU, Windows-XP machine with 3.25GB
RAM. We employ two real datasets: The Enron dataset2 is the graph of email ex-
change among employees of Enron, having 4,644 accounts. Each account corresponds
to a node and two accounts are linked if they have exchanged emails in both direc-
tions. The DBLP dataset3 is a random subset of 20,000 authors from the DBLP
bibliography. Each author corresponds to a node and two authors are linked if they
are coauthors in at least one paper. The Wiki dataset4 is a network Wikipedia ency-
clopedia writers around the world. It consists of 7,115 nodes and 103,689 edges.
4.6.1 Assessing the interval-walk attack
In our first experiment, we assess the probability of success of our interval-walk attack
as opposed to that of the classical walk-based attack [7]. We first test the walk-based
attack on the Enron and DBLP data, measuring its success rate in trials of 200
separate attack runs, as a function of the perturbation probability µ. An attack run































(a) Time vs. w (prob.) (b) Time vs. m (prob.)
Figure 4.3: Efficiency of the interval-walk attack.
nodes and re-identify at least one victim node. In [7], the suggested number of
malicious nodes k is Θ(log(N)) and the number of victim nodes is q = O(log2(N)).
Following this suggestion, we vary k at values 20, 25, 30 for both graphs, with number
of victims 100, 157 and 225, respectively.
Figures 4.4(a) and 4.5(a) show our results, which provide a glimpse of the prob-
ability that an adversary successfully identifies the embedded nodes in perturbed
DBLP and Enron data using a walk-based attack. When µ is 0, all attacks are 100%
successful. Still, already for rather small values of µ (10−7 to 10−6), the success rate
drops drastically to very low values. In addition, the success rate is lower for larger k
under the same perturbation value µ; that is because, with larger k, the node degree
sequence of the malicious nodes is more likely to be changed or the backbone to be
broken, making the attack more likely to fail. In effect, the walk-based attack can
be effectively prevented through random edge perturbation, with minimal impact on
the graph’s structure (as µ is negligible).



















































(c) Interval-walk attack at w = 4 (d) Interval-walk attack at w = 5
Figure 4.4: Evaluation of interval-walk attack for DBLP
interval-walk attack on the same DBLP and Enron data, again in trials of 200 runs
each. We show results for several values of the interval-width parameter w. As the
search space of the attack algorithm grows with w, the success rate also rises with it.
For µ≃10−4, the interval-walk attack succeeds in almost 100% of the cases, in stark
contrast to the walk-based one. Still, as µ grows further, the observed success rate
swiftly drops for all values of w. As with the walk-based attack, the success rate falls
as k grows.



















































(c) Interval-walk attack at w = 4 (d) Interval-walk attack at w = 5
Figure 4.5: Evaluation of interval-walk attack for Enron
width w and error-tolerance m, with µ = 10−3. The number of malicious nodes is
k = 4 log(N) and the number of victims q = log2(N). The algorithm’s search space
grows with both w and m (Section 4.4.2), hence the execution time also ascends
with them, yet remains lower than 3 minutes, rendering the attack rather feasible on
reasonably-sized real-world data sets.
An adversary who successfully identifies the embedded subgraph inside the per-
turbed graph may yet not locate the target victims, as the edges between the embed-
ded nodes and the victims may have been removed. The left-hand side of Table 4.4
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shows the measured percentage of victims that can be identified in a successful at-
tack. The number of malicious nodes and the victims remain at k = 4 log(N) and at
q = log2(N). As the table shows, more than 91% of victims are identified when the
attack succeeds.
µ Enron DBLP Events m=0 m=1 m=2
1·10−4 95.2% 98.3% Success 53 58 59
2·10−4 93.6% 98.3% False prediction 35 35 35
3·10−4 92.7% 96.7% Broken path 6 6 6
4·10−4 91.9% 94.2% Edge check fail 6 1 0
Table 4.4: Percentage of affected victims, effect of m
The error-tolerance m also affects an attack’s probability of success. The right-
hand side of Table 4.4 shows an instance of this effect: in a trial of 100 attacks with
m=0 on the Enron graph perturbed with µ=0.04, there are 53 successes, 35 failures
due to false predicted interval, and 6 due to broken path or edge check failures. Still,
when we relax the requirement for passing the edge check test, we can increase the
number of successes to 58 and 59.
To sum up, the interval-walk attack is more effective than the walk-based one and
feasible in terms of runtime. Still, both can be prevented under random perturbation































(a) Density, DBLP (b) Density, Enron
Figure 4.6: Preservation of density
4.6.2 Assessing utility preservation
We use the perturbed data derived in previous experiments to evaluate the extent to
which graph properties are preserved. Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the density,
transitivity and degree distribution for perturbed DBLP and Enron data. Each figure
shows the original, perturbed, and estimated values. Density and transitivity values
vary with the perturbation probability µ, while the degree distribution is given as a
single snapshot for µ = 10−3.
The purpose of applying random edge perturbation is to prevent structrual attack,
and yet to allow the graph data to be used for accurate analysis. To evaluate whether
this goal can be reached or not, we need to evaluate when the perturbation probability
µ is raised to a level which is sufficient for preventing practical attacks (e.g. the walk-
based attack and the interval-walk attack), still the original utilities can be accurately
estimated. From the experiments on the utility preservation and attack, we observe




























(c) Trans., DBLP (d) Trans., Enron
Figure 4.7: Preservation of transitivity
derived estimates are resilient to perturbation and approximate the original values
well, e.g. in both the graph density and transitivity estimation, the deviations from
the estimated values to the original grow very gently with the increasing of µ (Figure
4.7(a)(b) and Figure 4.8(a)(b)). Especially, the accuracy of estimated density value
appears to be insensitive to the increasing of µ. Even at µ = 10−3, both density and
transitivity can still be accurately estimated. On the other hand, as we demonstrated
in Figure 4.5(a)-(d), the success rate of both walk-based attack and the interval-
walk attack falls down very quickly with the growing of µ under similar range of µ.
Therefore, we conclude that it is possible to set up a µ value where both walk-based
attack and interval-walk attack can be effectively prevented, and yet the utility of the
graph can still be accurately estimated.
4.6.3 Distance-based classification
We now attempt to perform a specific data mining task, distance-based node classi-




























(e) Deg. distr., DBLP (f) Deg. distr., Enron
Figure 4.8: Preservation of degree distribution
Social graphs often possess hubs, i.e., nodes with very high degree. A particular
person’s connectivity pattern to the hubs indicates that person’s interests. For ex-
ample, in a social election, a person’s voting pattern may indicate its political views.
Thus, node classification based on such patterns is useful.
We consider a classification of nodes based on the distance between their hub
connectivity pattern (HCP) and some target patterns (TPs). Given a set of hubs, a
node’s HCP is the subset of hubs that this node has connectivity to. Each TPi is a
subset of the hubs defined by the analyst. Given a set of k hubs, HCP and TPi are
k-dimensional binary vectors. The distance between HPC and a particular TPi is the
edit distance between the two vectors. For each TPi, a group of nodes Gi is formed
by assigning group membership to the nodes that have closest distances to TPi than
to all other TPj(i 6= j). We aim to classify each node to the right group.
We use the Wiki graph. Hubs are chosen as the nodes that have top-10 degrees
in the graph (ranging from 482 to 1,053). We extract a subset of 200 nodes for
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(c) µ = 0.01 (d) µ = 0.05
Figure 4.9: Classification of nodes under perturbation
dimensional binary data (0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0) represent the HCP for a node that
has connectivity to the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th hubs. We define four target patterns,
TP1 =(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0), TP2 =(0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1), TP3 =(1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1) and TP4 =(1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0), hence 4 classes of nodes. We assign IDs
to the nodes so that nodes that are classified into the same group have consecutive
IDs. Figure 4.9(a) visualizes the original classification. Figures 4.9(b),(c),(d) show
the classification obtained from the perturbed graph with increasing µ. Classification




In this work, we studied the feasibility of using random edge perturbation as a pro-
tection against graph structural attacks. Specifically, we demonstrated theoretically
and offered experimental evidences that random edge perturbation is effective against
the existing walk-based attack. We also showed that more powerful attacks, based on
probabilistic heuristics, are feasible. Motivated by this, we studied theoretically the
probability of success for any structural attack on perturbed graphs and showed that
any structural attack can be thwarted by random edge perturbation scheme. More-
over, we developed methods to estimate accurately the properties of the original graph
from the perturbed data, and showcased accurate distance based node classification
tasks. Our analysis can be used by owners of social graph data to assess the privacy






As we know, existing approaches for data anonymization transform the data by either
generalizing or perturbing data values. Generalization-based approaches [75, 59, 56]
group records into equivalence classes (ECs), and render the records within the
same EC indistinguishable by generalizing their values on some pre-selected quasi-
identifying attributes (QIs) to the same range(s). Among others, the models of k-
anonymity [69], ℓ-diversity [59], and t-closeness [55] follow this framework.
Table 5.1 shows a sample of medical relational data records. Age and Weight
are quasi-identifying attributes [75]; knowledge of those attributes’ exact values can
allow an adversary to re-identify the person involved. Disease is a sensitive attribute;
it contains information that entails a privacy risk for the persons concerned. Figure
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id age weight disease
1 42 66 Gastritis
A
2 40 76 Diabetes
B
3 49 73 Pneumonia
4 54 68 Gastritis
A
5 55 53 Pneumonia
6 60 66 Alzheimer
F
Table 5.1: Sample medical relational data
age weight disease
[40, 49] [66, 73] Gastritis
A
[40, 49] [66, 73] Diabetes
B
[40, 49] [66, 73] Pneumonia
[54, 60] [53, 68] Gastritis
A
[54, 60] [53, 68] Pneumonia
[54, 60] [53, 68] Alzheimer
F
Table 5.2: Generalized medical relational data
5.1(a) visualizes these relational data in the two-dimensional space formed by the two
quasi-identifiers [39], Age×Weight.
An anonymization of these data by the generalization-based k-anonymity model
with k = 3 could form two ECs out of them, one containing records {1, 2, 3} and
one out of {4, 5, 6}. Table 5.2 shows this k-anonymized form in which the data may
be published. This anonymized form of the data substitutes each QI value by a
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(a) Original data (b) Generalized data
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(c) Perturbed data (d) Our approach
Figure 5.1: Comparison of anonymization paradigms
closed interval that covers all values of that QI within the same EC. Thus, all tuples
within the same EC become indistinguishable from each other as far as their QIs are
concerned. Thus, this anonymization would also qualify as a valid one under the kind
of more strict criteria enforced by the ℓ-diversity [59] and t-closeness [55, 56] models.
Figure 5.1(b) presents the two ECs of Table 5.2 as rectangular regions (minimum
bounding boxes) in the two-dimensional QI-space. The rectangular regions convey
the same range information as the data representation in Table 5.2. Incidentally,
this anonymization also affords a high diversity of sensitive attribute values in each
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ECs, while the distributions of those values in the two ECs follow closely their overall
distribution in the whole table. Thus, it also conforms to the constraints enforced by
more sophisticated generalization-based models, such as ℓ-diversity and t-closeness.
An adversary armed with the knowledge of QI values can neither re-identify the exact
record of a certain individual, nor confidently infer a sensitive attribute value thereof
or draw other privacy-compromising inferences about it. Still, this anonymized form
of the data sacrifices accuracy, as high-resolution information about QI values is
obscured.
Following the paradigm of random perturbation [4], an attribute value is modified
by adding to the original value a random variable uniformly or normally distributed in
a predefined interval [−α,+α]. This perturbation effectively contains an adversary’s
capacity to re-identify the record of a specific person, while some of the original
statistical information can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy to the benefit
of benign data analysis purposes [4]. Coming back to our running example, Figure
5.1(c) presents an example of how the published data may look after going through
random perturbation of their QI values. A careful examination of the figure reveals
that, even if the perturbed data achieves privacy and some utility objectives, they
may still be perturbed beyond recognition. The position of each record in QI-space is
quite different from the original one, while significant topological relationships between
the data points are destroyed. Data undergoing perturbation may miss important
properties of the original [32]. This loss can be detrimental to the performance of
data analysis tasks that depend on such properties.
We conclude that the existing anonymization paradigms following either general-
ization [75, 59, 55, 56] or random perturbation [4, 32, 64, 18, 76] face the following
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shortcomings.
• These paradigms do not offer to the data owner any leeway to influence, control,
or affect the anonymization process. In the best case, the data owner may simply
define certain parameters of the adapted paradigm, which may not be meaning-
ful to her and not reflect her needs. In models such as k-anonymity, ℓ-diversity,
or t-closeness, the data owner is expected to specify abstract thresholds (such
as k, ℓ, or t) that define the afforded privacy. In perturbation models, the data
owner is expected to specify properties of the perturbation noise. None of these
parameters describes utility properties of the data that need to be preserved.
• Both paradigms either destroy or blanket the information on the topological
relationships of data points, i.e. the relative distances for all pairs of records
under the Euclidean distance space. In generalization, such relationship are
totally obscured within ECs and severely amplified between them. In random
perturbation, they can be falsified to the point of outright deception. For in-
stance, the perturbed data in Figure 5.1(c) distorts the order of the original
data. While tuple 1 has the least age value in the real data, the perturbed data
present tuple 3 as having the minimum age. The weight of tuple 1 is originally
closer to that of tuple 4 than tuple 3; still, after perturbation this relationship
is reversed. In effect, the perturbed data cannot be of much use in data mining
applications that require correct relative distance information. For instance, our
approach can be applied to clustering or ranking problems, but also to skylines
extractions and spatial pattern mining where tables can contain coordinates for
objects and other attributes that need to be anonymized without loosing the
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precious topological informations encapsulated in the patterns.
• They compromise either the veracity or the exactness of the data. In particular,
perturbation-based schemes publish data in an exact (i.e., non-approximate)
form, but they are indifferent to the patterns they form. On the other hand,
generalization-based techniques put a premium on the veracity of the data (i.e.,
they do not falsify them), but sacrifice their exactness.
In this work, we propose a novel data anonymization paradigm that addresses
the above drawbacks. Given a relational data table T , we allow the data owner
to specify certain properties of interest (PoIs) among the QI attributes of T . The
set of PoIs describes the characteristics of the original data that the owner wishes
the anonymized data to maintain. Each PoI is expressed as a linear relationship
between a subset of QI attribute values. We develop a scheme that transforms T
to an anonymized form T A that satisfies all defined PoIs. This transformation is
achieved by a careful value substitution guided by a random walk that obeys linear
constraints. Our paradigm shares with perturbation-based schemes the principle that
exact values, instead of generalized ones, are published. Moreover, like generalization-
based schemes, it pays due attention to and respects the veracity of the data; it does
not allow them to be distorted in a way that misrepresents the patterns and their
topological characteristics. Thus, our scheme provides both veracity and exactness in
the anonymized data, and offers a different utility and privacy tradeoff to the user.
Similar to other anonymization techniques such as k-anonymity and l-diversity,
our anonymization technique does not require the data owner to know in advance
what the specific tasks that the published data is to be used for. The reason is
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that by knowing the properties of the original data are generally preserved in the
published data, the data miner is then be able to determine by themselves what
data mining tasks would yield accurate result over the published data. For exam-
ple, k-anonymization and l-diversity algorithms typically aims to preserve the overall
distribution of the data in the anonymization. Thus, the published data is good for
answering aggregate queries over the data, such as the count queries or range queries.
On the other hand, our scheme aims to preserve relative distances among the data
points, which allows data mining tasks such as clustering, ranking or any other task
that requires data localities, to be performed accurately over the published data. We
argue that assuming knowing the exact data mining task (e.g. clustering) that the
data miner will perform and publish direct the data mining result (e.g. clusters) in-
stead of the anonymized data is often inflexible and inadequate. There are mainly two
reasons: first, even for a single data mining tasks there may exist various algorithms
that yield different results. For example, there are a dozen of clustering algorithms
such as k-means clustering, mean shift clustering, spectral clustering, hierarchical
clustering and etc. Giving limited results to the data miner may still limit the study
of the data miner even for a single data mining task. Second, the data miner often
need to study subset of the data. Unfortunately, the target subset of data mining
study is usually not known in advance and the overall property of the data does not
necessary describe the local properties of the subset of the data, and thereby pub-
lishing the data mining result for the whole data is insufficient. On the other hand,
it is almost impossible to publish the data ming results for all possible subsets of the
data as the number of possible subsets is the exponential of the data size which itself
could be a large value. Therefore, publishing the anonymized data for data mining
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tasks is a better choice than publishing the data mining results directly.
We emphasize that the preservation of patterns that we propose does not com-
promise privacy. The conventional assumption [75, 4, 64, 59, 18, 55, 56] is that an
adversary possesses knowledge about values in the data; not about large-scale pat-
terns in them. A powerful adversary may have access to an external table containing
full information about all QI values. Armed with this information, one could attempt
to re-identify individuals by matching patterns among QI values, as it happens in the
cognate problem of graph anonymization [58]. Still, such an adversary cannot know
which specific patterns a given anonymization has preserved. This question is left
up to the data owner to decide; it does not form a default feature of our algorithm.
Thus, our model achieves a reconciliation between two requirements that are usually
assumed to be contradictory: it is both pattern-preserving and privacy-preserving.
We illustrate the intuition for our method on our running example. Our algorithm
substitutes QI values, i.e. moves the points in Table 5.1(a) to new positions. For the
sake of simplicity, we focus on the transformation of values for attribute Age. The set
of PoIs that need to be preserved consists of user-defined linear inequalities involving
Age values. Let di be the Age value of the i
th tuple. For example, the fact that d1 is
smaller than d2 (see Figure 5.1(a)) can be expressed by the linear inequality d1 < d2.
The fact that d4 is closer to d3 than d1 can be expressed as d4−d3 < d3−d1. The fact
that d6 is smaller than the sum of d1 and d2 can be expressed by d6 < d1 + d2. The
objective of our algorithm is to transform the data without violating the constraints
expressed by these inequalities. In a value substitution phase, our algorithm finds
a new set of values DA that satisfies the defined PoI constraints. Such a new data
set is shown in Figure 5.1(d). An examination of Figure 5.1 indicates that the data
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pattern in (d) preserves the original pattern in (a) much more faithfully than that
in (c), while it does not obscure the data as in (b). Still, the data values in (d) are
modified in a way that preserves privacy, and they do not appear exactly the same
as the original data. Furthermore, numerical QI values can also undergo shift and
scaling transformations in order to conceal the original provenance, if that is needed
by the privacy constraints of a certain application.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 3.2.
We review the preliminaries, notations and definitions that are useful for the rest of
the work in Section 5.2.
We also describe the two-phase operations needed by our pattern preserving ano-
nymization method; In Section 5.3, we explain how to perform the first phase -
properties extraction - using data locality properties as an example. In Section 5.4,
we explain the second phase - value substitution - in detail. Section 5.5 shows how to
apply pattern preserving anonymization to tabular data. In Section 5.6, we introduce
an intuitive privacy notion and describe how the privacy can be measured with our
approach. The experimental results are presented in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 conclude
the work.
5.2 Notations and Definitions
Let T be a table with n data records and m QI attributes. Entry ti,j refers to the
data value in the ith row and jth column in T . We first focus on describing the scheme
for anonymzing 1D data, and later generalize it to work for a table with multiple QIs.
Let D = {d1, . . . , dn} be a particular 1D data vector (i.e., a QI column of T ) that is
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subject to anonymization and X = {x1, . . . , xn} be the corresponding set of variables
that express the anonymized form of D. Then we define a property of interest as
follows.




cidi ≤ λ between values in D, where ci is the coefficient of di and
λ ∈ R+ a user defined constant.
We represent a particular PoI as a triple (D,C, λ), where C = {c1, . . . , cn} is the
set of all coefficients for the values in D. The set of all PoIs defined by the data
owner is denoted as P ; the ith PoI is represented as pi = (D,Ci, λi). P defines a set
of constraints Q on X; the ith constraint in Q is derived from pi and represented as
qi = (X,Ci, λi).
Our anonymization scheme consists of the two following phases:
1. The properties extraction phase, in which the owner defines the set of PoIs
P on D. This set describes the characteristics of the original data that the
owner wishes to be maintained in the anonymized data.
2. The value substitution phase, in which the owner finds a set of value sub-
stitutions DA = {dA1 , . . . , dAn} for the variables in X that satisfy Q.
The aim of our scheme is to ensure that all PoIs are preserved, while there are no
direct correlations between the anonymized form of the data DA and the original data
D. In addition, the algorithm should be computationally efficient. We first present
our approach for the properties extraction phase.
134
5.3 Properties Extraction Phase
While there are various types of relationships exist among the set of nodes, we focus
only on linear relationships for the following two reasons: first, the linear relation-
ships usually maintain rich information about the data. Generally, it is useful for the
study how one entity’s value is different from other entities’ values. For example, the
relationship that Alice is 10 years older than Bob can be represented as a linear rela-
tionship on the age attribute; the relationship that Alice earns 1000 dollars more than
the total income of Bob’s and Charlie’s can also be represented as linear relationship.
Second, the subject of linear programming is well studied. By focusing on linear re-
lationships we can make use of existing results on the topic linear programming, e.g.
the random walk used in our algorithm. Nevertheless, we conjecture that algorithms
for preserving other types of relationships can be develop using similar paradigm as
ours.
Clearly, the specific set of PoIs is highly dependant on the data mining application
the data owner is interested in. We emphasize that we do not constraint the types
of linear relationships that may be defined as PoIs. It is up to the data vendor to
decide what PoIs are important to be preserved, while the legitimate data recipients
can use them for their own purposes, which may go beyond discovering certain PoIs.
The PoIs are not necessarily the primary interest of the data recipients either. They
serve as a tool for preserving useful properties of the data. To illustrate the properties
extraction phase, we introduce a particular type of PoI, locality.
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5.3.1 Data locality
Locality captures relative distance information of two data values with respect to a
third data value.
Definition 5 (Locality). The locality of data values di and dk with respect to data
value dj, denoted as locdj(di, dk) is a linear relationship of the form |di−dj| ⊙ |dj−dk|,
where ⊙ ∈ {≥, <} makes the relationship true.
The distance between di and dj is denoted as di,j. Without loss of generality, we
assume that di < dk. A locality property is most interesting and informative when
dj lies between di and dk, i.e. di ≤ dj ≤ dk. Otherwise, it suffices to know whether
dj < di or dj > dk to deduce the locality property that holds, independently of the
value of dj. Under the assumption that di ≤ dj ≤ dk, the inequality defined by
locdj(di, dk) is equivalent to 2dj − di − dk ⊙ 0. In the following, we show how to
efficiently extract all the locality properties that hold in D.
5.3.2 Extraction of localities
Without loss of generality, we assume that D is sorted in non-decreasing order. At
first glance, each combination of i, j and k can form a locality ; thus, the total number





. A naive locality extraction algorithm would have to
enumerate all possible combinations of i, j, k in O(n3) time. Still, some of the localities
generated by such a process would be considered redundant. For example, from
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d1,3 ≤ d3,4 we can infer d1,3 ≤ d3,5, since, given the sorted order, d3,4 ≤ d3,5 is always
true. We use the following rules for pruning redundant locality properties:
• Rule 1: If di < dk and di,j ≤ dj,k, then di,j ≤ dj,k′ , ∀k′ > k and di′,j ≤ dj,k,
∀i′ ∈ [i, k].
• Rule 2: If di < dk and di,j ≥ dj,k, then di,j ≥ dj,k′ , ∀k′ ∈ [i, k] and di′,j ≥ dj,k,
∀i′ < i.
Definition 6 (Completeness). A set of localities Plocs is complete if and only if any
locdj(di, dk), ∀ i, j, k is either included in Plocs, or can be deduced from it based on
Rule 1, Rule 2 and the sorted order.
We now present an efficient algorithm for the extraction of a complete set of
localities on D. Our algorithm uses the two previously introduced rules to prune
redundant localities. We also show that the size of a complete set of localities is
O(n2).
Before getting into the details, we provide a simple example to illustrate the
intuition behind the algorithm. Figure 5.2 shows a set of data values D = {d1, . . . , d6}
from which localities are to be extracted. Suppose we wish to retrieve localities for
i = 2 and j = 3. The naive approach would try all possible values of k > j (i.e.,
k = 4, 5 or 6) to determine locd3(d2, d4), locd3(d2, d5) and locd3(d2, d6), respectively.
However, we can avoid this enumeration through a simple geometrical observation.
Notice that a circle centered at dj with radius dj − di, intersecting the D axis at
breakpoint µ implies that for all k values such that dk ≤ µ, it holds that dj − di ≥
dk− dj. Similarly, for all k values such that dk ≥ µ, dj − di ≤ dk− dj. Let dk− be the
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largest value in D less than µ and dk+ be the smallest value in D that is greater than
µ. In our example, dk− is d4 and dk+ is d5 (see Figure 5.2). Obviously, it suffices to
derive the localities dj − di ≥ dk− − dj and dj − di ≤ dk+ − dj, instead of generating
one for each possible k.
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6
di dj
µd dk - k+
Figure 5.2: Illustration of locality extraction
Our localities extraction algorithm follows the above observation to return as a
final result a set of localities, denoted Plocs. Algorithm 5 presents the pseudocode.
The two for loops (Lines 2 and 3) enumerate all possible combinations of i and j.
For each combination, we find a breakpoint µ = 2dj − di (line 4). The triple (i, j, µ)
can be used to generate a locality on the fly. The smallest value j∗ is found such that
dj∗ ≥ µ. The two bound indices k− and k+ are assigned the closest possible values
to µ from D, i.e., k− = j − 1 and k+ = j, respectively. The two generated localities,
dj − di ≥ dk− − dj and dj − di ≤ dk+ − dj, represented by the sets {i, j, k−,≥} and
{i, j, k+,≤}, are added to the set Plocs. In the example of Figure 5.2, with i = 2 and
j = 3, µ = 2d3 − d2 and the smallest j that satisfies the condition dj ≥ µ is j∗ = 5.
Thus, the localities d3−d2 ≥ d4−d3 and d3−d2 ≤ d5−d3 are generated and added to
Plocs. In some cases, the computed breakpoint value µ may be larger than dn. In the
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example of Figure 5.2, one such breakpoint value (i.e. value greater than dn) appears
with i = 2 and j = 5, i.e., µ = 2d5 − d2 > d6. For such cases, j∗ is simply assigned
the largest possible value, that is, j∗ = n (Line 12). In our running example, locality
d5 − d2 ≥ d6 − d5 is generated. After all localities are produced, Plocs is returned.
The amount of generated localities is O(n2). The following theorem proves that this
set is complete.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Completeness). The set of localities generated by the localities ex-
traction algorithm is complete.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume there is a non-redundant, non-trivial local-
ity locdj(di, dk) that is not included in Plocs, with di < dk. If dj ≤ di or dj ≥ dk, then
the locality is trivial, as it can be deduced from the sorted order. In case di < dj < dk,
assume µ = 2dj−di is such that µ < dk. If k is the smallest index j∗ such that µ ≤ dj∗ ,
then the locality should be included in Plocs; otherwise, if there is a j∗ < k such that
µ ≥ dj∗ , then the locality is redundant. In all cases, this leads to a contradiction to
our assumption. Similar reasoning applies when µ ≥ dk. By reductio ad absurdum,
the theorem holds.
Despite our pruning of redundant and trivial localities, O(n2) is still large. How-
ever, in practice, the data owner rarely needs to use the full set Plocs. Instead, a
smaller set is of interest, denoted as P . Most of the time, the data owner main focus
will be the preservation of a subset of localities with respect to a particular data value.
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Algorithm 5: Locality Extraction Algorithm
Data: Original data D
Result: a set of localities Plocs
µ, k−, k+ ← 0;1
for j ← 2 to n do2
for i← 1 to j − 1 do3
µ← 2dj − di;4
if µ ≤ dn then5
j∗ ← min{ℓ|dℓ ≥ µ};6








5.4 Value Substitution Phase
We have now introduced the concept of localities as a simple illustration to the def-
inition of properties of interest. In this section, we tackle the second step of our
anonymization scheme, i.e., the value substitution phase. The problem we face is to
find a set of values for the variables in X so that all the constraints in Q are satisfied.
As all the constraints in Q are linear constraints about the variables in X, our
problem can be treated using techniques developed for linear programming prob-
lems [79]. However, our problem is not a linear programming problem per se, since
an objective function is not defined and our goal is not to detect a solution that
optimizes an objective function, but simply to find any feasible solution. Thus, the
problem can also be seen as a case of a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) [6].
Furthermore, we also aim to achieve a solution in which the correlation between the
anonymized and the original data is weak. Our value substitution algorithm should
ideally return a solution randomly and uniformly sampled from the solution space.
To achieve our goal, we propose a Random Walk algorithm that satisfies both
efficiency and non-correlation requirements. D and X are viewed as vectors in a
n-dimensional space IRn, i.e. D = (d1 d2 . . . dn)
T and X = (x1 x2 . . . xn)
T . Geo-
metrically, each of the linear constraint in Q defines a half space in the n-dimensional
space IRn. Since all linear constraints in Q must be satisfied, the solution space be-
comes the intersection of all the half spaces defined by linear constraints. Obviously,
depending on the constraints defined by the data owner, the solution space could be
unbounded, leading to potential arbitrarily large solution values for certain dimen-
sions. Still, in practice, we ensure that data values are bounded within a meaningful
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(i.e., semantic) range. For instance, we assume that Age values can be bounded be-
tween 1 and 120. Let H be the set of constraints on the predefined ranges of variables
of X:
H : γmin ≤ XT ≤ γmax (5.1)
where γmin is a vector of lower bounds and γmax a vector of upper bounds, re-
spectively. Trivially, the set of all constraints on X, Q˜ = Q ∪ H, defines a bounded
polyhedron S in IRn.
We emphasize that any point within S is a feasible assignment to X that satisfies
the constraints Q˜. Thus, our problem is reduced to finding a point within S. The
Random Walk algorithm exploits the fact that D is an already known solution in S.
The algorithm carries out a random walk from D, and arrives at another internal
point within S. We ensure that the random walk always stays within the bounds of
S; thus, the arrival point corresponds to an acceptable value assignment to all the
variables in X.
In addition, in order to minimize the correlation of the destination point to the
original data D, the Random Walk algorithm is processed in an iterative manner.
As the number of iterations increases, the probability distribution of the location of
the final destination tends to be uniform [73]. Figure 5.3(a) illustrates the intuition
behind the random walk approach. The bounded polyhedron in the figure represents
the solution space defined by Q˜. The first random walk segment starts from D and
arrives at Y1. Subsequently, the i
th random walk segment arrives at Yi. After five
rounds of random walks, Y5 represents the final value substitutions for the variables in
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X. In the process of random walking, in order to ensure Yi is still within the solution
space, according to [73], Yi is a selected as a random point in the line segment between












Figure 5.3: Illustration of random walk algorithm
5.4.1 Random walk
We now elaborate on how to take a particular random walk within the solution space.
Let X be the current position vector. Each random walk iteration is characterized
by two parameters: the direction of the walk, ∆X, and the length of the walk in that
direction, denoted θ. The position vector X + θ ·∆X gives the destination point for
that random walk iteration. In the following we describe the derivation of ∆X and
θ:
• Walking direction ∆X. Let ∆X = (∆x1 ∆x2 . . . ∆xn). First, n numbers are
randomly chosen from a normal distribution to form a directional vector. Then,
the directional vector is normalized to a unit vector and returned.
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• Walking length θ. Once the walking direction ∆X is determined, an upper
bound of walking length in the chosen direction is determined. The walking
length should not be greater than the upper bound, lest the random walk arrive
at a destination outside the solution space. We denote this upper bound as l.
The walking length θ is then randomly and uniformly chosen from the interval
[0, l]. Figure 5.3(b) shows the maximum walking length l in the chosen direction,
with the ending point D′ landing on the boundary of S.
In order to find the value of θ, we first need to determine the upper bound thereof,
l. In the following, we provide an efficient procedure for calculating the value of l.
In short, the algorithm needs to solve |Q|+ |H| inequalities, each of them containing
only θ as a unknown variable. Thus, the time complexity of the value substitution
algorithm is O(|Q˜|).
5.4.2 Maximum walking length
The upper bound value l corresponds to the maximum possible walking length θ of a




ci,jxj ≤ λi (5.2)
To calculate l, we convert the linear inequalities in Q to a set of linear equalities




ci,j · xj + vi = λi (5.3)
where vi ≥ 0
Let V be the set of all slack variables, i.e. V = {v1, . . . , v|Q|}. Then (X, V )
represents the vector for all the variables in the system.
Similar to the defined walking direction ∆X for the variables in X, we can also in-
troduce a direction vector for the slack variables V , i.e. ∆V = (∆v1 ∆v2 . . . ∆v|Q|).
Then (∆X,∆V ) = (∆x1 . . . ∆xn ∆v1 . . . ∆v|Q|) is the direction vector in a partic-
ular random walk. In the following, we try to express each ∆vi in terms of ∆X.
As the destination of the random walk is within S, the following equation holds
after the random walk:
1≤j≤n∑
j
ci,j(xj + θ ·∆xj) + (vi + θ ·∆vi) = λi (5.4)
From Equations 5.3 and 5.4, we derive:
1≤j≤n∑
j
ci,j∆xj +∆vi = 0 (5.5)






Since V T ≥ 0 is always required and the values in X should always be in their
predefined ranges, the following system of inequalities can be formed:


V + θ ·∆V ≥ 0
γ1 ≤ X + θ ·∆X ≤ γ1
(5.7)
The only variable in the above system of inequalities is θ, thus the system can be
solved efficiently. Let [θmin, θmax] be the interval that defines the feasible range of θ
in the above system. The value of l is then defined as l = max{0, θmax}.
5.5 Table Anonymization
The anonymization scheme we have developed applies to 1D data vectors. In this
section, we generalize it to the multi-dimensional case, so as to anonymize a table.
In a nutshell, our approach is to anonymize each QI attribute column independently.
Moreover, instead of treating a single column as a single 1D data set, we can parti-
tion it to segments, and treat each segment independently of the others; this approach
confers a gain of efficiency without compromising our privacy and utility objectives.
We emphasize that this partitioning does not aim to contribute to the anonymiza-
tion itself, as partitioning does in generalization-based approaches, whose goal is to
minimize a utility metric while satisfying a privacy guarantee. In our context, parti-
tioning is only a mechanism to assist in defining PoIs conveniently and processing the
data efficiently. It is not essential to our scheme. In effect, we allow the data owner
to form partitions for the data so as to extract properties more conveniently. This
partitioning divides properties to be defined in the following categories:
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• In-partition properties These are properties that only involve data values within
a single partition. For example, assume that, in a high school final exam, the
teacher keeps records of the scores of students in class A and class B. If the
teacher only wants the students in each class to learn how well they perform
relative to each other (i.e. not learning the exact scores), she can form two
partitions based on the classes and extract in-partition properties.
• Cross-partitions properties These are properties that involve the data values
from two or more partitions. In the above exam scores example, if the teacher
wishes to study how well the students in class A perform relative to class B,
she can extract cross-partitions properties where each property involves a score
from class A and another one from class B.
5.6 Measuring Privacy
From the point of view of a data owner, our algorithm offers full flexibility in terms
of PoI definitions. The PoIs can be of any linear form and size. However, as each PoI
captures a linear relationship associated to data values, a very large set of PoIs may
set too restrictive constraints for the anonymization. In fact, such tight constraints
may result in the anonymized data looking undesirably similar to the original data. To
avoid such a state of affairs, the data owner needs to make wise judgments about the
balance between the desired utility and privacy by controlling the number of defined
PoIs. This way of striking a balance between utility and privacy comes in contrast to
the conventional approaches. Generalization-based models such as k-anonymity and
ℓ-diversity define a certain privacy goal that has to be satisfied. For these privacy-
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driven schemes, meeting the assigned privacy goal is the prime objective of anony-
mization, while utility should be preserved to the extent possible. By contrast, our
methodology allows the owner to define interesting utility-motivated properties first,
and the prime goal of anonymization is the preservation of the defined properties.
Instead of being privacy-driven, our anonymizaton scheme is utility-driven.
Nevertheless, even while our scheme does not afford a predefined privacy guar-
antee, as privacy-driven schemes do, a question of measuring the privacy it affords
does arise. An appropriate measure of privacy depends on the information that we
consider vulnerable to a privacy threat. One such privacy threat concerns the very
presence of an individual in the anonymized table. This kind of privacy threat is
treated by the k-anonymity model. Still, this privacy threat does not arise with our
scheme, as the exact quasi-identifying attribute values of each individual present in
the data are distorted. An adversary cannot certainly link a given known tuple to a
certain EC, as it happens in generalization-based anonymization. A more interesting
privacy threat concerns the disclosure of sensitive information about an individual in
the anonymized data. This threat arises when each individual’s tuple in the data is
associated with a sensitive attribute SA, which has to be published along with data for
use in data mining tasks. This type of threat is treated by models such as ℓ-diversity
and t-closeness. We focus our attention on this privacy threat.
We assume that each tuple t ∈ T in the relational data is associated with an
SA value st ∈ V , where V is the domain of SA. Our publication method can then
publish the value st of each tuple t after the randomization process. We envisage
an adversary who possesses the background knowledge of the QI value vector xt of
t and attempts to gain knowledge of st, as in [59, 55]. By the data publication
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methods followed in the generalization-based models of [59, 55], the adversary is
able to identify at least one generalized group (equivalence class) G where the target
record t may belong, and would attempt to infer or gain confidence about the likely
SA value of t by taking into consideration the set of SA represented in G. Still, by our
publication method, there are no groups where a tuple may belong to identify. By
its nature, our approach is more akin to (but less arbitrary than) perturbation-based
schemes than to generalization-based ones as far as the conceptualization of privacy
is concerned. It provides a middle ground between the randomness of the former
and the structural clarity of the latter. Yet the potential of identifying that a given
known tuple certainly belongs to a given Equivalence Class, as with generalization-
based models, simply does not arise. Therefore, we cannot design a privacy property
in relation to such a potential. However, we do study the general potential of an
adversary making correct inferences using data anonymized by our method.
We focus on a particular type adversary who gains confidence about the SA value
of t by inspecting the published data in the vicinity of xt, having the background
knowledge of xt. We envisage an adversary who follows this course of action. Such
an adversary would be able identify the nearest neighbors (NNs) to the position of xt
in the multidimensional space defined by the QI attributes. Such neighbors can be
derived by normalizing the domains of QI attributes and then calculating Euclidean
distances from xt to the tuples published after the random walk process. Armed with
no other background knowledge, our hypothetical adversary would only be able to
surmise that t’s SA value may be the same as that of one of the NNs to xt.
Confronted with such a hypothetical adversary, our anonymization method would
entail a potential privacy leak in case the adversary is led to a correct inference
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following the above guessing process. Thus, our method may potentially expose
sensitive information to the extent that the SA value st of a tuple t is the same as that
of one or more of the nearest neighbors to the original position xt of t, in the published
relational data, after randomization. Let nkt be the k
th nearest neighbor to the original,
pre-random-walk position of tuple t, among the post-random-walk relational data, and
skt = snkt be its SA value. The state of affairs that may present a privacy threat in
terms of sensitive attribute value disclosure under these circumstances is one where
st = s
k
t for one or more relatively small values of k. The tuple t itself will be one
among the nearest neighbors to its original position xt, while there may be more tuples
of the same SA value in the vicinity of xt that find themselves among the nearest
neighbors to xt after the random walk process. In a case of high concentrations of
tuples with the same SA value in nearby locations in the original data, circumstances
such as the above will arise and present a privacy problem. However, exactly the
same privacy problem arises with generalization-based methods as well. In such a
case of high concentration of same-SA tuples, an enforcement of ℓ-diversity on the
data is presented with an acute problem too; it needs to severely hamper data utility
by creating very large ECs to accommodate for such high concentrations. Yet, in
practical real-world data such high concentrations do not usually arise, and do not
constitute the most interesting cases. In the real-world data we use in our experiments
there exists a multitude of SA values whose frequencies in the overall table do not
exceed 14.7%.
From the preceding discussion it follows that the privacy our model affords over
a certain piece of anonymized data can be articulated in terms of the distribution
of value k, such that st = s
k
t , among all the tuples t ∈ T in the original table.
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Furthermore, a particular indicator of the privacy our method affords for a particular
tuple r is the lowest value of k such that st = s
k
t . We define this value as follows:
kt = min{k|st = skt } (5.8)
Given a certain anonymized form T ∗ of a table T , we can measure the kt value
for each tuple t ∈ T , and provide the distribution of these values (i.e., the number
of occurrences of each kt value) among all tuples in T . Furthermore, we can also
provide the distribution of all k values such that st = s
k
t (i.e., for each k, the number
of instances in which the kth post-random-walk nearest neighbor to xt has the same
SA value as t) among all tuples t ∈ T .
In our experimental section we present results for these two methods of assessing
the privacy our method attains.
5.7 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we conduct an extensive experimental evaluation of our pattern-
preserving anonymization scheme, using both real and synthetic data. Our first data
set is a sample of the IPUMS USA census data1 for the year 2008. It consists of
75K data records; we extract four attributes therefrom, namely Age, Birth place, and
Occupation as QIs. Our second data set is a synthetic one created by the randdataset
tool2. We create a table with 3 columns and 10K rows, where the columns are in-




experiments possible for both data sets, we assume that the three columns in the
synthetic data set are normalized values of Age, Birth place, Occupation and Income,
respectively. To compare with ℓ-diversity algorithm in both utility and privacy, we
employ the Adult dataset3. We extract the first 30K tuples from the dataset, and
treat the numerical attributes Age, Final weight and Education years as QIs and
incorporate the categorical attribute Occupation as the sensitive attribute.
We divide our experimental study in four parts. In the first part, we evaluate
the running time of our method and its information loss with respect to the number
of applied locality constraints. For our information loss evaluation, we employ a
simple information loss metric called distortion. In the second part of our study, we
compare the utility preservation achieved by our method to a random perturbation-
based scheme using k-means clustering; the ground of comparison is the degree in
which these two anonymization schemes preserve relative distance. In the third part
of our study, we compare our approach to a ℓ-diversity technique; the ground of
comparison now is the accuracy of aggregate queries answers using the anonymized
data these techniques generate. Last, in the fourth part of our study, we evaluate the
privacy guarantee offered by the same anonymized data in the third part of experiment
based on the discussion in Section 5.6. All experiments ran on a 3GHz CPU PC with




5.7.1 Running time and information loss
In our first experiment, we measure the runtime of our algorithm for locality extrac-
tion and value substitution. In the evaluation for the locality extraction phase, we
focus on how the runtime increases with respect to the size of a partition for the Age
attribute. We increase the partition size from 100 to 900, and measure the average
time for extracting all the localities with Algorithm 5. The domain of attribute any
A, [γAmin, γ
A
max] is taken as the range between the minimum and maximum values of
A in the original data in each partition. Without repeating, this domain definition
for an attribute is also used for the rest experiments. Figure 5.4(a) plots our results
for both census and synthetic data sets. As expected, the time grows quadratically
in partition size. However, for quite large partition size (e.g. 900), the runtime for
all the localities to be extracted is still within 90 seconds. Thus, our partitioning
approach performs locality extraction within reasonable time. This is due to the fact
that our approach avoids running the quadratic algorithm on the full data set size








































(a) Properties extraction time (b) Value substitution time
Figure 5.4: Algorithm runtime
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In our next experiment, we fix the partition size to be 100 and take 4, 000 itera-
tions of random walks, run the property extraction algorithm and randomly sample
a number out of the set of all localities produced. We emphasize that the random
character of this sampling aims to prevent experimental bias. We denote the percent-
age of sampled PoIs as σ. Then, we run our value substitution algorithm with the
chosen set of localities as constraints. We measure the runtime required for the value
substitution phase with respect to the percentage of sampled PoIs σ. Figure 5.4(b)
shows our results. Not surprisingly, the runtime for value substitution grows linearly
















Figure 5.5: PoIs size w.r.t. distortion
We also study the effect that the number of PoIs has on the distribution of the
anonymized data in relation to the original ones. We expect that the more constraints
we define, i.e., the more rigorous the delimitation of variables in X, the closer the
anonymized data will get to the original one. To assess the amount of distortion the
original data table T undergoes due to its anonymization to T A, we define a distance
metric between them, Dst(T , T A) as follows:
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m · n (5.9)
Intuitively, this metric measures the average relative error in each entry of the
anonymized data with respect to the original data. Figure 5.5 shows our experimental
results for both data sets. As expected, the distortion decreases as a function of the
size of PoIs it adheres to. Thus, the number of defined PoIs expresses the position
in the privacy/utility trade-off where we stand. Previous research has intensively






























































































(c) 6-clustering (d) 8-clustering










































































































(c) Query 3 (d) Query 4
Figure 5.7: Answering aggregate queries
5.7.2 Locality preservation
In this experiment, we evaluate the degree to which our method preserves local-
ity properties. In order to assess this quality, we perform a popular data mining
operation, k-means clustering, over the anonymized data set. We produce anonymi-
zed forms T A of the same original data table T using our approach, and a random
perturbation-based scheme [4], while ensuring that both of them effect the same
amount of distortion measure on the data; to that end, we first set the size of ran-
domly sampled PoIs σ for our scheme and measure the distortion Dst it effects on the
156
data; then, we tune the perturbation interval of [4] so that it effects the same (or less)
amount of distortion Dst′, such that Dst−ǫ < Dst′ < Dst on the data, allowing for a
small (negative) divergence ǫ. To avoid experimental bias, we ensure that our scheme
is always the one that effects the most distortion. Contrary to generalization-based
schemes, both of these approaches maintain exact data values, hence their results are
amenable to clustering. We compare the clustering results on these two anonymized
forms. As grounds of assessment we use the following clustering error metric:




|Ci(T ) ∪ Ci(T A)| − |Ci(T ) ∩ Ci(T A)|
where Ci(T ) and Ci(T A) are the sets of data records in the ith cluster based
on the original data T and the anonymized data T A, respectively. The clustering
error measures the percentage of data records that fail to be grouped in the correct
cluster due to anonymization. We measure the clustering error as a function of the
size of sampled PoIs σ for our pattern-preserving scheme, which defines the amount
of effected distortion for both compared methods. We set the partition size to 100,
and random walk iterations to 4000. The results are shown in Figure 5.6, with four
different values of the k parameter in k-means clustering, for both the census (c) and
synthetic (s) data set. As the figure shows, our scheme consistently outperforms the
one based on random perturbation. In all four cases, when the σ value reaches 8×10−3,
the clustering error with our approach falls below 10%. This result verifies that our
scheme truly preserves locality much more faithfully than random perturbation under
the same amount of distortion.
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5.7.3 Answering aggregate queries
Next, we study the suitability of using the anonymized data generated with our
approach for answering aggregate queries. The dataset used in this and the next
experiment is the Adult dataset. As explained earlier, the Occupation attribute is
taken as the sensitive attribute so as to enable a comparison against schemes following
the ℓ-diversity model. We compared the results derived with our scheme against the
generalization-based Mondrian algorithm for ℓ-diversity [51]. The sensitive attribute
Occupation (Occ) in the data has 14 distinct values, while the QI attributes Age,
Final weight (Fw) and Education years (Edu) take integer values in the following
intervals [17, 95], [12285, 1484705] and [1, 16] respectively. We design four types of
aggregate queries for query answering over the Adult data. Since there are three QI
attributes in the dataset, we design one average query for each of the attributes with
the predicates on other attributes. In addition, a count query is also designed with
the predicates for all the attributes. These queries are:
• Query 1: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T WHERE Age > τage AND Fw > τfw
AND Edu > τedu
• Query 2: SELECT AVG(Age) FROM T WHERE Fw > τfw AND Edu > τedu
AND (Occ = o1 OR . . . OR Occ = ob)
• Query 3: SELECT AVG(Fw) FROM T WHERE Age > τage AND Edu > τedu
AND (Occ = o1 OR . . . OR Occ = ob)
• Query 4: SELECT AVG(Edu) FROM T WHERE Age > τage and Fw > τfw
AND (Occ = o1 OR . . . OR Occ = ob)
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For each query instance, the parameters τage, τfw and τedu take the values that
are randomly and uniformly chosen from the domain of attributes Age, Fw and Edu
respectively. The parameters {o1, . . . , ob} are a random subset of all possible occu-
pation values of size b, where b is a random integer from the interval [1, 14]. The
first query counts the number of tuples that satisfy the three range conditions on
the QI attributes. Each of the next three queries asks for the average value of one
QI attribute based on predicates on other QI attributes and the sensitive attribute
Occ. To compare pattern preserving anonymization against ℓ-diversity based on a
common ground, we obtain anonymized data having the same amount of distortion
by the two algorithms, and evaluate the query performance under various SELECT
conditions by varying the parameters; we average the accuracy results for each query.
The accuracy of a query answer is gauged by the relative error
|φ−φA|
φ
, where φ (φA)
is the query answer based on the original data (anonymized data). In the following,
we explain the details of the experiment.
We first anonymize the Adult dataset using generalization with ℓ = 4, 6, 8, 10 and
12. We measure the relative errors obtained with generalization with respect to the
distortion (Equation 5.9). In order to measure the distortion of generalized data,
we assume that attribute values are uniformly distributed within each EC group,
and select the mean value of each attribute within the EC as its representative value.
Using this method, for each version of anonymized dataset T ℓ under a particular value
of ℓ, we can compute a distortion value Dstℓ . Then, for each Dstℓ value, we gradually
tune (via random removals and additions) the amount of PoIs σ used in our approach
(and hence the distortion of the anonymized data it generates), until we arrive at an
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anonymized data set having the same or just a bit more distortion than Dstℓ. In
the pattern preserving anonymization process, the partition size is set to 20, and the
number of random walking iterations is set to 40, 000. We found that the σ values
used for achieving the same amount of distortion as generalization are 0.05, 0.08,
0.12, 0.14 and 0.17, for the corresponding ℓ values 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 respectively. After
obtaining anonymized datasets having the same amount of distortion by Mondrian for
ℓ-diversity and our algorithm, we create 2,000 instances for each of the four queries,
and execute them over these anonymized datasets. When estimating the answers to
range predicates with ℓ-diversed data, again we assume that QI values are uniformly
distributed within their ECs, and calculate the estimates accordingly. For example,
when we execute the range predicate age> 27 over an EC G with age range [20, 30],





Our results on the effectiveness of answering aggregate queries are shown in Fig-
ure 5.7. We observe that for all the four queries, the results over the datasets obtained
by pattern preserving anonymization are more accurate than those over the data ob-
tained under an ℓ-diversity condition, even though both data have the same distortion.
This result shows that our pattern-preserving method and the associated publication
form preserves more practical utility than the Mondrian generalization-based publi-
cation method, even under the same distortion. We also observe that, as we increase
the value of σ, the relative error in aggregate queries is reduced. This result justi-
fies the use of pattern-preserving method for utility control, even for the purpose of
preserving the aggregate properties of the data. We deduce that our approach does
not present a disadvantage even in a domain where generalization-based approaches























































































(c) kt when σ = 0.12 (d) kt when σ = 0.14
Figure 5.8: The distribution of kt = min{k|st = skt }
data. Overall, our last two experiments verify that, the more PoIs are preserved, the
higher the accuracy gained in other data analysis tasks.
5.7.4 Privacy measure experiments
We now assess the anonymized data produced by our privacy-preserving scheme in
terms of the sensitive-value-aware metrics we have introduced in Section 5.6, over
real data. In this experiment, we use the same anonymized datasets generated in
our last experiment (Section 5.7.3) by pattern preserving annonymization with σ =
0.05, 0.08, 0.12 and 0.14, which have same distortion as the datasets anonymized by























































































(c) k when σ = 0.12 (d) k when σ = 0.14
Figure 5.9: The distribution of k such that st = s
k
t
anonymized dataset in terms of the privacy benchmarks discussed in Section 5.6, i.e.,
by means of: (i) the distributions of the ordinal number of the first post-random-walk
(i.e., anonymized-data) nearest neighbor kt to the pre-random-walk (i.e., original-
data) position xt of a tuple t having the same SA value as t; and (ii) the distribution
of the ordinal numbers of any post-random-walk nearest neighbor k to the original
position xt of t having the same SA value as t. We study these distributions and
discuss their privacy implications for the adversary model introduced in Section 5.6.
For each pattern-preserving anonymized form of the data, T A, we examine the
sensitive values of the nearest neighbors, in T A, to the original position xt of each
tuple t ∈ T . For the sake of clarity, we only show the results for the first 30 neighbors.
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We obtain two groups of figures, showing the distributions of ordinal nearest-neighbor
numbers kt and k, respectively.
In the first group of results, shown in Figure 5.8, the frequency of occurrences
of the kt ordinal number, where kt = min{k|st = skt }, decreases as a function of kt.
This result indicates that, among all nearest-neighbors (NN) to the original position
of a tuple xt, the first NN is the single NN most likely to have the same sensitive
value st as t (which implies that it may be the post-random walk image of t itself).
However, this maximum frequency never exceeds 15% in our experiments. Besides,
this frequency of appearances of kt = 1 gets larger as σ increases, since a larger σ
value implies less distortion, hence it becomes more likely that the very first NN to xt
has SA value st. In effect, an adversary that looks at pattern-preserving-anonymized
data having the same distortion as ℓ-diversified data for ℓ = 12 (Figure 5.8(a)), and
assumes that a tuple t has the same SA value as the first NN to xt among these
data, will only make a correct guess with probability of less than 11%. While the
respective probability for ℓ-diversification with ℓ = 12 is 8.3%, the pattern-preserving-
anonymization method has the distinct qualitative advantage of publishing data in
an exact, instead of generalized form; hence, it gains the utility advantages we have
witnessed in Section 5.7.3.
In the second group of results, shown in Figure 5.9, the number of appearances of
k, such that st = s
k
t , is not lower than the number of appearances of kt, with k = kt.
This is due to the fact that there exist kth-nearest-neighbors to xt that have the same
SA value st as t (i.e., having their k number with respect to xt counted among the
appearances of that k value), but are not the first occurrence of a nearest neighbor
to xt that has this property (hence their k number with respect to xt is not counted
163
as an appearance of a kt value). Moreover, k = 1 still has the highest frequency in
most, yet not all, cases. This result implies that the first NN to xt is oftentimes the
one most likely to have the same SA as t.
Still, given the distribution of k, we can deduce the probability that any nearest-
neighbor (among the first 30 ones) to xt has the same SA value st as t, and hence arrive
to a more robust conclusion about the amount of privacy achieved by our method.
For example, when σ = 0.08 (Figure 5.9(a)), the highest frequency (corresponding to
k = 15) is about 11.05%. Then, an adversary who looks at any nearest neighbor to
xt (i.e., not necessarily the first) and tries to infer the SA value of t will only guess
correctly with probability of no more than 11.05%. This is the highest probability
that this course of action can result to in this case. Similar results apply to other σ
values. We also observe that as σ increases, k = 1 becomes more likely to be the one
that has the highest frequency. For instance, in this experiment, only when σ = 0.08
(Figure 5.9(a)), i.e. the smallest among all figures, the value k = 1 does not have the
highest frequency; this result indicates the high distortion of neighborhood relation-
ships. In all other cases (Figure 5.9(b)(c)(d)), the frequency for k = 1 outperforms all
other k values and gets larger with increasing σ. This observation conforms with fact
that larger σ implies less distortion, and hence has less impact over the neighborhood
relationships.
Overall, we conclude that pattern-preserving anonymization affords a sufficiently
low probability of correct SA value inference. We re-iterate that this is a utility-driven
method, and the privacy it affords is measured a posteriori, without conforming to
an a priori bound. We assert that this a-posteriori-measured privacy can satisfy
the requirements of real-world applications, while offering higher utility than other
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schemes in real-world tasks.
5.8 Summary
This work has proposed a simple, yet effective, methodology for data anonymization;
this model allows the data owner to publish exact, instead of generalized, values,
yet also preserve patterns among the data. The owner defines a set of properties of
interest in the form of linear inequalities, which the anonymized data, generated by a
random walk process, preserve. Compared to traditional privacy-driven approaches,
our approach is considered as utility-driven in the sense that the defined properties
are guaranteed to be preserved while the afforded privacy is subject to them. Our
experimental study verifies that data anonymized by our approach allows for better
or similar performance in data analysis tasks compared to data undergoing the same
distortion under other anonymization methods, while achieving comparable notions of
privacy even in terms of sensitive information. As future work, it would be interesting
to further study the relationship of our scheme to other anonymization schemes.
Various meaningful properties of interest that are critical to different data mining
tasks are yet to be exploited.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
Organizations often own useful data and there is often a need to publish them for
the common good of others or discovering valuable information for the organizations
themselves via data mining . However, privacy violation may occur if these published
data contains sensitive information of individuals. To address such a problem, re-
searchers have developed privacy preserving data publication schemes. We discussed
some of the problems that remain to be solved for publishing three mostly investigated
types of data in the privacy preserving data publication literature, namely set-valued,
social graph and relational data. We are further motivated to provide solutions for
some of these problems.
Before presenting solutions to the problems that we study, we reviewed the related
work on the anonymization of set-valued, social graph and relational data for data
publication, and highlighted how our work is different from others in Chapter 2. Then
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we process to expand the detailed problems of study and contributions of this thesis.
First, motivated by the fact maintaining low utility loss in set-valued data ano-
nymization is challenging due to its high dimensionality and that a nonreciprocal
generalization scheme has the potential of achieving better utility and privacy trade-
off, we proposed the first nonreciprocal anonymization scheme for set-valued data
(Chapter 3. Our scheme treats each record of a set-valued data as a binary array and
uses techniques such as Gray coding, TSP sort and dynamic partitioning to obtain an
order of the data that is ideal for utility preservation by nonreciprocal anonymization.
We have also proposed a closed-walk algorithm which is more efficient than the back-
tracking algorithm for the randomization of assignments, making the algorithm faster
in time than the back-tracking based approach. Further, our anonymization scheme
is enhanced with a novel data publishing model based on the bit edit distance to
allow more useful information to be preserved compared to conventional approaches.
We have used experiments over two real datasets to show that our proposed scheme
maintains lower information loss and higher accuracy to answering aggregate queries
than other reciprocal schemes.
Second, we studied the effects of using random edge perturbation as a scheme for
thwarting structural attack in social graph publication ( 4) as well as utility preser-
vation. Our work is motivated by the existing work which has shown the possibility
of recovering the original distribution for relational data after random perturbation.
Interestingly, random edge perturbation has been rejected as an effective method
for preventing structural attack of social graph data by the previous literature due
to the fact that the graph utilities such as density, degree distribution, and average
path length distort severely under random edge perturbation. Conversely, we have
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shown that by utilizing the statistical properties of random edge perturbation, esti-
mation algorithms can be designed to accurately recover the graph utilities from the
perturbed graph for several important graph metrics such as density, degree distribu-
tion, transitivity and modularity. Further, a generic framework for estimating other
graph utility metrics were discussed. We have also observed that by exploiting the
same statistical principle of random edge perturbation, the adversary can launch a
more sophisticated attack which is called the interval-walk attack, leading to a higher
success rate than the traditional walk-based attack. We have described the proce-
dures of this new attack, and suggested the condition to preventing this attack using
random edge perturbation. Moreover, to have an insight to the rate of success of an
even stronger attacker, who has the ability of enumerating all subgraphs in the social
graph data, we have also tried to analyze the generic structural attack. We have used
experiments with two real social graph data to verify the effectiveness of our utility
estimation algorithms, the feasibility of the interval-walk attack and conditions for
preventing it.
Third, we proposed utility driven anonymization of relational data 5. Our work
is motivated by the following two drawbacks in the current anonymization schemes:
first, current schemes based on generalization and random perturbation either blind
or destroy the mutual relationships between the data points, making the anonymized
data unsuitable for data mining tasks such as clustering or ranking; second, current
schemes offer the data owner very little flexibility in choosing what information to be
preserved in the anonymized data, so that the anonymized data may not meet the
need for data publication. We therefore have proposed a novel pattern preserving
anonymization paradigm that goes beyond existing concepts and addresses the above
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drawbacks. Specifically, in the first phase, our scheme allows the data owner to define
a set of Properties of Interest (PoIs), represented as a set linear relationships among
the data points, to describe the information that the data owner wishes to preserve
in the anonymized data. In the second phase, our randomization scheme based on
random walking allows the data to be sufficiently randomized while ensuring that
the owner’s predefined PoIs to be strictly preserved. Experiments with both real
and synthetic datasets have shown that the anonymized dataset produced by our
algorithm is ideal for clustering and answering aggregate queries while maintaining
similar privacy guarantee to generalization based schemes.
6.2 Future Work
In above chapters, we presented the details of our work in privacy protection for pub-
lishing set-valued, social graph, and relational data, respectively. Besides of the algo-
rithms and analysis, we experimentally evaluated the effectiveness of our approaches.
In future, we would like to extend the existing work in the following directions:
• Set-valued data anonymization For the work in Chapter 3, our first future
extension is to improve the running time efficiency of our algorithm. In our
proposed algorithm, as an approach to improve the utility preservation, we sort
the data into a total order based on Gray and TSP order prior to nonreciprocal
generalization. Normally, TSP sort is only feasible for small size of data. Due
to this reason, we designed a partitioning algorithm based on dynamic pro-
gramming to divide the data into chunks and run TSP sort independently over
each chunk. Although TSP sort is feasible over the chunks of data, it is still
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the most time consuming step in the whole algorithm. In future, we would like
to further improve the running time of our algorithm by using another more
efficient sorting algorithm while achieving similar or better utility preservation.
Our second future extension is to further improve the utility preservation under
a given privacy guarantee. Achieving high utility in anonymizing set-valued data
is challenging due to the fact that the dimensionality of the data is usually large
and high dimensionality is undesirable as the utility preservation concerns [1].
Although our nonreciprocal scheme performs better in utility preservation than
other state-of-the-art reciprocal schemes, the absolute data distortion is still
high. Thus, it is still meaningful to further improve the utility preservation.
Our preliminary idea is as follows: since final utility of the published data
is determined by the matching graph, we could make use of bipartite graph
matching algorithm such as Hungarian algorithm to obtain optimal matchings.
Although the use of Hungarian algorithm benefits the utility preservation, there
are still two issues in applying this algorithm. First, the time complexity of
Hungarian algorithm is O(n3), meaning the algorithm is slow in practice when
the size of the data is large. Second, the matching produced by Hungarian
algorithm is deterministic and there could be potential issues with privacy when
an algorithm is deterministic. We would like to solve the above two problems
and apply the Hungarian algorithm for even better utility and privacy tradeoff.
• Social graph data anonymization For the work in Chapter 4, our first future
extension is to perform more fine-grained analyze for the general structural
attack. In this work, we have proposed the interval-walk attack which is a
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stronger form of structural attack than the walk based attack. However, there
is still another even stronger attack which is called the general structural attack.
In this attack, the adversary owns unlimited computation power to enumerate
all subgraphs and selects the subgraph that is most similar to the embedded
subgraph, which maximizes his probability of success in attacking the social
network graph. In Section 4.5 we have analyzed the chance of success using
such attack under graph perturbation with some numerical results based on the
expected value of the probability of success. The drawback of our analysis is
that since the result is based on the expected value, it does not capture the
complete statistical properties of success rate for the general structural attack.
In future, we would like to express the Equation 4.28 in Section 4.5, which
is the probability of success for general structural attack, into a closed form
equation. By representing the equation into a closed form, we are then able
to more conveniently study its statistical properties and therefore have better
understanding to how effective the random perturbation is in preventing the
general structural attack.
Our second future extension is to design estimation algorithms for other impor-
tant graph utility metrics. Currently, we have provided estimation algorithms
for graph density, degree distribution, transitivity, and modularity. However,
the estimation algorithms for several other important graph utility metrics, such
as the diameter of the graph, the average path length, are still unknown. These
graph utility metrics are also important for general graph or social network
analysis [25]. Although we have provided a general framework for estimating
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other graph utility metrics, there is still drawback of expensive computation
cost with the general framework algorithm. The reason for the drawback is
that the algorithm may require the enumeration of sub-structures in the graph
for accurate estimation, which is known to be very expensive in cost. Therefore,
it is meaningful to design efficient estimation algorithms individually for those
important graph utility metrics.
Our third future extension is to study the error of the estimation algorithms.
Although we have experimentally shown that our estimation algorithms can
accurately recover several important graph utilities, there is no result for the
theoretical bound of error for the estimation algorithms for general graph util-
ities. Although We have analyzed the error bound for the graph density in
Equation 4.16 in sub-section 4.3.5, we still need to investigate the error bounds
for other utilities such as modularity, transitivity, and degree distribution. With
the theoretical error bounds, we can better understand how good our estimation
algorithms are in the worst case.
• Relational data anonymization Our first future extension for the work in
Chapter 5 is to explore more real life scenarios where our the proposed ano-
nymization framework is applicable. Compared other anonymization schemes
such as k-anonymity and l-diversity with which a user can only specify a single
parameter, our approach offers the user full flexibility in defining the informa-
tion, which is represented as PoIs, to be preserved in the anonymized data.
However, the flexibility also raises the question of what exact PoIs to be defined
in different application scenarios. In the experiment, we show that by random
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sampling of the PoIs, the anonymized data preserves better clustering informa-
tion compared to using random perturbation. In future work, we would like to
investigate more applications of our framework and their corresponding PoIs to
be defined in each scenario.
Our second future extension is to define intuitive privacy model for our anony-
mization scheme. The benefit of our scheme is to allow utilities to be defined
prior to anonymization and ensure the preservation of defined utilities during
anonymization. However, due to the emphasis on the utility side, we are still
not able to define intuitive privacy metrics that is easily measurable. Although
we provide a method for measuring the amount of privacy in the anonymized
data based on the change of distributions in the nearest neighbors of records,
this metric is still not as easily interpretable as k-anonymity which simply en-
sures that the probability of a victim of being re-identified is not higher than
1
k
. We would like to define a similar metric for our scheme as future work.
Our third future extension is to generalize the idea of pattern preservation to
develop anonymization schemes for other types of data. Our current algorithm
only works for relational data. However, there are similar issues which require
the preservation of patterns in other types of data such as set-valued data and
social graph data. For example, in transactional data it would be meaningful
to preserve the association between different items for data mining and in so-
cial network it is meaningful to preserve the community structures for social
network analysis. Our two stages algorithm, i.e. patterns extraction and values
substitution, can be adapted to work for other types of data.
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